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The boundaries of my language signify the borders of my world. 
-- Ludwig Wittgenstein1 
 
Introduction:  The Limits of Language  
 Legal phrases, maxims and rules often enhance efficient dispute resolution by 
providing intellectual hooks on which to hang analysis, as well as mental handles with 
which to arrange otherwise complex arguments.  Like the questions we ask, the language 
of the law can shape the choices ultimately made by arbitrators and judges.  
 Words can beget misunderstanding as well as insight, however.  Expressions 
which bear multiple meanings often find themselves employed with promiscuous 
disregard to context and function.   
 The disorienting effect of language finds illustration in the principle that 
arbitrators may rule on their own authority.  Often expressed as Kompetenz-Kompetenz2 
                                                 
1  Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.  LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1921), at § 5.6.  In the original, the 
juxtaposition of boundaries (Grenzen) and the verb to signify (bedeuten) is particularly 
striking, since linguistic meaning usually grounds itself in distinctions and demarcation.  
An Austrian philosopher who taught at Cambridge in the early 20th century, Wittgenstein 
continues to influence legal theory in certain quarters.  See EDUARDO SILVA ROMERO, 
WITTGENSTEIN ET LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (2002), § 271 at 353-355; PROTRACTATUS, 
AN EARLY VERSION OF TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (B.F. McGuinness, T. 
Nyberg &  G. H. von Wright, eds., D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuiness, trans., 1971); 
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (Pierre Klossowski, trans., 1961), providing a 
slightly nuanced rendering of the cited phrase, “Les limites de mon langage signifient les 
limites de mon propre monde.” Id. at 86. 
2  Normally interchangeable, compétence-compétence and Kompetenz-Kompetenz often 
take their usage by the speaker’s preference for a German or a French formulation.  
Given a slight scholarly preference for the German phrase, that formulation will be used 
in this paper.  See generally Pierre Mayer, L'Autonomie de l'arbitre dans l'appréciation de 
sa propre compétence, 217 RECUEIL DES COURS 320 (Académie de droit international de 
La Haye 1989); Emmanuel Gaillard, L’effet negative de la competence-compétence, in 
ÉTUDES DE PROCÉDURES ET D’ARBITRAGE EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET 
385 (J. Haldy, J-M. Rapp & P. Ferrari, eds., 1999); ADAM SAMUEL, JURISDICTIONAL 
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Chs. 4 & 5, 177-274 (1989).   
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(literally “jurisdiction on jurisdiction”), the precept has been applied to questions such as 
who must arbitrate, what must be arbitrated, and which powers arbitrators may exercise.3 
As we shall see, this much-vexed principle possesses a chameleon-like quality that 
changes color according to the national and institutional background of its application.  
 The basic rule that arbitrators may decide on their own jurisdiction says nothing 
about who ultimately decides a particular case.  Rather, the rule states only that the 
question of “who decides what” may itself be addressed by an arbitrator.  At least until a 
competent court directs otherwise, arbitral proceedings need not stop just because one 
side challenges the arbitrator’s authority.  
 To say that arbitrators may make jurisdictional decisions tells only part of the 
story.4  Every jurisdictional ruling by an arbitrator begs two further questions, one 
relating to timing and the other to finality.  
 The timing question asks when judges should intervene in the arbitral process to 
monitor possible jurisdictional excess.  If an unhappy respondent denies having agreed to 
arbitrate, a court might be requested to declare the arbitration clause invalid.  Should a 
judge entertain a “mid-arbitration” request to stop the proceedings?  Or should the 
respondent be required to wait until an award has been rendered, and only then seek 
vacatur for alleged jurisdictional excess?   
 Each alternative carries its own risks and opportunities for mischief.  Delay in 
                                                 
3  When the very existence of the arbitration agreement is challenged, the term 
“arbitrator” may turn out to be a misnomer.  However, to avoid an unduly heavy style, 
discussions of arbitral jurisdiction often speak of “arbitrator” (rather than “alleged 
arbitrator”) even when that status remains an open question.  In that context, the term is 
used for convenience, with no intent to presume ultimate conclusions on the matter. 
4   While thoughts may be simultaneous, words remain sequential, creating a chronically 
inadequate container for legal truth, reminiscent of the “treasure in earthen vessels” 
mentioned in Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians (II Cor. 4:7). 
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judicial scrutiny can subject respondents to the expense of unauthorized proceedings 
before overreaching arbitrators.5  However, early access to courts increases opportunities 
for dilatory tactics.  In the business world, determining the scope of arbitration clauses 
may implicate time-consuming investigations into complex questions of fact and law 
related to matters such as agency relationships and the corporate veil.6   
 The second question relates to the effect that judges should give to arbitrators’ 
jurisdictional rulings.  In what circumstances (if any) should an arbitrator’s decision on 
his or her authority be final?   
 Legal systems differ on whether and when an arbitrator’s decision on his or her 
authority should foreclose judicial determination on the matter.  Some countries (notably 
the United States) implement the litigants’ agreement to have arbitral authority 
determined by the arbitrators themselves.  Judges, of course, must still ask what (if 
anything) the parties actually expected the arbitrator to decide.7  Assuming such an 
agreement exists, however, it will be respected.  
                                                 
5  Under some circumstances (depending on the applicable institutional rules and arbitral 
situs) the arbitrators may award costs against the losing party, including attorneys’ fees.  
Not always, however, as proven by recent American case law.  See CIT Project Finance v. 
Credit Suisse First Boston, 799 NYS2d 159, 2004 WL 2941331 (2004), holding an award 
of attorneys’ fees to be permissible only if explicitly provided in the parties’ agreement.   
6  See e.g., Intergen v. Grina, 344 F. 3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (litigation between two parent 
entities, neither of which had signed arbitration clause, with one side seeking a “plaintiff 
friendly” court); Bridas v. Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2006) (government 
manipulation of oil company made it the state’s alter ego); Sarhank v. Oracle Corp., 404 
F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005) (parent should not answer pursuant to arbitration clause signed by 
subsidiary); Kazakhstan v. Istil Group, [2006] EWHC 448 (Comm.) Queen’s Bench 
(vacating award against Kazakhstan for lack of substantive jurisdiction.); Fluor Daniel 
Intercontinental  v. General Electric Co., 1999 WL 637236 (SDNY, 20 August 1999) 
(estoppel required signatories of arbitration clauses to arbitrate with non-signatory).   
7  In many instances the question will be more along the lines of what the parties 
expectations would have been had they given the matter any thought. 
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 Other countries (notably Germany) seem to preclude such agreements to arbitrate 
arbitrability.  This approach sacrifices liberty of contract in order to provide an extra 
measure of protection against inadvertent loss of the proverbial day in court.    
 This dual line of inquiry, looking at timing of judicial intervention and effect of 
arbitral determinations, can remove much of the mystification afflicting jurisdictional 
discourse in arbitration law.  From a policy perspective, the correct answers will not 
always be self-evident.  However, asking the right questions, rather than simply reciting a 
catch-phrase, permits attention to costs and benefits of each alternative, enhancing the 
transactional security and economic cooperation that can be facilitated by arbitration.8 
I. The Basics 
A. An Anti-sabotage Mechanism 
1. The Principle in Primitive Form 
 In its most primitive form, the principle that arbitrators may rule on their 
                                                 
8  While the rationale for arbitration varies according to context, its core value lies in the 
same principles that justify freedom of contract.  Business managers can negotiate a “fix 
to fit the fuss” as people in the American South say.  For international contracts, 
arbitration enhances neutrality (and thus predictability) and secures a significant treaty 
enforcement mechanism.  In business-to-business transactions, arbitration can facilitate 
access to expertise, particularly in construction and reinsurance.  By contrast, the 
motivator for American consumer arbitration often lies in avoiding jury trial.  This does 
not mean that arbitration commends itself for all agreements.  See Theodore Eisenberg 
and Geoff Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante 
Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts (30 August 2006), Cornell 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, which studies more than two thousand contracts 
contained as exhibits in 2002 for Form 8-K SEC filings, required under American 
securities laws for material events.  The study finds that only 11 % of the contracts 
included arbitration clauses.  The highest rates were to be found at 37% and 33% for 
employment and licensing contracts respectively.    
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jurisdiction serves as a measure to protect against having an arbitration derailed before it 
begins.  The arbitral tribunal (and/or the relevant arbitral institution) need not halt the 
proceedings just because one side questions its authority.  The principle reduces the 
prospect that proceedings will be derailed through a simple allegation that an arbitration 
clause is unenforceable, due to any number of contract law defenses.  In most legal 
systems,9 arbitrators can get on with their work until ordered to stop by a judge with 
authority to do so.10   
 The rule is not foolproof, of course, given the eternal ingenuity with which fools 
often acquit themselves.  Recalcitrant parties can still mount troublesome court 
                                                 
9  Exceptions do exist, however.  In China, for example, the power to rule on the validity 
of an arbitration agreement is given to “the arbitration commission” (which is to say, the 
supervisory arbitral institution) rather than the arbitrators.  The assumption seems to be 
that ad hoc arbitration does not take place in China.  Article 20 of the Arbitration Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (effective 1 September 1995) provides, “If a party 
challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement, he may request the arbitration 
commission to make a decision or apply to the People’s Court for a ruling.  If one party 
requests the arbitration commission to make a decision and the other party applies to the 
People’s Court for a ruling, the People’s Court shall give a ruling.”  See translation in 
CHENG DEJUN, MICHAEL J. MOSER, & WANG SHENGCHANG, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2nd edn, 2000), at 727.  Article 26 of the same 
statute provides that an arbitration agreement must designate an “arbitration 
commission”.  While this term clearly includes Chinese arbitration institutions, it is not 
entirely certainly to what extent foreign associations fall within its purview.  See 
discussion in Jingzhou Tao, Articles 16 and 18 of the PRC Arbitration Law, 
23 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL (2007), forthcoming. 
10  Anti-arbitration injunctions issued by courts with questionable authority over the 
arbitration raise issues beyond the scope of this paper.  See Emmanuel Gaillard, 
Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration, in Pervasive 
Problems in International Arbitration 203 (L. Mistelis & J. Lew, eds. 2006).  See also 
Hakeem Seriki, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Arbitration:  A Final Nail in the Coffin?, 23(1) 
J. INT’L ARB. 2 (2006).  For the time being, let us assume that a Massachusetts court 
monitors an arbitration taking place in Boston, that a Paris judge is asked to recognize an 
award rendered against a French company, or that a Swiss judge is called to enforce an 
award by attaching assets in a Geneva bank.  We can leave for another day the 
circumstances under which a court in Mumbai or Karachi might attempt to enjoin an 
arbitration in London.  
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challenges (even if not ultimately successful) designed to slow the train.11  However, the 
principle does avoid conceptual barriers to arbitration that would exist if legal systems 
considered jurisdictional powers of judges and of arbitrators to be mutually exclusive.12   
 On occasion, analogies have been made between arbitral jurisdiction and the 
power of courts to construe constitutional provisions related to their authority.  Such 
comparisons should be resisted.  Few non-circular options exist for interpreting judicial 
authority, at least in western legal systems.  By contrast, in commercial arbitration the 
enforcement of arbitral authority (initially a matter of the litigants’ consent13) normally 
rests with national courts, which must undertake some investigation into the legitimacy of 
that authority as part of the enforcement process. 
2. Diversity:  The Timing and Impact of Court Intervention  
 Although most countries accept that a jurisdictional objection does not 
automatically stop an arbitration, little consensus exists on other aspects of an arbitrator’s 
                                                 
11  See generally PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD, & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, 
TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1996), Sections 660-682; W. 
LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK, & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3rd ed, 2000), at 48-49 & 512-515; W. MICHAEL REISMAN, W. 
LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (1997), at 524-540 & 645-664; Antonias Dimolitsa, Autonomie et 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 1998 Rev. arb. 305. 
12 While few modern legal systems follow such an approach, vestiges can still be found in 
some court decisions.  See MBNA America Bank v. Loretta Credit, 281 Kansas 655 
(2006), discussed infra.  
13  Without such consent, there would be insufficient connections to the parties or 
transaction sufficient to justify any jurisdiction at all.  The state does, of course, provide 
support for the parties’ agreement, principally in the form of judicial enforcement of the 
award, conditioned on the respect for minimum standards of procedural fairness.  The 
consent underlying arbitration remains qualitatively different from the implied 
submission to government courts that arguably results from living in society.  Arbitration 
agreements empower a particular adjudicator to decide specific questions with respect to 
a limited number of persons, constrained by a contractually-conferred mission. 
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ruling on his or her authority.  National practice diverges in both (i) the timing of court 
examination of arbitral authority and (ii) the impact that an arbitrator’s jurisdictional 
ruling will have in a judicial proceeding.  
 Diversity results from the fact that an arbitrator’s jurisdictional power, at least in 
commercial arbitration,14 derives from national law and institutional rules,15 not from the 
treaty framework imposed by the New York Convention.16  Consequently, the expression 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz has thus taken on several lives, giving rise to a constellation of 
related but distinct notions, often subject to undue mystification.17  While commentators 
sometimes refer to “the internationally recognized doctrine” of Kompetenz-Kompetenz,18 
                                                 
14  A different regime obtains for investment arbitration under the ICSID Rules, under 
which awards are subject to review not by national courts, but by an internal annulment 
process.  See Article 52 of the 1965 Washington Convention.  Treaty foundations also 
exist for other supra-national adjudicatory bodies, such as the European Court of Justice, 
the International Court of Justice, and the European Court on Human Rights.   
15  For institutional incarnations of the principle, see e.g., ICC Rules Article 6, 
UNCITRAL Rules Article 21, AAA International Rules Article 15, LCIA Rules Article 23 
and ICSID Rules Article 41.  
16 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1958).  Twenty four countries originally 
signed the Convention.  The rest have joined by accession or succession.  The most recent 
adherents include Afghanistan, Liberia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, bringing 
to one hundred thirty-eight (138) the total number of countries bound by the treaty.  
Although the Convention requires courts to respect arbitration agreements and awards, 
grounds for invalidating an arbitration clause lie with national law.  For example, Article 
V(1)(a) speaks of the parties incapacity “under the law applicable to them” or the 
agreement’s invalidity under “the law to which the parties have subjected it.”  In this, the 
Convention is not unlike Section 2 of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, which leaves the 
validity of an arbitration agreement to state contract law. 
17  Unfortunately, more than one symposium has given the principle an unfortunate 
oversimplification, with sweeping generalizations that derive either from the ignorance of 
a novice or (in some instances) the polemical mischief of someone who knows better but 
for ideological reasons suggests that “international jurisdictional standards” represents a 
synonym for the way things are done in France. 
18  DAVID JOSEPH, JURISDICTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THEIR 
ENFORCEMENT (2005), Section 13.23, at 392.  Compare Laurent Lévy, Anti-Suit 
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it would be more accurate to speak of doctrines in the plural.19  Variations derive both 
from disparate implementations of the principle and from divergent views on what 
exactly is meant by a “jurisdictional question”.20   
 To illustrate, if German courts are asked to hear a matter which one side asserts is 
subject to arbitration, they would decide immediately on the validity and scope of the 
arbitration agreement.21  In neighboring France, challenge of arbitration clauses must 
normally wait until an award has been rendered.22    
 Across the Channel in England, litigants have a right to declaratory decisions on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Injunctions Issued by Arbitrtors, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBIRTRATION 115 (E. Gaillard, ed. 2005) suggesting that “in upholding their 
jurisdiction, arbitrators implicitly declare than any other court .. is prevented from ruling 
on the same matter.”  Id. at 117.  While consistent with French doctrine, this position 
would not represent expectations of most American arbitrators, familiar with possible 
judicial decisions on jurisdiction during arbitral proceedings.  Other perspectives in this 
collection of essays on anti-suit injunctions include contributions by Axel Baum, Frédéric 
Bachand, Matthieu de Boisséson, José Carlos Fernnández Rozas, Philippe Fouchard, 
Christopher Greenwood, Konstantinos Kerameus, Julian Lew, Michael Schneider and 
Steven Schwebel. 
19  In some literature, it has also been suggested that so-called “anti-suit injunctions” 
issued against arbitration violate the principle that arbitrators determine their own 
jurisdiction.  See Emmanuel Gaillard, Il est interdit d’interdire, 2004 REV. ARB.  47 
(2004), discussed infra.  The usefulness of such a perspective depends on what version of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principles are taken as a standard baseline.   
20  As models for various wrinkles on the problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the current 
paper focuses on the law of six legal systems:  England, France, Germany, Switzerland, 
the United States and the UNCITRAL Model Law.  This selection was made to further 
analytic clarity, and in no way implies a lack of interest or importance with respect to 
other legal systems.   
21 ZPO, Section 1032(1).    
22  NCPC, Article 1458.  In some countries, notably Greece, distinctions seem to be made 
between decisions confirming jurisdiction (review permitted) and denying jurisdiction 
(review not permitted).  See STELIOS KOUSSOULIS, JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2000) at 59-62.   
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arbitral authority only if they take no part in the arbitration.23  In Germany the 
admissibility of such applications depends on whether the arbitral tribunal has already 
been constituted.24  By contrast, it seems that courts may entertain applications for 
jurisdictional declarations at any time in Sweden25 and in Finland.26   
 In Switzerland, courts asked to appoint an arbitrator will normally apply a prima 
facie standard in deciding whether the arbitration clause is valid, but engage in full 
consideration of jurisdiction (at least as to law) in the context of award review.27  
American courts, however, may order full examination of the validity of an arbitration 
clause at any stage of the arbitral process to determine whether, as a matter of fact and 
law, the parties have indeed agreed to arbitrate.28   
 The United States generally permits parties to give arbitrators the final word on 
some aspects of arbitral power.29  A similar result would seem to obtain in Finland.30  In 
                                                 
23  1996 English Arbitration Act, Section 72.  
24  ZPO, Section1032(2), permitting applications only before the tribunal’s constitution. 
25  1999 Swedish Arbitration Act, Section 2, discussed in Kaj Hobér, Arbitration Reform 
in Sweden, 17 ARB. INT’L 351 (2001) at 357-58; Christopher Seppälä, Comment on 
Section 2 of the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 Dealing with the Right of Arbitrators to 
Rule on their Own Jurisdiction, in THE SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT OF 1999 FIVE YEARS 
ON:  A CRITICAL REVIEW OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 45 (Lars Heuman & Sigvard 
Jarvin, eds. 2006). 
26  Petri Taivalkoski, Le nouveau droit finlandais de l’arbitrage international, in 
RECHERCHE SUR L’ARBITRAGE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARÉ 126 (1997).  
Making reference to Section 50 of the 1992 Arbitration Act (23 October 1992/967), Dr. 
Taivalkoski writes, “Quant à la demande principale concernant la validité de la 
convention d’arbitrage, le droit finlandais prévoit la possibilité d’intenter une action 
déclaratoire de nullité contre la convention d’arbitrage indépendamment de toute action 
au fond.”  Id. at 158 .  
27  LDIP, Articles 7 and 179(3). 
28  Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp. 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000). 
29  See discussion of First Options, infra. 
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other countries, however, the effect of such agreements remains far from clear.31 
 In light of this multiplicity of applications, the temptation exists to suggest that 
the term Kompetenz-Kompetenz be exiled from the arbitration lexicon, and that scholars 
abandon any hope of rationalizing the principle.  Such radical change would be ill-
advised, however.  Only the most compelling reasons justify banishment of time-honored 
notions.32  The remedy for confusion will normally lie in a fuller appreciation of the 
contextual application of the term, a task to which we now turn. 
 The modest suggestions of this paper are threefold.  First, discourse about arbitral 
jurisdiction suffers considerable damage through loose jargon divorced from specific 
national practice.  What matters is when courts examine the parties’ actual agreements 
about arbitral authority and the effect (if any) that judge give those agreements.  Second, 
agreements to submit jurisdictional questions to arbitration should be honored but not 
presumed.  Finally, although arguments about the timing of judicial intervention remain 
finely balanced, the weightier considerations argue for postponing most jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 Gustaf Möller, The Arbitration Agreement, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION IN 
FINLAND 7 (Finnish Arbitration Association 2004), noting as follows: “[T]he parties may 
by a separate arbitration agreement confer on the arbitrators the power to finally 
determine the matter of jurisdiction in a final and binding award.  A specific separate 
arbitration agreement as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal will give the tribunal 
the power to decide this question and has the effect that a party expressly waives his right 
to challenge the award on jurisdiction.  Conversely, if the arbitral tribunal – subjectg to a 
specific agreement to make a final decision on jurisdiction – finds that it has no 
jurisdiction, such decision would be final.”  Id. at 17.  
31  See discussion of jurisdictional agreements in German law, infra.   
32 One recalls the words of Jean Portalis, an illustrious author of the French Civil Code: 
Tout ce qui est ancien a été nouveau; l'essentiel est d'imprimer aux institutions nouvelles 
le caractère de permanence et de stabilité qui puisse leur garantir le droit de devenir 
anciennes.  (“All which is old was once new; the essential is to imprint on new 
institutions the character of permanence and stability capable of guaranteeing their right 
to become old.”)  Discours préliminaire sur le projet de Code civil (1804). 
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inquiry until after the award has been rendered.   
B. Judicial Intervention:  When and to What Extent? 
1. The Shadow of Public Power 
 On its face, Kompetenz-Kompetenz addresses the powers of arbitrators, in 
particular their right to make jurisdictional rulings.  The flip side of the equation, 
however, reveals a rule about courts, and the limitations on judges’ ability to hear certain 
matters imposed when litigants decide (or allegedly decide) to submit controverted 
questions to private dispute resolution.  This reverse perspective highlights the heart of 
understanding how the principle works in practice. 
 Although private, arbitration proceeds in the shadow of public coercion.  
Arbitrators have no marshals or sheriffs, and thus parties often ask judges to stay 
litigation, compel arbitral proceedings, seize assets or grant res judicata effect to an 
award so as to preclude competing court actions.  The contours of arbitral power thus 
concern not only arbitrator and litigants, but also national legal systems which must 
establish guidelines for when and to what extent courts may intervene to review or to pre-
empt the arbitrator’s jurisdictional ruling.    
 From the perspective of a national legal system, challenges to an arbitrator’s 
authority raise two distinct questions.  The first relates to the point in the arbitral process 
when courts ought to examine arbitral authority to prevent or correct an excess of 
jurisdiction.33  The second addresses the matter of when (if ever) courts should defer to 
an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determination as final.   
                                                 
33  The somewhat awkward phraseology, “preventing or correcting” imposes itself by 
virtue of the fact that judges sometimes intervene at the beginning of the process (to 
compel arbitration or to consider competing court litigation) and sometimes at the end (to 
review awards).  
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2. Timing  
 The first inquiry concerns the timing of judicial intervention.  Paradigms range 
from the American approach (courts may intervene at any moment) to the French model 
(courts wait until after an award is rendered).  The difference becomes significant when 
one side to the dispute makes application to a court with supervisory (curial) competence 
over the arbitration, asking that the proceedings be stopped or that a case be heard 
notwithstanding an alleged arbitration clause.34   
 Between these two extremes, many legal systems provide hybrid timing solutions 
that vary according to the specific posture in which arbitral jurisdiction has been 
challenged.  One standard might apply when a legal action is brought in respect of 
matters purportedly referred to arbitration.  Another standard might pertain to motion for 
declaratory judicial determination of preliminary jurisdictional questions.  Distinctions 
might be made depending on whether the applicant has or has not taken part in the 
arbitration.35   
3. Effect of an Arbitrator’s Determination  
 The other question relates to the effect of an arbitration agreement on 
jurisdictional questions.  A legal system might take the position that all arbitral decisions 
                                                 
34  On the costs and benefits of different timing options, see Christopher Seppälä, 
Comment on Section 2 of the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 Dealing with the Right of 
Arbitrators to Rule on their Own Jurisdiction, in THE SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT OF 
1999 FIVE YEARS ON:  A CRITICAL REVIEW OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 45 (Lars 
Heuman & Sigvard Jarvin, eds. 2006).   
35  In England, for example, one can see the interaction of 1996 Act Sections 9 (stay of 
legal proceedings in respect of matters referred to arbitration), 30 (jurisdiction to 
determine jurisdiction), 32 (application for judicial determination of preliminary 
questions) and 72 (person who takes no part in arbitration may apply for court 
declaration).  Compare the situation with respect to pre-award judicial intervention in 
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, all discussed infra.   
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on jurisdiction may be reviewed de novo by the appropriate court.36 However, such is not 
the only option, or even the most sensible one.  An alternative would be for courts to ask 
what jurisdictional matters the parties agreed the arbitrator would decide, and to defer 
accordingly.   
 Each option presents its own risks, requiring lawmakers to navigate between 
policy dangers much as Odysseus had to sail between Scylla and Charybdis.  If courts 
may defer to arbitrators on jurisdictional matters, intellectual sloppiness (or a desire to 
clear dockets) might lead judges to accept mere contract recitals rather than to engage in 
rigorous inquiry into what the parties really meant.  The other risk lies in undue rigidity, 
precluding recognition even of the litigants’ clearly expressed wishes for finality in 
arbitral determinations about jurisdiction issues.   
 In systems where courts may defer to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determination, 
judges must still examine arbitral authority.  However, the analysis takes place at a 
different level, asking whether the parties intended an arbitrator to have the last word on a 
particular jurisdictional issue.  The pertinent question is what the contract provides.37 
 With the obvious exception of challenges based on public policy (non-arbitrable 
subjects), analysis would normally focus on the parties’ pre-dispute intent.  Courts must 
examine the facts of each case as they bear on the parties’ pre-dispute expectations.  If 
                                                 
36  In most cases, courts will have the last word on jurisdiction, rendering misplaced the 
fretting about arbitrators’ “unfettered discretion” such as evidenced in Ottley v. 
Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F. 2d 882 (2d Cir. 1982) at 898 (Lombard, J., dissenting).  
37  The alternative of no judicial review does not necessarily conflict with the first and 
second timing alternatives.  It might be that an American court, examining jurisdiction 
early in the game when a motion is made to compel arbitration, comes to the conclusion 
that the parties intended for the relevant issue to be given to the arbitrator for decision.  
As discussed below, the two timing extremes are represented by the French model (which 
defers judicial intervention until the award stage) and the situation in the United States 
(where courts may address arbitral jurisdiction at any moment). 
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(and only if) the litigants intended arbitration of a particular jurisdictional question, the 
matter would be given to the arbitrator for ultimate disposition, not just an expression of 
preliminary views.  However, in all events courts would first look seriously at the parties’ 
expectations.   
 
4. A Cautionary Tale about an (Allegedly) Lazy Professor 
 The point about the binding nature of an agreement to arbitrate jurisdiction might 
be illustrated by the following scenario.  Imagine a publication dispute between a law 
journal and a learned professor.  Having written an article for the journal, the professor 
asserts that the editor agreed to pay a $1000 royalty.  On failure to pay, she files an 
arbitration claim based on what she believes to constitute a valid arbitration clause in the 
license to publish.   
 “No way!” the editor replies.  “On its face, the clause provides that an arbitrator 
has jurisdiction only over claims filed within thirty days after the dispute arises.  This 
lazy professor missed that deadline, having waited to file her claim on the 4th of July, 
more than two months after our early May disagreement on the matter.” 
 The professor sees things quite differently.  She replies that no differences arose 
until the middle of June.  She recalls no discussion in May, and challenges the editor’s 
recollection.   
 Primitive Kompetenz-Kompetenz notions would permit an arbitration to go 
forward notwithstanding the challenge, at least until a competent court directs otherwise.  
The French approach would go further, allowing an arbitrator to address his or her 
authority free from judicial interference until after an award has been rendered.   
 It might be that the author and the journal decide to establish an explicit process 
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by which to resolve their jurisdictional differences.  They sign a written agreement to 
have an arbitrator determine when the disagreement arose:  the first week of May or the 
middle of June.  They agree that the same proceeding will address entitlement to the 
$1000, and that both questions will be addressed by an eminent French scholar whom 
they jointly appoint as sole arbitrator.   
 After hearing the witnesses and reading the parties’ submissions, the arbitrator 
finds no evidence of a disagreement before the 15th of June.38  This means the author’s 
claim was timely filed on the 4th of July.  Further, the arbitrator finds that the editor did 
indeed agree to pay $1000 for the article.   
 Does any sound policy gives the editor a jurisdictional escape hatch?  Having 
agreed to submit the time limits to arbitration, why should the Editor be allowed to 
renege on the bargain and ask courts to decide de novo when the disagreement occurred?  
Although a judge might be skilled at weighing the evidence, the parties submitted the 
question to arbitrators.   
 Any such a second bite at the jurisdictional apple would seem inconsistent with 
the whole thrust of modern arbitration law, aims to give res judicata effect to arbitral 
awards based on valid agreements. Any arbitral award should, of course, be subject to 
challenge for jurisdictional infirmity, such as physical coercion or forgery in the 
arbitration clause.  However, an agreement accepted with informed consent, followed by 
fair proceedings, should bind both sides.  Having lost the arbitration, the editor should not 
be permitted to refuse the author her $1000 fee by re-opening the dispute.   Indeed, if the 
                                                 
38 The time limits in this scenario, we remember, are restrictions on arbitral authority, not 
statutes of limitations.  The latter remain substantive.  The hypothetical presumes that the 
challenge is launched against the right to arbitrate, not substantive recovery. 
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award is made abroad, refusal to grant recognition might well violate the New York 
Convention.  
 In this cautionary scenario, a particular issue (the date of the Editor/author 
disagreement) started out being characterized as “jurisdictional” but ended (by the 
parties’ consent) as a matter of the “substantive merits” in their dispute.  There is nothing 
unusual about such transformation.  Without going as far as the proverbial Humpty 
Dumpty,39 most thoughtful people accept that words have different meanings in different 
contexts, and that language would be misapplied if labels used against one background 
are transferred to another with no adjustment to take into account their function.40 
5. A Word on Procedural Context  
 The standards by which courts evaluate arbitration clauses often vary according to 
the procedural context in which the clauses present themselves.  Much depends on what 
might be called the “mechanics” of judicial review, with some countries applying 
different criteria to pre-award and post-award judicial scrutiny, to distinguish between 
prima facie and full review.  On occasion, legal systems permit jurisdictional challenges 
brought in the course of court actions (“stop the lawsuit so we can arbitrate”) but deny 
requests for declarations about ongoing arbitrations (“stop the arbitration because we 
                                                 
39  In an episode from the sequel to Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty asserted, 
“When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.”  
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1872).  The whimsical reference serves 
as a warning against careless vocabulary.   However, language can also be misapplied if 
labels in one context are transferred automatically to another, with no adjustment to take 
into account their purpose. 
40  Some things are said to go without saying.  Nevertheless, they may go much better 
with the saying.  For example, the word “run” can be used as a verb and noun, with quite 
different meanings, depending on its context.  When we have a head cold, our noses run.  
As a financial institution fails, there may be a run on the bank.     
 
 19 
should be in court”).41  In some instances a court will address jurisdiction differently 
depending on whether or not the arbitration has actually begun.42  Different rules might 
also apply according to whether the arbitration is conducted locally or abroad.43   
 Several scenarios merit consideration.  First, applications might be brought to 
review awards, either partial or final.  Such requests could be made at the place of 
arbitration (motions to vacate or to confirm an award) or at the enforcement situs 
(motions to recognize or to enforce an award).  Second, a respondent in a court action 
might assert an arbitration clause as a bar to a lawsuit brought on the merits of claim, 
usually for breach of contract.  Finally, a litigant considering that a dispute should be 
heard in court rather than in arbitration may petition for a judicial declaration (combined 
with an injunction in some countries) about the scope or validity of an arbitration clause.  
Such actions might be brought either before or during the arbitration. 
6. Review Standards 
 Differences relate not only to when and whether courts may address arbitral 
jurisdiction, but on the standards of review applied when they do examine the validity of 
the arbitration clause.  The most significant dividing line relates to whether the judge will 
                                                 
41 In systems that permit injunctions, like the United States, motions for declarations 
related to arbitrations would likely be combined with motions to enjoin or to compel the 
arbitral proceedings. 
42  See discussion of German ZPO Section 1032(2) and French NCPC Article 1458.  In 
many countries, of course, the various procedural postures are not always easily 
separated.  In the United States, for example, applications to stay lawsuits and motions to 
compel arbitration are often made before the same court at the same time.See e.g., 
Intergen v. Grina, 344 F. 3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003), 344 F. 3d 134, in which the defendants in 
a lawsuit moved both to compel arbitration and to stay legal proceedings.  See discussion 
in George Smith & Sarah Holloway, Intergen N.V. v. Grina:  Fundamental Contract 
Principles Trump Policy Favoring International Arbitration where Nonsignatories are 
Involved, 20 ADR & THE LAW 266 (AAA, 2006). 
43  Such seems to be the case in Switzerland, as discussed infra. 
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make a full inquiry into the parties’ intent, or simply a summary examination, applying 
what is sometimes called a prima facie standard. 
 For example, a seller might bring a judicial action to collect the price of an 
engine.  In response, the buyer (who alleges the engine was defective) might move to stay 
litigation, asserting that the parties had agreed to arbitrate their dispute.  The seller might 
reply with allegations that the arbitration clause was void.  
 In the alternative, the buyer might file an arbitration for product malfunction, 
alleging an engine explosion that caused personal injury and loss of profits.  Here it 
would be the seller (preferring to be in court) who asks a judge to address the validity and 
scope of the arbitration agreement, perhaps arguing that the person who signed the clause 
lacked authority, or that the clause was not broad enough to cover the tort action for 
personal injury or the financial claim for lost profits.  
 German law illustrates how these procedural postures evoke different judicial 
responses.  Courts in Germany would address challenges to the arbitration clause in the 
context of a lawsuit, with the buyer arguing that the claim should be heard by arbitrators.  
A judge could also hear the seller’s application (if brought before arbitration began) for a 
declaration that the arbitration clause was invalid.   However, if the arbitration was in 
progress (and no lawsuit had been brought), the arbitrators would simply rule on their 
own jurisdiction and proceed with the case.  Judicial pronouncement on the allegedly 
defective arbitration clause would await challenge to an award, whether partial or final.44   
 Matters get even more complicated in legal systems where different standards of 
                                                 
44  See German ZPO Article 1032(1) and Article 1032(2).  Applications for declaratory 
relief seem permitted only before the tribunal has been constituted.  Compare English 
Arbitration Act Section 9 and Section 72.   
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review apply according to the procedural posture of the arbitration.  French judges, for 
example, asked to hear a claim can address the validity of an arbitration clause only in the 
most superficial manner, and only in the event no arbitral tribunal has been constituted.  
At that point the court can ask whether the clause was clearly void (for example, the 
document might lack any signature), but must put off until later any more complex 
questions (such as disputes about whether the scope of the arbitration clause covers the 
dispute).45  Once the arbitration has started, however, judges must sit on their hands until 
the award is made, when they provide a full examination of alleged defects in the 
arbitration clause.46   
 In some countries, courts distinguish between arbitration held at home or abroad.  
Swiss courts, for example, make a full and comprehensive review of the validity of the 
arbitration clause when the arbitration has its seat abroad.  By contrast, when the 
arbitration is held in Switzerland, judges engage only in a summary examination of 
arbitral jurisdiction (examen sommaire).  Full review must wait until the award stage.   
 In other nations (such as the United States) courts engage in full examination of 
arbitral power regardless of whether the arbitration has begun, and irrespective of 
whether they are being asked to hear the merits of the claims.  The court might decide 
that the lawsuit should stop and the arbitration should proceed.  Or vice versa. Or, the 
court might pass this jurisdictional question back to the arbitrators themselves for their 
determination.   
                                                 
45 See also French NCPC Article 1458. 
46  NCPC, Article 1458, permitting pre-arbitration review only to determine if the 
arbitration clause is manifestment nulle.  Standards for judicial review are contained in 
other provisions, for example Article 1502 for international arbitration.  
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7. The Judge’s Role:  Preventive or Remedial? 
 As a general matter, pre-award requests for declarations and injunctions implicate 
a preventive role for courts.  The jurisdictional foundation of an arbitral proceeding must 
be monitored before anyone knows what the arbitrator will decide.  The arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction becomes an issue because judges are asked to make a respondent participate, 
or to tell a claimant that the arbitration lacks jurisdictional foundation.47    
 By contrast, when arbitral jurisdiction becomes an issue in the endgame, after an 
award is rendered, judges exercise a remedial function, correcting mistakes that allegedly 
occurred earlier in the arbitral process.  The validity of an award might be subject to 
judicial scrutiny at the arbitral seat, through motions to vacate or to confirm under local 
law.48  Or the award might be subject to scrutiny when presented for recognition abroad, 
by a winning claimant seeking to attach assets or a prevailing respondent asserting the 
award’s res judicata effect to block competing litigation.  Normally (but not always) the 
New York Arbitration Convention would be invoked.49  At this point, a different set of 
options present themselves.  Courts then face the choice of either giving effect to the 
                                                 
47  9 U.S.C. § 4 provides that courts may compel arbitration “upon being satisfied that the 
making of the agreement for arbitration …is not in issue.”   
48  9 U.S.C. § 10 permits vacatur of an award “where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers.”  For a U.S. Supreme Court pronouncement on determining arbitral jurisdiction 
at the award stage, see First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). In 
international cases, the New York Convention Article V provides that courts need not 
recognize an award if the arbitration agreement “is not valid” (Article V(1)(a)) or if the 
award “deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the 
submission to arbitration.”  (Article V(1)(c)).   
49  For a case where an award was found subject to neither the domestic provisions 
(Chapter 1) of the Federal Arbitration Act or the international provisions (Chapter 2), see 
Bechtel Co v. Department of Civil Aviation of Dubai, 360 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.D.C. 2005).  
For a case implicating both national statute and the New York Convention, see Yusuf 
Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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award (by confirmation, recognition or enforcement) or rejecting its validity (by vacatur 
or non-recognition).   
C. Three Meanings of Kompetenz-Kompetenz  
 When questions are raised about the validity or scope of a particular arbitration 
clause, one option would be for the arbitration to stop automatically, until matters have 
been clarified by a judge.  It is against this extreme position, which denies arbitrators any 
right at all to rule on their own authority, that one must begin to explore the various 
meanings of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.50 
 If a legal system does allow the arbitration to proceed in the face of a 
jurisdictional challenge, the story could unfold in several ways.  At least three different 
approaches might be envisaged. 
 First, the arbitrators might offer an opinion on the limits of their own authority, 
but without in any way restricting the court’s consideration of the same question.  
Although the arbitration does not necessarily stop, neither do related judicial actions.  
Courts proceed pursuant to whatever motions might be available under local law.   
 Second, courts could refrain from entertaining any jurisdictional motions until 
after an award had been rendered.  The arbitrators would then have the first word on 
jurisdiction.51 
                                                 
50  See e.g. the Kansas Supreme Court decision in MBNA America Bank v. Credit , 
discussed infra.  
51  As explained more fully below, some legal systems distinguish between judicial 
consideration of arbitral jurisdiction in connection with (i) request for a declaratory 
judgment and (ii) the context of a court action on the merits of the claim.  Moreover, 
distinctions are often made between applications that can be filed before, as opposed to 
after, an arbitral tribunal has been constituted.  Finally, varying evidentiary standards (full 
review as contrasted with summary examination) frequently apply depending on when 
(before or after the award is rendered) the court examines arbitral authority. 
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 The third meaning given to Kompetenz-Kompetenz requires that courts defer 
completely to an arbitrator’s decision about his or her own authority.  The arbitrator gets 
the last word as well as the first.  However, such a result requires that judges first 
determine that the parties did in fact agree to such finality.52     
1. No Automatic Stop to the Arbitration 
 Under the first hypothesis, the arbitrator’s right to make jurisdictional rulings 
operates in tandem with a rule allowing judges to examine an arbitrator’s jurisdiction 
before an award has been rendered.  In some countries, courts may step in from day one, 
at any time in almost any circumstance.53  In others, courts might have full power to 
address arbitral jurisdiction in the context of lawsuits on the merits of the claim, but only 
limited margin to maneuver through declaratory judgments.54   
 The arbitrator’s right to rule on jurisdiction holds significant practical value (at 
least for the party wishing to arbitrate) notwithstanding the possibility of court 
intervention.  A recalcitrant respondent cannot bring the proceedings to a halt just by 
                                                 
52 Depending on the legal system, judicial proceedings to address the finality of the 
arbitrator’s ruling could take place either before or after the award had been renderd.  
This question of timing would be a separate issue from the matter of finality. 
53  In the United States, for example, courts address arbitration questions in connection 
with motions to stay court proceedings or to compel arbitration, as well as to confirm or 
vacate awards.  Limits do exist on appellate review of lower court orders on arbitration.  
See 9 U.S.C. § 16.  For United States cases, see Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. 
E.F. Hutton, 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991) (courts determine whether contracts void 
because of signatory's lack of power to bind principals); Engalla v. Permanente Med. 
Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (malpractice claim against health care provider referred 
to ad hoc arbitration that left administration to the parties rather than independent 
institution; habitual delays in the process found to constitute evidence of fraud by health 
care provider).  See also Brake Masters Systems Inc., v. Gabbay, 206 Ariz. 360, 363 
(2003), stating, “Our arbitration statutes and the weight of authority from other 
jurisdictions allow either a pre-arbitration or a post-arbitration determination of 
arbitrability.”   
54  See German ZPO Section 1032(2). 
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challenging jurisdiction.55  Moreover, whether courts ultimately substitute their own 
views for those of the arbitrators depends on the facts of each case.  In some instances a 
judge might order the proceedings suspended, either permanently or until the 
jurisdictional facts have been determined.56  In others, the arbitration clause may be 
found to be robust enough to cover the controverted dispute.57   
 As mentioned, even in countries that permit courts to address arbitral jurisdiction 
before an award is rendered, distinctions are often made between judicial actions on the 
merits of a dispute (where a defendant asserts the action is preempted by an arbitration 
clause) and requests for declaratory judgments about potential or ongoing arbitrations 
(where a respondent asserts defects in the arbitration clause).  With respect to court 
actions on the merits, judges usually possess full power to address jurisdictional 
questions, particularly in countries following the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law.  
For declaratory decisions, however, the law sometimes limits the circumstances in which 
such applications may be made.58  
                                                 
55  See U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Howsam, Bazzle and First Options, discussed 
infra. For an English case expressing a similar view, see, e.g., Christopher Brown Ltd v. 
Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer, [1954] 1 Q.B. 8, stating that arbitrators 
whose authority is challenged are entitled to inquire into the merits of the jurisdictional 
issue, not for the purpose of binding the parties, but to satisfy themselves (as a 
preliminary matter) about whether they ought to proceed with the arbitration or not.  The 
same basic principle has been enacted into the 1996 English Arbitration Act at § 30, 
although the Act now provides timing limitations on judicial review.  See discussion of 
Act § 72, infra.   
56  See discussion infra of Sandvik v. Advent. 
57  See discussion infra of Pacificare v. Book. 
58  In England, only a person who takes no part in arbitration would normally be 
permitted to seek a court declaration on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.  1996 Arbitration 
Act, § 72.  In Germany an application for a court declaration on the arbitration clause 
may be made only before the arbitral tribunal is constituted.  Th arbitration proceedings, 
however, may still be commenced while the court action is pending.  See ZPO Section 
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 In this regard, it is important not to confuse the allocation of functions between 
arbitrators and the supervisory arbitral institution with the allocation of responsibility 
between arbitrators and national courts.  For example, under the Arbitration Rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, if the ICC Court is “prima facie satisfied” that an 
arbitration agreement may exist, any jurisdictional challenge of a deeper nature goes to 
the arbitrators. This does not mean, however, that national courts will be deprived of 
power to make jurisdictional determinations when asked to stay litigation, enjoin 
arbitration or vacate an award.59 
2. Giving Arbitrators the First Word 
 In other legal systems, recourse to courts must wait until the end of arbitration, 
after an award has been rendered.  This version of Kompetenz-Kompetenz lays down 
rules about the stages in the arbitral process at which judges may intervene.  The positive 
part of the principle addresses itself to arbitrators, permitting them to decide challenges to 
their own authority.  The so-called “negative effect” of the principle speaks to courts,60 
telling judge to wait until arbitration ends before inquiring about the validity or effect of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1032(3).  By contrast, in the United States courts may direct proceedings stayed during 
determination of issues on which arbitral jurisdiction depend.  See Sandvik AB v. Advent 
Int’l Corp. 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000). 
59  But see Apollo v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989), discussed infra, where the court 
relied in part on the ICC Rules to limit the court's own review function. When the 
defendant questioned whether the arbitration clause remained valid after contract 
assignment, the federal court turned the matter over to the arbitrators themselves.  
60  Emmanuel Gaillard, L’effet negative de la competence-compétence, in ÉTUDES DE 
PROCÉDURES ET D’ARBITRAGE EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET 385 (J. Haldy, 
J-M. Rapp & P. Ferrari, eds., 1999).  The “negative effect” might be considered as part of 
the arsenal of doctrinal tools to combat dilatory tactics of a party wishing to sabotage the 
proceedings.  See Emmanuel Gaillard, Les manoeuvres dilatoires des parties et des 
arbitres dans l’arbitrage commercial international, 1990 REV. ARB. 759.  
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an arbitration clause.61   
 Best exemplified by French law, this approach means that if an arbitrator has 
already begun to hear a matter, courts must decline to hear the case.  The judge has a 
limited jurisdiction to hear a case only if the arbitration has not begun, and only if the 
alleged arbitration agreement is found to be clearly void (manifestement nulle).  Given 
the importance of French doctrine in this field, the full text merits consideration:  
When a dispute which has been brought before an arbitral tribunal pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement is brought before a governmental court, the court must 
declare itself without jurisdiction.  If the dispute has not yet been brought before 
the arbitral tribunal, the court must also declare itself without jurisdiction unless 
the arbitration agreement is clearly void.62 
 
 At issue here is the timing, rather than the extent, of judicial review.  Going to 
court at the beginning of the proceedings can save expense for a defendant improperly 
joined to the arbitration.  On the other hand, judicial resources may be conserved by 
delaying review until the end of the process, by which time the parties might have settled.   
 Even in countries that allow judicial intervention before an award is rendered, a 
                                                 
61  The negative effect of arbitration clauses sometimes extends beyond jurisdictional 
matters, to judicial orders for provisional measures, see Elliott Geisinger, Les relations 
entre l’arbitrage commercial international et la justice étatiqe en matière de mesures 
provisionnelles, 127 SEMAINE JUDICIAIRE 375 (December 2005); JEAN-FRANÇOIS 
POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, DROIT COMPARÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL 
(2002), Section 6.3.2.2, at 554-555. 
62 See Article 1458, Nouveau code de procédure civile:   
Lorsqu’un litige dont un tribunal arbitral est saisi en vertu d’une convention d’arbitrage 
est porté devant une juridiction de l’État, celle-ci doit se déclarer incompétente.   Si le 
tribunal arbitral n’est pas encore saisi, la juridiction doit également se déclarer 
incompétente à moins que la convention d’arbitrage ne soit manifestement nulle.   
 
Although certain provisions of domestic French arbitration law do not apply to 
international arbitration, such is not the case for Art. 1458, which falls within Title I of 
Book IV of the NCPC.  See NCPC Art. 1507 and Décret du 12 mai 1981, Arts. 55 and 56, 
providing for non-application of certain provisions in Titles IV, V and VI. 
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core element of modern arbitration law resides in recognition of separate spheres of 
responsibility for courts and arbitrators.  Pale hints of the negative aspect of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz can be found, for example, in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision which 
adopted a “wait and see” approach with respect to public policy questions related to 
arbitration of treble damages claims.63 
 This is not to say, however, that the French timing mechanism itself has gained 
widespread acceptance.  Such across-the-board deference to arbitrators (or alleged 
arbitrators) commands no wide international consensus.  Outside the French hexagon, 
legal systems follow a more flexible and nuanced approach with respect to court 
intervention.  Significant departures from French practice can be seen not only in the 
United States, but also in important arbitral venues such as England, Sweden and 
Switzerland, as well as nations such as Germany which follow the UNCITRAL Model 
Arbitration Law.64   
 The point is not trivial, since scholars sometimes cloak the Gallic perspective with 
wider acceptance than may actually be the case.  Readers even encounter references to 
principles “generally recognized in comparative law”65 which, on closer examination, 
                                                 
63  See discussion infra of Pacificare v. Book. 
64  See discussion infra, Section I-D. 
65  See Emmanuel Gaillard, Il est interdit d’interdire, 2004 REV. ARB.  47 (2004),  
suggesting that anti-suit injunctions (courts prohibit lawsuits or arbitrations through 
contempt-of-court sanctions) “fail to recognize this principle very generally accepted in 
comparative law”. (Anti-suit injunctions “méconnaissent ce principe [compétence-
compétence] principe très généralement reconnu en droit comparé.”)  Id. para. 21, page 
61.  While not explicitly addressing “positive” (arbitrator rights) and “negative” (judicial 
restraint) principles, the essay’s context (court actions that trump arbitration) clearly 
infers reference to the latter.  The essay’s title derives from a leftist slogan (“It is 
forbidden to forbid”) of the May 1968 Paris uprisings, when university walls sported 
gems such as Ni Dieu ni maître! (Neither God nor master!), La lutte continue (The 
struggle continues) and Sexe, c'est bien, a dit Mao, mais pas trop souvent. (Sex is good, 
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describe nothing more than the parochial French approach (however commendable).  
Whatever the optimum policy might be on timing judicial intervention, the temptation to 
blur lines between the “is” and the “ought” of legal doctrine must be resisted.66 
3. The Arbitrator’s Decision is Final 
a) Jurisdiction as a Question of Substantive Merits 
 Regardless of when judges entertain motions on arbitral jurisdiction, the parties 
might agree, expressly or impliedly, to subject the jurisdictional question to arbitration.  
In legal systems following this third approach, jurisdictional questions themselves are 
considered capable of settlement by arbitration, pursuant to agreement by the parties.67  
                                                                                                                                                 
said Chairman Mao, but not too often).  Professor Gaillard presents a more subtle 
message in La reconnaissance, en droit Suisse, de la seconde moitié du principe d’effet 
négative de la compétence-compétence, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE & DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION:  LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 311 (2005) at 312: “La 
même unanimité [compétence des arbitres pour connaître de leur compétence] ne se 
retrouve pas en droit comparé lorsque la règle s’adresse non plus aux arbitres mais aux 
juridictions étatique.” (The same unanimity [jurisdiction on jurisdiction] does not appear 
in comparative law when the rule addresses itself to courts). 
66  As a policy matter, Professor Gaillard suggest that “anti-suit injunctions negate the 
very basis of arbitration, that is, the parties’ consent to submit their disputes to 
arbitration.”  See Emmanuel Gaillard, Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in 
International Arbitrtaion, in Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration 203 (L. 
Mistelis & J. Lew, eds. 2006), at 213.  While true in many cases, this approach might on 
occasion presume its own conclusion, in that some legal systems see the “basis of 
arbitration” as more limited than full party autonomy.  The policy underpinning for the 
“negative” jurisdictional principle was also summarized by Professor Gaillard in his 
contribution to the Briner Festschrift, cited supra: “Il convient également [en plus de 
permettre aux arbitres de poursuivre leur mission lorsque leur compétence est contestée] 
de s’assurer que le même contentieux ne puisse être aussitôt porté devant les juridictions 
étatiques qui, en l’absence de convention d’arbitrage, auraient été compétentes pour 
connaître le fond de l’affaire.” (One must also [in addition to allowing arbitrators to 
pursue their mission when jurisdiction is contested] provide that the same dispute is not 
brought before state courts which, in the absence of an arbitration clause, would be 
competent to address the merits of the matter.)  Id. at 312. 
67  On the notion of “merits” in an international arbitration, see Veijo Heiskanen, Dealing 
with Pandora:  The Concept of Merits in International Commercial Arbitration, 
forthcoming in ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL.  
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Under these circumstances, an arbitrator’s determination on his or her own authority will 
be final.  The parties’ agreement transforms the jurisdictional difference into a disputed 
question of fact or law, whose substantive merits the litigants submit to final 
determination by an arbitrator.68   
 The application of this line of reasoning will in all events depend on the facts of 
each case.  In some instances, the parties may indeed have agreed to submit a 
jurisdictional question to final and binding arbitration.  In other instances, an assertion 
that they have done so will be preposterous, unable to withstand analysis except by 
ignoring reality in favor of fiction.  The parties’ agreement, determined on a case-by-case 
basis, will determine whether this brand of Kompetenz-Kompetenz makes sense.  In each 
instance, the question for judges will be:  what did the parties intend to submit to 
arbitration?  
 Legal systems disagree on whether judges should ever be permitted to accord 
finality to an arbitrator’s decision on his or her authority, even on a finding of the parties’ 
prior consent.  In practice, giving arbitrators the last word on jurisdictional questions 
means that some litigants may well lose their access to court.  The peril derives not so 
much from isolated mistakes, whether by arbitrators or by courts, but from the risk that 
an overburdened judiciary might fall into a systematic proclivity toward granting 
jurisdictional authority to arbitrators, even when contracts are ambiguous on the matter.   
 Long gone are the days when judges exhibited blanket hostility to arbitration.  
Today, courts often perceive arbitration as a way to clear crowded dockets.  Even the best 
of judges may be tempted to exchange rigorous reasoning for the convenience of a 
                                                 
68  For an illustration, see the “cautionary tale” discussed infra in connection with the new 
German approach to Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
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finding that the parties really did want jurisdictional questions addressed by arbitrators.  
Such a tendency seems to have been a factor in recent changes in German law, which 
now reduces the prospect of never-bargained-for arbitrations by requiring that all 
questions of arbitral authority go to judges.69   
 This approach, however, may create even more problems than it resolves.  A 
judicial monopoly on final resolution of jurisdictional questions imposes serious 
restrictions on party autonomy, particularly among sophisticated business managers.  The 
result is a serious limit on the liberty of contract that has long bolstered healthy 
commercial transactions in free economies.   
b) German Doctrine:  Then and Now 
 Prior to Germany’s adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1998, court 
decisions had recognized that an arbitral tribunal might be granted the power to rule on 
its own jurisdiction pursuant to a specific clause, accepted by both parties, that implicitly 
dispensed with subsequent judicial review.  In a landmark decision, Germany’s highest 
court, the Bundesgerichthof, had decided that the parties to a commercial contract could 
submit the question of arbitral authority to final and binding arbitration.70  What the court 
called a Kompetenz-Kompetenz-Klausel, or “jurisdiction on jurisdiction clause”, was 
deemed sufficient to insulate the arbitrator’s decision on the matter from judicial scrutiny. 
 Currently, the prevailing opinion in Germany (both scholarly and judicial) seems 
                                                 
69  See references to work by Peter Schlosser and decisions of the BGH, discussed infra. 
70 BGH, 5 Mai 1977, III ZR 177/74.  Reported in 68 BGHZ 356, at 358.  See discussion 
in Peter Schlosser, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 
(1989) at § 556.  See generally, JAN K. SCHÄFER, RICHARD H. KREINDLER & REINMAR 
WOLFF, SHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT KOMPENDIUM FÜR DIE PRAXIS (2006), at §§ 191-193. 
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to hold that such Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses are invalid.  Germany case law has held 
that the parties may not restrict judges from examining arbitral jurisdiction in the context 
of challenges to either interim or final awards.71  Whether such a position constitutes 
sound doctrine remains open to debate, as discussed later. 
c) French and Swedish Perspectives 
 French law seems to include a more nuanced position with respect to the finality 
of an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determinations.72  Unlike Germany, France has known no 
marked break with prior case law, which may account for the fact that the Gallic position 
seems to be elaborated through scholarly comment.73  
                                                 
71  See BGH, 13 Januar 2005, III ZR 265/03.  Reported NJW 16/2005 at 1125.  The case 
states that a court may decide on arbitral jurisdiction without waiting for a preliminary 
award to be rendered under ZPO Section 1040 (the equivalent of Article 16 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law).  See also BGH decision (February 2006) reported in 2006 
SCHIEDSVZ 161, at 164, finding no violation of ordre public when jurisdiction was 
addressed only in a final (rather than preliminary) award, given that courts would have 
the opportunity to addres the matter then.  Review of a final award would normally be 
made underZPO Section 1059, while review of a preliminary jurisdictional award would 
proceed under ZPO Section 1040.  As discussed infra, other provisions of German law 
relevant to arbitral jurisdiction in other contexts include ZPO Article 1032(1) (courts 
before which an action is brought shall consider the validity of an arbitration clause 
raised as a defense to the action) and ZPO 1032(2) (application for determining the 
admissibility of arbitration may be brought prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal.)  
72  See e.g., Laurence Franc, Contractual Modification of Judicial Review of Arbitral 
Awards:  The French Position, 10  AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 215 (1999), suggesting that 
French law prohibits party agreement on any modification of judicial review.   
73  See PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD, & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, TRAITÉ DE 
L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1996), § 659 (at 414), asserting that the 
arbitral power to make jurisdictional rulings has “all too often” been understood as giving 
arbitrators power to decide alone on their authority, which would be “neither logical nor 
acceptable”.  (Trop souvent encore, le principe de la compétence-compétence est compris 
comme donnant aux arbitres le pouvoir de décider seuls de leur investiture, ce qui ne 
serait ni logique, ni acceptable.”)  The French original speaks of arbitral “investiture”, 
which might be interpreted as appointment, a narrower notion than jurisdiction.  
However, the English version clearly uses the term “jurisdiction”.  See FOUCHARD, 
GAILLARD & GOLDMAN (E. Gaillard & J. Savage, eds. 1999) at § 659 (page 400). 
 33 
 As a starting point, it is clear that the legal framework for judicial review of 
awards bears a mandatory character.  The grounds on which courts set awards aside 
(enumerated in Nouveau code de procedure civile) may not be abrogated by contract.74  
 Less evident, however, is the proposition that a ban on waiver of statutory 
annulment standards necessarily means limitation of the questions which by contract may 
be submitted for final determination by arbitrators.  What might be a jurisdictional 
question in some contexts could become a matter of the merits in an arbitration where 
both sides clearly submitted the issue to arbitration.   
 For example, one party to a bill of lading might contend that it incorporated by 
reference the arbitration clause in a related charter party.  Posed in those terms, the matter 
would normally be a jurisdictional question ultimately to be determined by courts.  
However, nothing in French law suggests that the two parties cannot, in a clear and 
distinct agreement, agree to be bound by an arbitrator’s determination on that question.  
 Sweden seems to take a similar position, albeit in a more explicit fashion.  After 
providing that arbitrators may rule on their own jurisdiction, Section 2 of the Swedish 
Arbitration Act adds that this principle “shall not prevent a court from determining such a 
question” and that the decision of arbitrators on their jurisdiction “is not binding” but 
rather subject to the full panoply of grounds for challenging awards.75  Again, it is not 
                                                 
74 For cases in which French courts have voided arbitration clauses attempting to change 
judicial review, see Cour d'appel de Paris, 27 Oct. 1994, Diseno v. Société Mendes, 1995 
Rev. Arb. 261.  See generally cases cited in FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN § 1597, 
speaking of the “mandatory nature” of the organization of challenge to  awards” (le 
caractère impératif de l’organisation des voies de recours).  For a critique of the logic of 
the French position, see Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the 
Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, at 454 n. 22 (2005). 
75  Arbitration Act 1999, 4 March1999.  See generally, Christopher Seppälä, Comment on 
Section 2 of the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 Dealing with the Right of Arbitrators to 
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certain that the mandatory nature of judicial review necessarily prohibits parties from 
submitting jurisdictional questions to arbitration if they so wish. 
d) The American “Arbitrability Question” 
 In the United States, a clear line of judicial pronouncements holds that in some 
situations arbitrators may rule on their own powers without subsequent de novo review 
by courts.  In the sense used by American courts, such grants of jurisdictional power are 
not legal fictions, but require evidence of the parties’ real intent expressed in concrete 
language either in the main contract or in a separate agreement.  
 Jurists from outside the United States may find the terminology unfamiliar.  Court 
decisions speak of the “arbitrability question” in the same way that the rest of the world 
refers to a jurisdictional issue.  If an “arbitrability question” has been submitted to 
arbitration, then courts defer to the arbitrator on the matter.   
 Admittedly, the words “Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause” do not figure in American 
cases.  However, after the “arbitrability question” decisions have been broken down and 
decorticated, one finds that judges in the United States have been using the same 
conceptual framework as the pre-1998 German cases.  In this context, one might recall 
how the middle-aged cloth merchant in Molière’s Bourgeois Gentilhomme learned, much 
to his delight, that he had actually been speaking prose all along, without ever being 
aware of this rhetorical skill.76  The difference, however, is that courts in the United 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rule on their Own Jurisdiction, in THE SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT OF 1999 FIVE YEARS 
ON:  A CRITICAL REVIEW OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (Lars Heuman & Sigvard 
Jarvin, eds. 2006; Symposium Proceedings, University of Stockholm, October 2004). 
76  Jean-Baptiste Poquelin (Molière), Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (The Would-Be 
Gentleman) (1670), Act II, Scene 4.  Monsieur Jourdain, a nouveau riche draper, has 
hired a philosophy teacher to increase his oratorical skill.  On learning that language 
which is not poetry is prose, the newly enlightened merchant exclaims with amazement 
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States seem happily oblivious to the link between American legal notions and the 
doctrines elaborated in the rest of the world to meet similar juridical problems. 
 In addressing jurisdiction, American courts sometimes say the issue is not only 
“who decides what,” but also “who decides who decides”.  This formulation provides 
another way of asking when arbitrators may determine the contours of their own 
decision-making authority.77 
 The American approach often involves the transformation of a jurisdictional 
matter (normally for courts) into the substantive merits in the arbitration itself (for the 
arbitrators).  Jurisdictional challenges usually relate to the arbitrator’s authority to decide 
an issue or to exercise a particular procedural power.  Once it has been determined that 
the parties agreed to entrust to the arbitrator the adjudication of disputes on such 
questions, then almost by definition the question is no longer one of jurisdiction.  
Arbitrators receive their power from the parties’ consent.  If a court decides that the 
parties asked the arbitrator to decide a matter (for example, time eligibility requirements 
for arbitration), then in essence this constitutes the court’s jurisdictional determination.  
 When the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate is disputed, however, courts 
will generally refuse to compel arbitration until they resolve whether the arbitration 
clause exists at all.78  In some events, the existence and content of the parties’ agreement 
                                                                                                                                                 
and pride, “Par ma foi! il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose sans que j'en 
susse rien.”  (“My Lord! For more than forty years I have been saying prose without 
knowing anything at all of the matter.”) 
77  See e.g., Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 287 
(1999).  See also discussion infra of First Options v. Kaplan. 
78 See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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may have to be determined by a jury.79 
 The recent decision in Alliance Bernstein Investment v. Schaffran80 illustrates the 
various ramifications of the American approach.  A former employee of a New York 
hedge fund alleged wrongful termination, claiming that he had been fired for cooperating 
with government investigations into wrongdoings by his employer.81   
 The employment relationship was subject to rules of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD), which provided for mandatory arbitration with one important 
exception:  claims of employment discrimination.82  Normally, the arbitration clause 
would have been invoked by the employer, on the assumption that juries tend to possess a 
more sympathetic predisposition toward employees.83   
                                                 
79  China Minmetals Materials Ltd. V. Chi Mei, 334 F.3d 274 (3d. Cir. 2003), involving 
allegations of a forged contract in a dispute about what (if anything) a New Jersey 
company (Chi Mei) agreed to sell to a Chinese corporation (Minmetals).   The court 
stated, “If there is doubt as to whether such an agreement exists, the matter, upon a proper 
and timely demand, should be submitted to a jury. Only when there is no genuine issue of 
fact concerning the formation of the agreement should the court decide as a matter of law 
that the parties did or did not enter into such an agreement.”  Id. at 281. 
80 445 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).  Contrary to the suggestion by some commentators, this 
case seems to be focused on jurisdiction from a contractual perspective, not subject 
matter arbitrability in the public policy sense.  Compare note in 17 WORLD ARB. & MED. 
REP. 171 (2006), at 172.   
81  In particular, the former employee asserted that his employer had violated the “whistle 
blower” provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.   
82 NASD Rule 10201(b) provides that “a claim alleging employment discrimination …in 
violation of a statute is not required to be arbitrated” unless the parties have explicitly 
agreed to arbitration of the discrimination action either before or after the dispute arose.  
In other words, the submission of a discrimination claim must be specific, rather than 
covered in a broad “blanket” arbitration clause covering disputes in general.  
83 Not all wrongful dismissals will be the result of discrimination.  For example, an 
employee might be wrongfully terminated because he is fired without reason in violation 
of his or her contract, or for a reason not otherwise permitted by law, such as reporting on 
the misbehavior of a boss.  Discrimination has traditionally been conceptualized as 
dismissal for reasons of bias based on race, religion or gender.  In this case, the question 
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 In this case roles were reversed.  For reasons that are not entirely clear from the 
face of the decision, the employer (not the employee) moved for a declaratory judgment 
that the “whistle blower” action (alleging retaliation for cooperation with government 
investigator) constituted an “employment discrimination” claim by the employee, and 
thus was not subject to arbitration.  The arbitrator’s authority thus depended on whether 
the employee’s claim could be characterized as an “allegation of discrimination” within 
the meaning of the NASD Rules.   
 The court did not see its role as deciding whether or not the arbitrator possessed 
jurisdiction to hear the claim.84  Rather, the question was who (judge or an arbitrator) 
would decide whether the allegations of termination for “whistle blowing” were subject 
to arbitration, or instead amounted to the type of discrimination claim that was carved out 
of the scope of the arbitration clause.85 
 The starting point for analysis lay in the relevant NASD Rules, under which the 
arbitrators were expressly “empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all 
provisions under the [NASD] Code” in a way that was “final and binding” on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
was whether the allegedly unfair termination (retaliation) was to be characterized as 
“discrimination” or simply a firing that was contrary to the law for other reasons. 
84  The claim of non-arbitrability related to the scope of a contract provision (NASD Rule 
10201), not any public policy limits on arbitration of “whistle-blower” claims.  If public 
policy had been at issue, the result would likely have been different.  
85  In its opening paragraph, the court stated that the issue before it was not “whether the 
claims must be arbitrated, but rather … who will decide the arbitrability question.”  445 
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).  The distinction is sometimes ignored.  A recent summary of 
Alliance Bernstein suggested that the case “held that an employee’s claim [for violation 
of the statute] is for an arbitrator to decide.  See 17 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 171 
(2006).  While the commentary later states the holding correctly, the introductory slip of 
the pen reveals a general tendency to conflate the two issues. 
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parties.86  The court’s job, therefore, was to ascertain what the parties meant by that 
language.87   
 According to the Second Circuit, a presumption exists that the parties would 
normally intend an “arbitrability question” to be determined by a judge.88  The 
presumption might, however, be overcome.89  To do so would require “clear and 
unmistakable” evidence that the parties wished the question to be decided by 
arbitrators.90  This intent could be found, for example, in a separate agreement providing 
for arbitration of “any and all controversies” including interpretation of the provisions of 
                                                 
86  NASD Rule 10324 provides, “The arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and 
determine the applicability of all provisions under this Code and to take appropriate 
action to obtain compliance with any ruling by the arbitrator(s).  Such interpretations and 
actions to obtain compliance shall be final and binding upon the parties.  
87  Since American contract law is generally a matter for states, the court normally looks 
to state law for guidance about the parties’ intent.  See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 
938, at 944 (1995); John Hancock Life Ins. v. Wilson, 254 F. 3d 48, at 53 (2d Cir. 2001).     
88  First Options, supra, at 944-45. 
89 See also PaineWebber v. Bybyk v. 81 F. 3d 1193 (1996), holding that whether an 
investor’s claims against a brokerage firm were subject to arbitration was a question for 
the arbitrators.  The matter in Bybyk involved NASD time limitations on eligibility for 
arbitrations.  Although the court on occasion referred loosely to these arbitration 
eligibility requirements as a “statute of limitations” the case did not concern a proper 
statute of limitations arising under the applicable law, which would clearly have been for 
the arbitrator.  See discussion of “admissibility” infra. 
90  Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F. 3d 205, at 208 (2d Cir. 2005).  The case 
at bar was covered by the American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration 
Rules (for domestic transactions), which provided in Rule R-7 that “the arbitrator shall 
have power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections to the 
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.”  One might note that this 
language could be subject to misinterpretation if the “arbitrability question” presented 
was whether one side had indeed signed the arbitration agreement.  Clearly, arbitrators 
cannot pull themselves up by their own jurisdictional bootstraps.  Question of “scope” of 
an arbitration clause (which might be subject to an arbitrator’s binding jurisdictional 
determination) must be distinguished from questions about who is a party (on which an 
arbitrator will rarely have the last word, absent a clear separate agreement on the matter, 
concluded by the very party contesting jurisdiction).  
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the relevant arbitration rules.91   
 In Alliance Bernstein the court was careful to keep close to the language of the 
arbitration provisions.  The language of the relevant rule did not provide for “any and all” 
matters to be arbitrated, but only for power to “interpret and determine the applicability 
of” provisions under the NASD code, which would include the scope of the exclusion for 
discrimination claims.92  Since there was no disagreement that both sides had accepted 
the NASD rules,93 the parties’ intent to arbitrate their differing interpretations of the rules 
could be ascertained from the four corners of the documentation before the court.  The 
arbitrator’s decision on this matter would not be subject to later judicial second guessing.  
Rather, the “whistle blower” claim would be subject to arbitration if, and only if, the 
arbitrator so determined.   
 The Court found the question of whether “whistle blower” claims were arbitrable 
was for the arbitrators, and thus insulated that finding from review for “excess of powers” 
under the Federal Arbitration Act.94  The award might well be attacked on other 
jurisdictional grounds, however.  For example, the arbitrator would still lack power if an 
irregularity could be found in signature of the agreement containing the reference to 
arbitration.  Perhaps the person who signed was not authorized to do so.   Or, the 
signature might have been compelled by a gun at the head.  Or, maybe the signature was 
                                                 
91  In cases where only one party to the dispute is a member of the NASD, a separate 
agreement would be required to indicate such a clear intent to arbitrate jurisdictional 
questions.  See John Hancock, 254 F. 3d at 54-55.   
92  NASD Rule 10324.  
93  The employer was a member of the NASD itself, and the employee had signed a so-
called “Form U-4” agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise 
between me and my firm … under the rules, constitutions or by-laws” of the NASD.    
94  9 U.S.C. § 10(4).   
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a forgery.  But the decision on jurisdiction over the “whistle blower” claim could not be 
disregarded because a judge later disagreed with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the 
rules.    
 Under this approach, once a precise question has clearly been delegated to an 
arbitrator, it ceases to be “jurisdictional” in the context of the case to which it is relevant.  
Since the arbitrator has been empowered to hear the matter, any further inquiry must be 
limited to “What did the arbitrator decide?”  That decision might relate to a matter which, 
in the abstract, would be characterized as jurisdictional.  However, the parties’ intent 
prevails, and the arbitrator will determine the matter in a final way.   
 Such allocation of functions between judges and arbitrators explains itself 
principally by reference to contract principles.95  Absent an express or implied waiver of 
the right to go to court, a litigant will not normally be denied recourse to otherwise 
competent tribunals.  But once such a waiver has been given in the form of an arbitration 
clause, it is hard to see why a litigant should be permitted to renege on this bargain to 
arbitrate.  
 Reasonable people, of course, might argue about what the parties had in mind 
when they made their bargain.  One judge might think that another judge got it wrong, or 
was misguided, in her reading of how the relevant arbitration rules or contract affected 
the questions that would be submitted to arbitration. But these debatable matters of fact, 
do not call into question the jurisdictional principle that the parties to a dispute may 
                                                 
95 Regulatory impulses also come into play, although usually only at the margins.  Even if 
the parties to a dispute authorize adjudication through arbitration, courts will hesitate to 
enforce private decision-making that runs afoul of public policy, either by virtue of 
touching subjects too sensitive to be removed from government tribunals (e.g., claims of 
discrimination) or because the decision-making process is tainted with bias or corruption. 
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empower arbitrators to decide controversies about the pre-conditions to arbitration. 
 American judges who review questions of jurisdiction must look beyond labels, 
and instead fix their scrutiny on the parties’ real deal.  If two litigants intended to submit 
a question to final and binding arbitration, then the arbitral determination holds, 
regardless of whether the question would initially have fallen within the arbitrator’s 
mission. In this sense, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause remains alive and well in the 
United States. 
 In defining “arbitrable questions”, courts are in the business of drawing lines 
between jurisdiction and merits, often in a manner that enlarges the arbitrator’s authority.  
Although issues of substance (merits of the dispute) and jurisdiction (arbitrator's right to 
hear the case) should be treated differently by courts, the two categories are not fixed 
immutably in the real world.  A particular question might be characterized as “substantive 
merits” in one dispute and “jurisdiction” in another.  If indeed the parties to an arbitration 
agreement clearly intend for a matter to be decided by arbitration, then a “jurisdictional” 
label would be inappropriate if it were to lead courts to usurp the arbitral function.  To 
ignore this possibility might, in some circumstances, put a country in breach of its New 
York Convention obligations.  The wrinkles on this topic are sizable, and thus it has been 
addressed in greater detail below in the discussion of the new German arbitration law. 
D. Paradigms and Hybrids:  Another Look at Timing  
1. Policy Concerns 
 Fixing the point in time for court intervention involves a relatively clear (albeit 
difficult) choice between costs and benefits related to the expenditure of either public or 
private resources.  Under one model, a party unhappy with having to arbitrate may go to 
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court at any moment for the purpose of contesting arbitral power.  Another paradigm, 
however, provides for court challenge of arbitral authority only after an award is 
rendered.   
 Court challenge to jurisdiction at the beginning of the process can save time and 
expense for the litigants.  If a judge finds the alleged arbitral clause to be void, or too 
narrow in scope to cover the dispute, then neither side need waste time or money in 
arbitration.  The parties are free to pursue their litigation in the appropriate judicial 
forum.   
 By contrast, government funds can be preserved by delaying judicial review until 
after the award has been rendered.  In many legal systems, similar or analogous concerns 
about economy of judicial resources impose restraints on appeal of interlocutory lower 
court decisions.96 
 If questions of authority are left to the end game, perhaps there will not even be a 
jurisdictional challenge in court.  The case might settle, or the party resisting arbitration 
might prevail.  And if the matter does go to court, the arbitrator may have done much of 
the intellectual heavy lifting, sorting facts and law to provide the reviewing judge a 
helpful analytic road-map.  
                                                 
96 See, e.g., Section 16 of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S. C.§ 16).  See also 
discussion of the “collateral order” doctrine in Lauro Lines SRL v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 
(1989) and Digital Equipoment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Ind., 511 U.S. 863 (1994).  See 
also 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b), involving appeal when an order involves “a controlling 
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion”.  See 
also, International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Local Lodge, 410 F.3d 
204 (5th Cir. 2005); ATAC Corp. v. Arthur Treacher's, Inc., 280 F.3d 1091 (6th Cir. 
2002); Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V Shropshire, 278 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2002).  For 
conversations on this topic, thanks are due to Ward Farnsworth, Gary Lawson and Louise 
Ellen Teitz. 
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2.  Extremes:  France and the United States 
a) United States 
 American arbitration law traditionally has given parties a right to raise a matter of 
arbitral authority at any time, whether before or after the award.  Such determinations 
would usually be made pursuant to litigation under Sections 3 and 4 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, providing for stay of court litigation and orders to compel arbitration.97  
 This approach means that a party who never agreed to arbitrate will not need to 
waste time and money in a proceeding that lacks an authoritative foundation.  Moreover, 
either side can request clarification about the scope of the arbitrator’s power before 
substantial sums are spent needlessly.  The prospect of award vacatur on jurisdictional 
grounds cannot be excluded, but it may be less likely to hang as a Sword of Damocles in 
cases of obvious jurisdictional defect. 
b) France 
 By contrast, the French model delays court consideration of jurisdictional matters 
until the award review stage.98  This approach reduces the prospect of dilatory tactics 
designed to derail an arbitration.  A bad-faith respondent will be less able to add the cost 
of a court challenge at the same time that the arbitration is going forward.99 
                                                 
97  See generally discussion in Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton, 925 
F. 2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991).  In Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, , 513 U.S. 265 (1995) 
and Vimar Seguros v. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) judges determined arbitral 
jurisdiction at the outset of the process, rather than waiting to see what the arbitrators 
would decide.  See also the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Pacificare, Howsam, Bazzle, 
and Buckeye, infra. 
98 NCPC, Article 1458. 
99  For a recent case of the Cour de Cassation interpreting the French version of 
compétence-compétence in the context of an ICC arbitration, see SARI Métu System 
France, Cass. 1re civ., C., 1 Dec. 1999, holding that only the clear nullity of an arbitration 
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 Another benefit from the French paradigm lies in its potential for higher quality 
jurisdictional review by judges, who will be able to benefit from the arbitrators’ earlier 
consideration of the matter.  And government resources may be conserved for the simple 
reason that a settlement might obviate the need for judicial review.   
 A cynic, of course, might note that the French rule can have practical advantages 
for arbitrators themselves, who will not be declared incompetent until after collecting 
their fees.  But as Rudyard Kipling might have written, that is another story. 
3. Hybrids:  England, Switzerland and the UNCITRAL Model 
 Countries that delay judicial intervention until the award stage aim to preserve 
government resources.  By contrast, legal systems that permit court rulings on arbitral 
jurisdiction at any moment allow litigants to avoid the expense of an invalid proceeding.   
 Attempts to find a middle way in the timing of jurisdictional challenge have not 
always proved easy.  Like the man who hoped to get his girlfriend drunk without 
emptying the wine bottle,100 efforts at meeting both goals have often served 
disappointment.   
 Nevertheless, some legal systems do explore hybrid solutions.  England, 
Switzerland and the UNCITRAL Model provide examples. 
                                                                                                                                                 
agreement would bar application of the principle by which an arbitrator was permitted to 
rule on his own jurisdiction.  
100 In Italian, the observation traditionally takes on a more matrimonial nuance:  Non puoi 
avere la botta piena e la moglie ubbriaca.   
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a) England101 
 The position in England seems once to have been roughly analogous to that in the 
United States, in that arbitrators addressed jurisdiction subject to general control by the 
competent court.102  Such remains the case with respect to final awards, where 
dissatisfied litigants may challenge arbitrators’ mistakes on substantive and procedural 
jurisdiction.103.   Things have become a bit more complex since 1996.104  Today, the 
English Arbitration Act gives an arbitral tribunal the right to rule on its own substantive 
jurisdiction.105  The right to challenge arbitral jurisdiction by declaration or injunction is 
open only to a person “who takes no part in the proceedings.”106  This power can be 
                                                 
101  Since the 1996 Arbitration Act does not apply in Scotland, but governs arbitrations 
with their juridical seat in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, this paper will resist 
reference to “British” arbitration law.   Since 1536 England and Wales have been part of 
the same legal system.  However, to avoid the cumbersome expression “England and 
Wales or Northern Ireland”, more convenient terms such as “English arbitration” or 
“arbitration in England” will be used. 
102 See e.g., opinion by Devlin, J., in Christopher Brown Ltd v. Genossenschaft 
Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer, [1954] 1 Q.B. 8.  See MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. 
BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1982 edition) at 514-15, discussing the possibility of 
declaratory relief on questions of jurisdiction under the law as it stood prior to 1996. 
103  See 1996 Act, Section 67 (substantive jurisdiction) and 68(2) (“serious irregularity” 
defined to include “the tribunal exceeding its powers”). 
104  The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators has attempted to provide comprehensive 
enlightenment through two valuable studies:  Guidelines for Arbitrators as to How to 
Deal with Challenges to Their Jurisdiction, 68 ARBITRATION 3 (2002) and Guideline on 
Jurisdictional Issues in International Arbitration, 70 ARBITRATION 308 (2004), also 
reproduced in 17 WOLRD TRADE & ARB’N MATERIALS 113 (April 2005) . See also Peter 
Aeberli, Jurisdictional Disputes under the Arbitration Act 1996:  A Procedural Route 
Map, 21 ARB. INT’L 253 (2005) 
105  1996 Act, Section 30. 
106 English Arbitration Act ' 72.  Non-participants may challenge jurisdictional defects 
regardless of whether failure to participate was by choice or by inadvertence, and 
regardless of whether in hindsight non-participation seems justified.  The English 
Arbitration Act in ' 30 provides for arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction as a 
preliminary matter but in ' 67 also permits judicial challenge of any jurisdictional 
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particularly useful in connection with what are sometimes called “unilateral” arbitration 
clauses, which permit one side the option to litigate in court rather than to arbitrate.  If the 
other side begins an arbitration before the option has been exercised, the power to request 
a declaration provides the machinery for vindicating the right to litigate.107  
 Most challenges to substantive competence must wait until an award has been 
rendered.108  At that time courts will have an opportunity to review excess of authority as 
well as the arbitrators’ improper arrogation of powers.109  On occasion, a jurisdictional 
ruling may also give rise to allegations of procedural irregularity.110 
 The Act does permit application for judicial determination on a “preliminary point 
                                                                                                                                                 
determination.  In ' 9 the Act provides for stay of litigation only if the court is satisfied 
that the arbitration agreement is not “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.” 
107 See Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Elektrim, [2005] 1 All E.R. 476, 2005 WL 
1630790.  The case is discussed in Simon Nesbitt & Henry Quinlan, The Status and 
Operation of Unilateral or Optional Arbitration Clauses, 22 ARB. INT’L 133 (2006). 
108  Arbitration Act § 67.  
109 See Arbitration Act § 68.  See Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impreglio 
SpA [2005] UKHL 43. 
110 For a case in which an arbitrator’s jurisdictional decision was challenged on grounds 
of procedural irregularity, see Aoot Kalmneft v. Glencore International A.G. ([2002] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 128 (Queen’s Bench, 27 July 2001), 2001 WL 825106).  An ad hoc London 
arbitration addressed a dispute between an oil trading company and an oil production 
entity in Kalmykia.  The oil trader claimed that it had paid for oil never delivered, while 
the production company alleged it had been the victim of fraud by one of its officers, who 
allegedly had no authority to conclude the agreement.  In an interim decision, the sole 
arbitrator ruled that he had jurisdiction.  The production entity challenged this award inter 
alia on the grounds that a finding of validity for the arbitration clause prejudged the case 
on the merits.  By finding that the officer had authority to commit to arbitration, the 
arbitrator gave an implicit preview of his views with respect to the binding nature of the 
main agreement.  Justice Coleman rejected the challenge, finding that an arbitrator may 
“rule on his own jurisdiction at the outset, even if that involves deciding whether there 
was a binding contract to arbitrate and even if his decision on that matter gives rise to a 
conclusion in respect of a major issue on the merits of the underlying claim in the 
arbitration.” Id., Paragraph 84.  See discussion in Robert Knutson, Procedural Fairness, 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz and English Arbitral Practice, 6 LCIA NEWS 5 (November 2001). 
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of jurisdiction.”  In this latter context, courts may consider the matter only on agreement 
of all parties, or if the arbitral tribunal grants permission and a court finds that addressing 
the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs.111   
 Otherwise, a party seeking annulment of an arbitrator's decision for excess of 
jurisdiction may do so only after attempting to remedy the problem through the 
appropriate arbitral procedures.  In the interest of arbitral efficiency, court challenges to 
awards can only be brought after any available institutional review.112  And a “use it or 
lose it” principle requires that challenges for excess of authority must be made 
“forthwith” or within the time provided by the arbitration agreement.113  To rebut the 
presumption that the right to object has been waived, the challenging party must show 
that it did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered, the 
grounds for objection.114  In this respect, the Act leads to a result different from the one 
obtaining in Switzerland, where defendants may lose their right to challenge an award's 
jurisdictional underpinnings by boycotting the proceedings.115   
                                                 
111  1996 Arbitration Act, § 32.  If the parties have not all agreed, an application requires 
permission of the arbitral tribunal.  In this latter instance, the court must be satisfied not 
only of potential cost savings, but also that the application was made without delay and 
that there is “good reason” why the matter should be judicially decided.  
112  Act § 70(2) speaks of “any available arbitral process of appeal or review.”  However, 
courts are not necessarily bound by the arbitral institution's decision on the matter.  
Challenge to an award must also be delayed until exhaustion of any application to correct 
an award under Act § 57, in default of the parties’ agreement otherwise.  
113  1996 Arbitration Act § 73 (1). In some instances, the arbitral tribunal may set the 
appropriate time limits for challenge.   
114  Id., Section 73.  The English Act is more severe than the analogous provisions in 
Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, which covers only a party who 
actually “knows” of a procedural defect.  
115  See Westland Helicopters v.  Emirates Arabs Unis, Arabie Saoudite, Etat du Qatar, 
ABH et Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), Swiss Tribunal fédéral, 19 April 
1994, 120 II 155 ATF (1994), also reported in 12 ASA BULLETIN 404 (1994). 
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 Arbitral jurisdiction might also be tested in court if one party brings a court action 
for a claim which the other party says is covered by the arbitration agreement.  Arbitral 
authority is put at issue in a motion to stay legal proceedings, and the point is decided 
then and there.  Like analogous provisions in Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
English arbitration law contemplates that in some instances there might be simultaneous 
proceedings by courts and arbitrators regarding the competence of the arbitral tribunal.116  
b) Switzerland117  
 Although not free from scholarly debate,118 Swiss case law seems to distinguish 
between arbitration held inside and outside of the country.  Federal statute provides that 
arbitral tribunals shall rule on their authority, normally through interlocutory decisions,119 
and that objections to jurisdiction must be raised before the tribunal prior to any defense 
on the merits.120  Moreover, state courts must decline jurisdiction unless they find that the 
                                                 
116  1996 Arbitration Act § 9.  This section requires a stay of proceedings only so far as 
they concern that matter to be referred to arbitration and only if the court is satisfied that 
the arbitration agreement is not “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.”    
117  See generally, BERNHARD BERGER & FRANZ KELLERHALS, INTERNATIONALE UND 
INTERNE SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER SCHWEIZ (2006) at Chapter 2, Section 7 (II), 
paragraphs:  607-617; PIERRE LALIVE, JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & CLAUDE REYMOND, 
LE DROLIT DE L’ARBITRAGE (1989), AT 379-386; WERNER WENGER, Commentary on 
Article LDIP 186, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND 459-477 (2000).  See 
also Zina Abdulla, The Arbitration Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN 
SWITZERLAND 15 (G. Kaufmann-Kohler & B. Stucki, eds. 2004), at 29-32. 
118  See work by J.-F Poudret & G. Cottier, discussed infra.  See also Werner Wenger, 
Kommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht, Internationales Privatrecht, Basel, 
discussed in Tribunal fédéral, ATF 122 III 139, (Fondation M v. Banque X, 29 April 
1996) and Andreas Bucher, Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse, at 55, n. 130, 
discussed in Tribunal fédéral, ATF 121 III 38 (Compagnie de Navigation et Transports 
SA v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA, 16 January 1995).  
119  Article 186 of the Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé (LDIP) provides that 
such jurisdictional rulings should be made “en general / in der Regel”. 
120  Id., Article 186(2). 
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arbitration clause void, inoperative or incapable of being applied.121 
 If the seat of the arbitration is in Switzerland, courts engage in only summary 
examination of arbitral authority.122  When the arbitral seat lies outside of Switzerland, 
however, the Tribunal fédéral has called for a fuller and more comprehensive 
examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement.123  This inquiry would generally 
occur at the time the clause is invoked in a Swiss court action on the merits of the 
dispute, allegedly brought in disregard of the agreement to arbitrate.  In applying Article 
II of the New York Convention (requiring reference to arbitration unless the clause is 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed), courts would not limit themselves to 
a summary (prima facie) examination of the validity of the agreement to arbitrate.  
                                                 
121  Id. Article 7, providing for courts to verify that the arbitration clause is not “caduque, 
inopérante ou non susceptible d’être appliqué.”  
122  Tribunal fédéral, ATF 122 III 139, Fondation M v. Banque X (29 April 1996), which 
holds at consideration 2(b): “Il est généralement admit que, si le juge étatique est saisi 
d’une exception d’arbitrage et que le tribunal arbitral a son siège en Suisse, le juge se 
limitera à un examen sommaire de l’existence prima facie d’une convention d’arbitrage, 
afin de ne pas préjuger de la décision du tribunal arbitral sur sa propre compétence.”  (“It 
is generally accepted that if a state judge hears a defence based on arbitration, and the 
arbitral tribunal has its seat in Switzerland, the judge will limit himself to a summary 
examination of the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, in order not to 
prejudge the arbitral tribunal’s decision on its own jurisdiction.”)  
123  Tribunal fédéral, ATF 121 III 38, Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v. MSC 
Mediterranean Shipping Company SA (16 January 1995).  The court stated at 
consideration 3(b), “En revanche, si le tribunal arbitral a son siège à l'étranger, le juge 
étatique suisse, devant lequel une exception d'arbitrage est soulevée, doit statuer sur ce 
moyen de défense avec plein pouvoir d'examen quant aux griefs soulevés, et en 
particulier celui déduit de l'article II al. 3 de la Convention de New York, sans pouvoir se 
limiter à un examen prima facie.”  (By contrast [to arbitration conducted inside 
Switzerland] if the arbitral tribunal has its seat abroad, the state judge before whom the 
arbitration exception is raised must decide on this defense with full powers of 
examination concerning the grounds for challenge, and in particular that of Article II (3) 
of the New York Convention, without limiting himself to a prima facie examination.)  
 50 
 The logic of this distinction (which has not gone unquestioned124) seems to be 
that when arbitration occurs abroad, Swiss courts might not get a chance at a later time to 
correct an arbitrator's erroneous decision about jurisdiction under the questionable 
agreement.  By contrast, most arbitration conducted inside Switzerland will be subject to 
judicial review on the grounds enumerated in the federal conflicts of law statute, which 
include excess of jurisdiction.125 
 Comparisons are sometimes made between jurisdictional review in France and in 
Switzerland.  Notwithstanding some inferences to the contrary, one can see as many (or 
more) differences as similarities.  For arbitrations inside the forum state, both countries 
delay full judicial review of arbitral authority until the award stage.  There the similarity 
ends, however.  Swiss law contains nothing equivalent to the extreme French position 
that requires courts, while the arbitration is ongoing, to refrain from addressing even the 
clearest indications of an arbitration clause’s invalidity.126  On the contrary, Swiss courts 
verify the validity of arbitration clauses in a summary fashion (prima facie) when asked 
either to appoint an arbitrator or to hear disputes allegedly subject to arbitration.127  And 
                                                 
124 See Jean-François Poudret and Gabriel Cottier, Remarques sur l'Application de Article 
II de la Convention de New York, 13 ASA BULLETIN 383 (1995).  The authors write, “Si 
cette solution doit certes être approuvée, la motivation qui la soutient repose toutefois sur 
une distinction peu convaincante et même infondée...”  Id., at 387.   See also works by 
Wenger and Bucher, cited supra. 
125  Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, Article 190.  In some instances the 
parties may waive challenge to the award.  See discussion infra of LDIP Article 192.  
126 Article 1458, French Nouveau code de procédure civile. 
127  See Articles 7 and 179(3) of the Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé.  See 
decision of Swiss Tribunal fédéral, ATF 122 III 139, Fondation M v. Banque X, discussed 
supra and in François Perret, Parallel Actions Pending Before an Arbitral Tribunal and a 
State Court, ASA Special Series No. 15 (January 2001) at 65-66.   With respect to 
consideration of arbitration clauses prior to appointment of an arbitrator, the federal 
statute calls for an examen sommaire (summary examination). 
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as already noted, when the arbitral seat is outside Switzerland, Swiss courts are free to 
engage in a full inquiry into the validity of the arbitration clause. 
 Moreover, Swiss case law has held that an arbitrator will be deprived of 
jurisdiction to hear a matter if a case has already begun before a foreign court.  This 
application of lis pendens has been criticized, since it permits a bad-faith litigant to 
paralyze an arbitration by starting litigation abroad before a Swiss arbitral proceeding has 
begun.128  Recent federal legislation gives arbitrators sitting in Switzerland the right to 
rule on their own jurisdiction even if a foreign court has already been seized of the 
matter.129 
                                                 
128  See Fomento de Construcciones y Contrats S.A. v. Colon Container Terminal S.a., 
Swiss Tribunal fédéral, 14 mai 2001 ( Ie  Cour Civile), BGE 127 III 279/ATF 127 III 
279; reported in 2001 REV. DE L’ARBITRAGE 835 (commentary by Jean-François 
Poudret); Elliot Geisinger and Laurent Lévy, Applying the Principle of Litispendence 
[2000] Int’l A.L.R. (Issue 4).  See also Adam Samuel, Fomento - A tale of litispendance, 
arbitration and private international law, in Liber Amicorum Claude Reymond: Autour de 
L’Arbitrage 255 (Bredin, Lalive, Poudret & Terré, eds. Litec, Paris 2004).  Under Article 
9 of the Swiss LDIP, an arbitral tribunal in Geneva was required to suspend its work in 
deference to a judicial action begun in Panama.  Some observers consider the case might 
have been better decided on the rationale that participation in the Panama litigation 
constituted a waiver of the right to arbitrate.  See also, Matthias Scherer &Teresa 
Giovannini, Geneva Court Will Not Enforce Foreign Anti-Arbitration Injunction, IBA 
Arbitration Committee Newsletter 42 (September 2006) (commenting on decision of 
Geneva Tribunal of First Instance, 2 May 2005, rejecting an application to stay 
arbitration (2005 ASA Bulletin 728, with note by M. Stacher).For a more general 
perspective on parallel court proceedings, see Martine Stückelberg, Lis Pendens and 
Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 949 (2001).  
For another perspective on anti-suit injunctions, see John Fellas, Anti-suit Injunctions in 
Aid of Arbitration, 20 INT’L ARB. REP. 25 (April 2005). 
129  See Article 186, al 1bis, LDIP, which provides as follows:  “Il [le tribunal arbitral] 
statue sur sa compétence sans égard à une action ayant le même objet déjà pendante entre 
les mêmes parties devant un autre tribunal étatique ou arbitral, sauf si des motifs sérieux 
commandent de suspendre la procédure.”  [“The arbitral tribunal decides on its 
jurisdiction without regard to an action with the same object pending between the same 
parties before another national court or arbitral body, unless serious reasons demand 
suspension of the procedure.”]  Modification du 6 octobre 2006.  The provision is 
expected to enter into force early in 2007, either the day of its acceptance by the voters in 
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 In some events an arbitrator’s excess of jurisdiction may escape any judicial 
scrutiny, even if the arbitral seat lies in Switzerland.  Although proper monitoring for 
excess of authority would normally be provided under the federal conflicts of law 
statute,130 the parties may by agreement dispense with such review if both sides are non-
Swiss.131   
c) The UNCITRAL Model Law 
 Countries that follow the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law provide yet another 
twist on the timing of judicial review.  The statute dates from 1985, when the United 
Nations sponsored a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration132 which has 
been enacted in more than fifty countries.133 
 The UNCITRAL Model gives the arbitral tribunal an explicit right to determine 
                                                                                                                                                 
the event a referendum, or (if no referendum is held) on the first day of the second month 
following the deadline for a referendum, which has been fixed at 25 January 2007.  See 
also Communiqué, Département fédéral de justice et police (Alexander Markus, Office 
fédéral de la justice) 17 May 2006. 
130  Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, Article 190(2)(b) & (c).  
131 Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, Article 192.  Non-Swiss parties are 
defined as having neither domicile, habitual residence or business establishment in 
Switzerland. 
132 Drafted by the U.N. Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration received General Assembly 
approval on 11 December 1985. See U.N. General Resolution 40/72, 40 GAOR Supp. 
No. 53, A/40/53, at 308. See generally HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, 
GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
(1989); Henri C. Alvarez, Neil Kaplan, & David W. Rivkin, Model Law Decisions 
(2003); Pieter Sanders, The World of UNCITRAL Arbitration and Conciliation (2nd edn, 
2004). 
133 The geographically and culturally diverse countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL 
Model Law include Australia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Russia, Scotland, Singapore, Spain, and New Zealand. Within the United States, 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, and Texas have adopted the Model Law on a 
state level. 
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its own jurisdiction in the form of a “preliminary” award, subject to challenge on a 
request from a party within thirty (30) days.134  Arbitrators, of course, may choose to 
delay decisions on jurisdictional matters until the final award.   
 The Model Law does not prevent courts from finding an arbitration clause to be 
void in the context of a judicial action on the substantive merits of the case, assuming 
judicial jurisdiction exists over the relevant parties and/or dispute.135  The Model Law 
envisions the possibility of simultaneous proceedings by courts and arbitrators regarding 
the competence of the arbitral tribunal.136 Article 8 provides that a court must refer 
parties to arbitration only if it finds the arbitration agreement not to be “null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed.”   
 Controversy does exist on the standard for pre-award review.  Some authorities 
hold to “full review” while others adopt a “prima facie review” approach that refers 
parties to arbitration unless the arbitration clause appears void on its face.137   
 The “prima facie” approach leaves open the question of whether a court’s 
decision is subject to being re-opened at a later stage.  A judge might say, “I’ve given the 
clause a quick glance, and it looks fine to me.”  Presumably this would not preclude a 
                                                 
134  Article 16, Model Arbitration Law of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law. 
135  See HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEUHAUS, GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1989), at 306: “This provision 
provoked debate between those who considered that the court should have power to stay 
the arbitral proceedings in order to prevent potentially needless arbitration and those who 
would have ... had the court suspend its own proceedings in order to avoid delay and 
needless court intervention.”   
136  Holtzmann and Neuhaus note that "a court might still consider the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal in considering whether a substantive claim should be referred to jurisdiction...." 
See HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEUHAUS, supra at 486.   
137  See Frédéric Bachand, Does Article 8 of the Model Law Call for Full or Prima Facie 
Review of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction?, 22 ARB. INT’L (2006). 
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later jurisdictional attack on the award, which under the UNCITRAL Model would be 
available for invalidity of the arbitration agreement or arbitral decisions falling outside 
the scope of the arbitration submission.  By contrast, if the judge’s quick glance 
determines the clause is void, the parties would seem to be stuck with that decision, since 
by definition there would be no award to review.   
E. The First Word and the Last   
1. Base-line Positions 
 One way to summarize the different base-line positions on determinations of 
arbitral authority might be to ask when arbitrators have the first word on their 
jurisdiction, and when they have the last.  Here is how the landscape might be described. 
1.  In most modern legal systems, an arbitrator will have the “first word” on 
his/her jurisdiction, unless a court of competent jurisdiction says otherwise.  The 
arbitral tribunal need not stop the proceedings just because a party questions some 
aspect of arbitral authority.   
 
2.  The fact that arbitrators can have the first word does not mean that they always 
do have the “first word”.  A litigant might go to court to challenge arbitral 
jurisdiction without waiting for an award.  Such is the situation in the United 
States and Germany. 
 
3.  By contrast, in other countries courts must generally wait to examine 
jurisdiction until an award is rendered.  This is the rule in France, subject to 
certain narrow exceptions.    
 
4.  In all major legal systems, the “last word” on arbitral jurisdiction will normally 
be for courts at the time an award is subject to scrutiny in the context of a motion 
to vacate, confirm or grant recognition.   
 
5. Countries differ dramatically, however, on whether and when the parties may 
entrust a jurisdictional matter to final and binding arbitration, thus in effect 
transferring the “last word” from the courts to the arbitrators.  In the United 
States, deference to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional decision requires a finding that 
“the arbitrability question” has clearly been given to the arbitrators.  Courts might 
make this finding either at the beginning of the arbitral process (when one side 
tries to compel arbitration) or at the end (when an award is presented for review).  
Other legal systems (notably Germany) deny deference to agreements that purport 
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to subject jurisdictional questions to final determination by arbitrators.  Results 
may depend on whether the purported agreement on jurisdiction takes the form of 
a separate agreement or a clause in the main commercial contract. 
 
2. The Devil in the Detail 
 Being human, judges like arbitrators sometimes get it wrong.  Errors can creep 
into a judge’s understanding of the parties’ intent on jurisdictional questions.  The results 
may be either denial of a party’s day in court (in a so-called “pro-arbitration” decision) or 
disregard of the parties’ bargain to arbitrate (in a so-called  “anti-arbitration” decision).”   
 Although trivial, the point is of utmost importance in connection with rules on 
arbitral jurisdiction.  The establishment of any principle bears a danger of misapplication, 
a fact that might be taken into account by policy-makers in determining whether the rule 
is likely to provide an optimum balance of efficiency and fairness.   
 Some risks are greater than others.  By allowing parties to grant arbitrators final 
authority on jurisdictional matter, a legal system increases the peril that faulty contract 
interpretation will result in some litigants will being denied their day in court.  Judges 
might take a mere contract recital for a manifestation of genuine party consent.  The 
problem is particularly delicate in complex large-scale commercial fact patterns, where 
legal principles often end up being indicative rather than dispositive.138   
 The complexity of other policy concerns facing legislators can be seen in the 
various wrinkles engrafted on the major guidelines set down for establishment of arbitral 
jurisdiction.  As has been mentioned elsewhere, these include (i) special rules on 
                                                 
138  In contrast, the United States federal court decisions set forth relatively firm rules for 
problems that repeat themselves with routine regularity in American arbitration: class 
actions in consumer lending, and time limits in securities complaints against brokers.   
See discussions of Bazzle and Howsam, infra. 
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declaratory court decisions,139 (ii) mechanisms to address preliminary points of arbitral 
jurisdiction,140 (iii) varying appellate procedures for decisions that implicate arbitral 
jurisdiction,141 (iv) different standards by which courts address arbitral jurisdiction before 
(as opposed to after) an arbitration has begun, or before (as opposed to after) an award 
has been rendered.142  As to the wisdom of these nuances, only time will tell.  
II. Clarifications  
A. Supra-National Adjudicatory Bodies 
 In most instances, Kompetenz-Kompetenz refers to how national courts exercise 
supervisory competence, as discussed earlier.  However, the phrase Kompetenz-
Kompetenz has also been applied in forms of international dispute resolution that proceed 
largely independent of close national court supervision, including the practice of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and arbitration under the rules of ICSID, the International 
                                                 
139  Some countries such as England and Germany restrict the right of courts to provide 
declaratory decisions about arbitral authority, but not the power to address arbitral 
jurisdiction in the context of an action on the underlying dispute. 
140  Compare UNCITRAL Article 16 (immediate appeal of jurisdictional ruling) with 
Section 32 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act, which permits an application to the court 
for a determination on substantive jurisdiction if made by all parties or with the 
permission of the arbitral tribunal.  English law also provides for interim awards on 
jurisdiction, subject to court review.  See Sections 31(4) and 67 of the 1996 Act.  On the 
policies behind bifurcated hearings to address jurisdictional decisions separately, see John 
Gotanda, An Efficient Method for Determining Jurisdiction in International Arbitrations, 
40 COLUMBIA J. TRANS. L. 11 (2001). 
141  For the position in the United States, see 9 U.S. C. § 16,  providing different standards 
for appeal of lower court decisions on arbitral jurisdiction, depending on whether the 
court finds for or against the arbitrator’s power. 
142  French courts address arbitral jurisdiction only if the arbitral tribunal has not yet been 
“seized” of the matter, and must limit their inquiry to whether an arbitration clause is 
clearly void (manifestement nulle).  NCPC Article 1458.  Compare the situation under 
UNCITRAL Article 8.  Similarly, in Switzerland courts generally review an arbitration 
clause on a prima facie basis (examen sommaire) before the award, but reserve plenary 
review following an arbitrator’s decision.  LDIP Ariticles 7 and 179(3).   
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Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.143  The import of this jurisdictional 
principle takes on a different cast when the arbitral tribunal is not subject to immediate 
and well-established forms of control by national courts. 
 An example of arbitration removed from the review of national courts can be 
found in the ICSID system, which pursuant to treaty provides a structure for arbitration of 
investment disputes between host states and foreigners.144  ICSID tribunals render their 
awards outside the framework of national arbitration statutes.  The Convention forecloses 
challenge to awards on normal statutory grounds145 in favor of ICSID’s special system of 
quality control under its own internal challenge procedure.146 
Consequently, jurisdictional determinations are by necessity subject to the 
                                                 
143 See generally cases summarized in Pierre Lalive, Some Objections to Jurisdiction in 
Investor-State Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  IMPORTANT 
CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 376 (2002 ICCA Congress, London) at 378-380. 
144  The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Washington 18 March 1965 (ratified by 140 nations) 
established the International Centre for Investment Disputes (ICSID) to hear disputes 
between Convention states and investors from another party to the Convention.  See 
generally EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LA JURISPRUDENCE DU CIRDI (2004); RUDOLF DOLZER 
& MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); Abby Cohen Smutny, 
Arbitration Before the International Centre for Investment Disputes, 3 BUS. LAW INT’L 
367 (September 2002).   
145  For ICSID arbitration in the United States, this rule has never been tested in a court 
action raising the conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act (allowing motions to 
vacate awards) and the Washington Convention (which excludes such vacatur).  The US 
Constitution in Article VI (2) lists both treaties and federal statutes as the “supreme Law 
of the Land,” without establishing a hierarchy.  On some matters statutes clearly override 
treaties.  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-499 § 1125, providing that no treaty shall require 
“exemption from (or reduction of) any tax imposed” on gains from disposition of US 
realty. When Congress is silent courts look to canons of statutory interpretation such as 
“last in time prevails” or “specific restricts general.”  See Detlev Vagts, The United States 
and its Treaties:  Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 (2001). 
146 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States Article 52, ICSID Basic Documents 25 (1985).  See generally 
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND 
ARBITRATION 46–50 (Duke 1992). 
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arbitrators’ jurisdiction alone, absent evidence that the parties never consented in any 
way to ICSID arbitration.147  While this may at first blush appear to be similar to the 
situation in other forms of arbitration,148 there is no judiciary to exercise supervisory 
power, since Article 26 of the Washington Convention provides that consent to ICSID 
jurisdiction shall (unless otherwise stated) be deemed to constitute consent to arbitration 
“to the exclusion of any other remedy.” 149 
Similar non-national Kompetenz-Kompetenz principles might be appropriate for 
the emerging field of tax treaty arbitration.  Recent proposals have been elaborated by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development150 and in research sponsored 
by the International Fiscal Association. 151 
                                                 
147  Convention Article 41 provides that “The Tribunal shall be the judge of its own 
competence.”  See also Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 41.  The 
Centre’s jurisdiction is addressed in Article 25 of the Washington Convention itself. 
148  See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION (2001) at 521, comparing ICSID 
Article 41 with ICC Rule 6 and Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
149 See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION (2001) at 347, noting that 
consent to ICSID arbitration means that “the parties have lost their right to seek relief in 
another forum, national or international.”   
150 See Proposals for Improving Mechanisms for Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes, 
Public discussion draft, February 2006 (OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs), proposing 
amplification of the “Mutual Agreement Procedure” in Model Income Tax Convention 
Article 25.  
151  WILLIAM W. PARK & DAVID R. TILLINGHAST, INCOME TAX TREATY ARBITRATION 
(2004).  In this connection, the IFA-sponsored study makes the following proposal: “In 
the event that an arbitral tribunal fails to decide a claim because it deems the matter to be 
outside the scope of the convention, and thus governed solely by national law, either 
Contracting State or the taxpayer may challenge this finding before a Jurisdictional 
Review Panel.  This Panel shall be constituted according to the process provided in 
Article 5.  The Panel shall consider de novo whether the claim is governed by the 
Convention.  The decision of the Panel shall be final.  Following a decision that a claim is 
governed by this Convention, a new arbitral tribunal shall be constituted pursuant to 
Article 5 and shall be bound by the Panel’s jurisdictional determination.”  Id., page 97, 
including Proposed Article 8(c) of Supplement to Double Tax Convention Article 25,  
 59 
B. Applicable Law 
 If a question arises about whether an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide its 
jurisdiction, what procedural law should be applied to test the limits of the principle?  
The quick answer (not very helpful) would be that the matter will be determined under 
whatever arbitration principles might be deemed appropriate by the forum where the 
challenge arises.  For example, if the arbitrators’ jurisdictional determination has been 
questioned before French courts, the applicable procedural law would be the Nouveau 
Code de Procédure Civile.  If in the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act.  In 
England, the 1996 Arbitration Act.  And should a litigant, by some extraordinary 
boldness, challenge the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in ICSID arbitration the 
judges seized of the matter would (one hopes) look to the 1965 Washington Convention.  
 The answer is much more complex in reality.  National legal systems quite rightly 
look to other legal systems through a variety of mechanisms, including reference to a 
transnational procedural lex mercatoria 152 or in some cases the law applicable to the 
merits.153  In a federal system, the laws of different political subdivisions might compete.  
                                                 
152 Rhône Méditerranée v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983).  See also Isover St. 
Gobain v. Dow Chemical France et al., ICC Case 4131 (1982), ICC COLLECTION OF 
ARBITRAL AWARDS, Volume I: 1974-85 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, eds., 1990), 
upheld by the Paris Cour d’appel, 21 October 1983, 1984 REV. ARB. 98; English language 
extracts in 9 ICCA YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 132 (1984). 
153  Pepsico v. Officina Central de Asesoria, 945 F.Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  See also 
DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS , THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (14th edition, L. Collins, gen. ed., 
2006), Rule 57(1), at 712, suggesting that “the material validity, scope and interpretation 
of an arbitration agreement” are governed by the parties’ chosen law or (in the absence of 
choice) the law most closely connected with the arbitration agreement, normally that of 
the arbitral seat.  This formulation is a considerable improvement over that in the prior 
edition, which included the “effect” of an arbitration agreement in the ambit of applicable 
law.”  While true as far as it goes, the rule fails to mention that the “effect” of arbitration 
agreements can also be determined by the arbitration law of the arbitral seat, the treaty 
context, and law of the recognition forum, regardless of the parties’ choice.   
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Depending on the issue, procedural questions in the United States might be subject to one 
of three different chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act,154 as well as state contract 
principles regarding interpretation of the New York Convention.155  Or state law might 
apply, either by virtue of the arbitral seat156 or the parties’ choice.157  
C. The Autonomy of the Arbitration Clause 
 A frequent source of confusion about the arbitrator’s right to rule on his or her 
jurisdiction lies in the interaction of Kompetenz-Kompetenz principles and the doctrine of 
“separability” or the “autonomy” of the arbitration clause. 158  Many eminent authorities 
have addressed the interaction of the two principles,159 which when all is said and done 
are designed to create presumptions that help the arbitration process run smoothly.160 
                                                 
154  FAA Ch. 2 implements the New York Convention, and Ch. 3 the Panama Convention. 
155  Article II of the New York Convention requires “an arbitral clause in a contract or an 
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties….”  See Kahn Lucas v. Lark Int’l , 186 F.3d 
210 (2d Cir. 1999), holding that “signed by the parties” applies to arbitral clauses in 
contracts as well as separate arbitration agreements.  For a contrary holding, see Sphere 
Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir.1994).  Little evidence 
indicates how many arbitrators reflect on the comma before taking jurisdiction.  
156 New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988). 
157 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Information 
Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
158  See Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separabiltiy” in 
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121 (2003); Adam Samuel, 
Separability of arbitration clauses - some awkward questions about the law on contracts, 
conflict of laws and the administration of justice, [2000] ADRLJ 36; Christian Herrera 
Petrus, Spanish Perspectives on the Doctrines of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and 
Separability:  A Comparative Analysis of Spain’s 1988 Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 397 (2000). 
159 See e.g., Pierre Mayer, L'Autonomie de l'arbitre dans l'appréciation de sa propre 
compétence, 217 RECUEIL DES COURS 320 (Académie de droit international de La Haye 
1989) at 339-352. 
160   Redfern and Hunter state, “There are essentially two elements to this [jurisdictional] 
rule:  first, that an arbitral tribunal can rule on its own jurisdiction; and secondly that, for 
this purpose, the arbitration clause is separate and independent from the terms of the 
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 Kompetenz-Kompetenz is distinct from, but intersects functionally with, the notion 
that an arbitration agreement can be operationally detached from the main contract in 
which it is found.  Often conceptualized as a matter of “separability,” the principle that an 
arbitration clause possesses contractual autonomy permits the arbitrators to do their job, 
notwithstanding what their award might say about the validity of the contract in dispute.  
The separability doctrine gives the arbitration clause the status of a contract autonomous 
from the principal agreement in which it is encapsulated.161  Thus arbitrators may decide 
issues relating to the validity of the main contract (such as allegations of fraud in the 
inducement, or "per se" violations of antitrust law) without risk that their power will 
disappear retroactively.  The autonomy of the arbitration clause recognizes the 
contracting parties' presumed intent that the arbitrator should be empowered to decide on 
the validity or survival of the principal commercial contract.  Otherwise the arbitrators 
might be stripped of power at the very moment when evaluating important aspects of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
contract containing the transactions between the parties.”  ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN 
HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, LAW & PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (4th ed. 2004), Section 5-42, at 254.  See 
also JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003), Section 14-19 at 334.   These authors 
write, “While competence-competence empowers the arbitration tribunal to decide on its 
own jurisdiction, separability affects the outcome of this decision… Without the doctrine 
of separability, a tribunal making use of its competence-competence would potentially be 
obligated to deny jurisdiction on the merits since the existence of the arbitration clause 
might be affected by the invalidity of the underlying contract.”  
161 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).  
Surprisingly, one recent decision has invoked First Options v. Kaplan to question the 
validity of the separability doctrine.  See Maye v. Smith Barney, 897 F. Supp. 100 
(S.D.N.Y.  1995).   
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parties' business relationship.162     
 Separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz can serve much of the same function, in 
that both notions create mechanisms to prevent a bad faith party from stopping the 
arbitral proceedings before they have begun.   The autonomy of the arbitration clause 
operates with respect to defects in the main contract which might otherwise taint the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction.  The doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, on the other hand, gives 
the arbitrator the right to pass upon even alleged infirmities in the arbitration clause itself.   
 To illustrate the difference between the separability of the arbitration clause and 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, assume that an arbitration clause has been included in a 
marketing agreement by which a consultant agreed to help an American corporation 
obtain a public works contract in the Ruritania.  It might be alleged both that (i) the 
person who signed the agreement for the American corporation was not authorized to do 
so and (ii) the consulting agreement was void because the payments thereunder were 
earmarked in part to bribe government officials.163  Separability notions would permit the 
                                                 
162  Many countries permit the arbitration agreement to be subject to a different law than 
that of the main contract.  On separability, see generally Peter Gross, Separability Comes 
of Age in England, 11 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 85 (1995), discussing Harbour 
Assurance Co. (U.K.) v. Kansa General International Assurance Co., [1993] 3 All E.R. 
897; MATTHIEU DE BOISSESON, DROIT FRANÇAIS DE L'ARBITRAGE (2d Ed., 1990), at 
pages 482-484 and 491-493 (''575 and 579); and cases discussed in ADAM SAMUEL, 
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1989), at 
155-172.  See generally Adam Samuel, Separability and the US Supreme Court Decision 
in Buckeye v. Cardegna, 22 Arbitration International 477 (2006).; Adam Samuel,  
Separability of arbitration clauses - some awkward questions about the law on contracts, 
conflict of laws and the administration of justice”, [2000] ADRLJ 36.  
 
163 Or the illegality might derive from a violation of antitrust law, or a lender not being 
authorized to engage in banking in the relevant jurisdiction.  See Worthen B. & T. Co. v. 
United Underwrit. Sales Corp., 251 Ark. 454 (1971); but see Shepard v. Finance 
Associates of Auburn, Inc., 366 Mass. 182 (1974).  Compare Harbour v. Kansa Harbour 
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arbitrators to find the main contract void for illegality without destroying their power 
under the arbitration clause to do so. 164  Separability would not, however, prevent the 
court from determining whether the individual who signed the agreement was authorized 
to bind the corporation to arbitrate; nor would separability save from ultimate annulment 
or non-recognition an award based on an arbitrator's erroneous assumption about such 
corporate power.165 
 On the other hand, French principles permit the arbitrators to go to the end of the 
proceedings and decide the matter of the corporate signature, rather than having the 
question to be referred to the appropriate court at the outset of the arbitration.166  
However, without a separability principle, the arbitrators’ right to rule on their own 
jurisdiction would not save the validity of an award that had declared the main contract 
void because of illegality. 
 The situation in American case law has been subject to several key decisions of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Assurance, [1993] Q.B. 701 and 10 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 194 (1994); Peter 
Gross, Separability Comes of Age in England, 11  ARB. INT’L 85 (1995). 
164 Contracts to engage in bribery are generally void throughout the world, while 
contracts to arbitrate are not. A court probably could, however, refuse to enforce the 
award if the arbitrator had decided that the contract did not implicate bribery when in fact 
(in the court's view) it did.  While the arbitrator's finding on the validity of the contract 
would normally be entitled to deference, many statutes and treaties contain explicit 
provisions for judicial refusal to enforce awards that violate public policy.   See e.g., 
French N.C.P.C. Article 1502(5) and New York Convention Article V(2)(b). 
165  See e.g., South Pacific Properties v. Egypt, French Cour de Cassation (6 January 
1987), [1987] REV. ARB. 469, note Ph. Leboulanger.  Translation and note by Emmanuel 
Gaillard, 26 I.L.M. 1004 (1987). 
166  German law as it now stands might permit the parties to enter into a "Kompetenz-
Kompetenz clause" that could insulate the arbitrator's findings on the signature from any 
judicial review, although it is not clear whether such findings would withstand a 
challenge to the validity of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause itself. 
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the United States Supreme Court.  In the landmark American Prima Paint decision,167 a 
claim was brought for fraud in the inducement of the purchaser of a paint business.  The 
buyer sought rescission in court rather than before the bargained-for arbitral tribunal.  
The court in essence asked, “Who, court or arbitrator, shall decide whether there was 
fraudulent inducement of a contract?”  Without the autonomy of the arbitration clause, 
the question would have been for the court, since an arbitrator could not have declared 
the main agreement to be rescinded without thereby invalidating the arbitration clause.  
Separability of the arbitration clause permitted the fraud charge, with respect to the main 
agreement, to be characterized as related to the merits of the case, rather than to the 
jurisdiction of the arbitrator.   
 The principle was recently affirmed in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna 
where the United States Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine in the context of a 
consumer dispute heard in state court and involving an alleged violation of state 
statute.168  This classic separability case involved a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction 
                                                 
167  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).   
168 126 S.Ct. 1204 (2006).  A decision by Justice Scalia found that the Florida Supreme 
Court failed to adhere to the teachings of Prima Paint  in a putative class action against a 
check cashing service accused of making usurious loans in violation of Florida law.  
Claimants argued that because the contract was allegedly void, the arbitration clause was 
unenforceable.  The action was brought by the borrowers, with lenders seeking to compel 
arbitration.   The Court held that the illegality did not invalidate the arbitration clause, 
which was separable (autonomous) from the main agreement.  Although the Court 
reached the right result, a bit of careless phraseology has the potential to create mischief 
in subsequent cases.  Justice Scalia asserted, “Applying them [general arbitration 
principles] to this case, we conclude that because respondents challenge the Agreement, 
but not specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions are enforceable apart from 
the remainder of the contract.  The challenge should therefore be considered by an 
arbitrator, not a court.”  Id. at 1209  These sentences imply both too little and too much.  
First, an arbitration clause might well be invalid even if a challenge aims at the main 
agreement, as in event of forgery or lack of capacity.  Second, arbitrators do not lose the 
right to “consider” jurisdiction simply due to challenge launched against the arbitration 
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based on the alleged invalidity of a loan agreement.  Had the view of the state court 
prevailed, the arbitrators would have had no power to consider their own jurisdiction.  
From the start, the charge of “void contract” would have taken away that opportunity, 
since the allegedly invalid loan agreement would have been inseparably linked to the 
arbitration clause.169 
III. Taxonomy:  What is a Jurisdictional Question?  
A. Existence, Scope and Public Policy 
 In practice, an arbitrator’s right to decide a question will often depend on how that 
question is characterized by the reviewing court.  Labeling matters as “jurisdictional” 
puts them into the realm where judges would normally expect to exercise some scrutiny, 
depending on the circumstances of the case and the approach of the relevant legal system.   
 To reduce the risk of simply presuming one’s own conclusions about what is or is 
not jurisdictional, it might be helpful to suggest three common categories of defects in 
                                                                                                                                                 
provisions.  Instead, any consideration of the provisions is simply subject to judicial 
scrutiny, absent the parties’ agreement otherwise.  Justice Alito did not participate and 
Justice Thomas dissented on the basis that the FAA does not apply in state court 
proceedings to displace a state law prohibiting enforcement of an arbitration clause.  See 
generally, Alan Scott Rau, Separability in the United States Supreme Court, 2006 
STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV. 1 (2006); Adam Samuel, Separability and the U.S. Supreme 
Court Decision in Buckeye v. Cardegna, 22 ARB. INT’L 477 (2006).     
169  Whether the arbitration law of the United States should allow arbitration of such 
consumer disputes remains open to question.  In Europe the pre-dispute arbitration clause 
in the usurious loan agreement would most likely be void.  See Article 6.1 of the 1993 
European Union Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, which  invalidates “unfair” contract 
terms in consumer contracts. Articles 3 and 4.1 set out the basic notion of an unfair 
contract, which include terms not individually negotiated if they cause a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract.  An annex 
contains an indicative and non-exclusive list of “the terms which may be regarded as 
unfair” including paragraph “q” which presumes a term to be unfair if it has the effect of 
“excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other 
legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to 
arbitration not covered by legal provisions…”  
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arbitral authority.     
(i) Existence of an arbitration agreement.  In some instances there may be no 
binding agreement to arbitrate (for example, due to absence of signatory 
authority), or strangers to the agreement might have been joined through fraud, 
forgery or duress.170  
 
(ii)  Scope of authority.  An arbitrator might be asked to decide substantive 
questions which the arbitration clause never submitted to his or her determination.  
Or the arbitrator might disregard party-agreed rules on how the arbitration was to 
be conducted, perhaps by exceeding limits on arbitral powers;171 
 
(iii)  Public policy.  An arbitration might purport to address subjects that a 
relevant legal system says may not be arbitrated (subject matter arbitrability172), 
or which a court feels lie within its exclusive purview.173  Or an award might give 
effect to illegal conduct.174   
 
The first two flaws relate to the contours of the parties’ contract.  The third derives from 
public policy, regardless of what the parties might have agreed.   
 There is no magic in this tripartite classification, which commends itself only as a 
                                                 
170  See e.g., Chastain v. Robinson- Humphrey, 957 F. 2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992) (forgery); 
Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, 121 F. 3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997).  See also 
decisions in Sphere Drake v. All American, Three Valleys and  Sandvik, discussed infra.  
See generally, BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS (2005). 
171  On occasion, arbitral institutions may also play a role in excess of authority.  For 
example, if disputes are to be settled by arbitrators appointed by the International 
Chamber of Commerce, a tribunal should not normally be constituted by the American 
Arbitration Association or the London Court of International Arbitration.  See Maritime 
International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 
(D.D.C. 1982). 
172  Subject matters that have traditionally been sensitive (notwithstanding that many are 
not considered arbitrable) include competition law, securities regulation, bankruptcy and 
intellectual property.  See e.g., Alain Prujiner, Propriété intellectuell et arbitrage:  
quelques réflexions après l’arrêt Caillou, CAHIER DE PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE, 
MÉLANGES VICTOR NABHAN (2004).   
173  See discussion infra of United States v. Stein, concerning the right to legal fees in a 
criminal tax investigation. 
174  An arbitrator would not likely be permitted to render an award giving effect to a sale 
of illegal arms to terrorists or ordering payment for slaves or heroine.  Nor would an 
arbitrator be permitted to reinstate a pilot dismissed from employment for showing up 
drunk at the cockpit.  See discussion infra.  
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starting point for analysis.  Jurisdiction remains a notoriously slippery term.  Different 
statutes employ different terms, and divergent intellectual pigeon-holes to organize 
grounds for jurisdictional challenge.175  In the real world, an alleged problem sometimes 
involves a combination of factors, or represents shades of gray on a jurisdictional 
continuum.   
 Violations of public policy, of course, will defeat the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements regardless of the parties’ wishes, at least within the forum whose norms have 
been offended.176  The problem with public policy, of course, lies in its malleability and 
potential for mischief when applied through a parochial lens.  Although courts can hardly 
be expected to enforce an arbitration agreement related to an arms sale to terrorists, the 
“public policy” shibboleth frequently finds itself invoked with respect to concerns of 
much less magnitude.177   
 The other two categories of jurisdictional shortcoming (existence and scope of the 
clause) might be remedied by the parties’ agreement.  If the challenge relates to the very 
validity of the arbitration clause, the issue could be submitted to final arbitral 
                                                 
175  Compare: 1996 English Act, Section 67 and Section 68, French NCPC Article 1502, 
Swiss LDIP Article 190, FAA Section 10 FAA, UNCITRAL Model Law Article 34. 
176  It might be that one country finds it intolerable for the arbitrator to have applied the 
parties’ choice-of-law clause in a way that disregards its competition law, while another 
country might be offended if the arbitrator does ignores the choice-of-law clause.  
177  See e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups Inc. 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006), refusing to 
recognize an arbitration agreement because it would have required a California resident 
to travel to Boston for arbitration, notwithstanding that she was an admittedly savvy 
businesswoman who “knew her industry inside and out.”  Id. at 1310 (dissent by 
Kozinski).  Finding an arbitration clause unconscionable (a matter held to be for judge 
rather than arbitrator), the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court decision dismissing a 
California state action brought by the franchisee.  The prize for parochialism may well go 
to Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063, 
1068-69 (N.D. Ga. 1980), vacating award simply because it applied a French interest rate 
to an international contract involving a company from France. 
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determination through a second agreement legitimately concluded by the party sought to 
be bound.  Such a result has been accepted in some legal systems,178 but not others.179  
Without such a subsequent agreement, however, arguments about proper parties will 
inevitably be subject to review by a court asked to enforce the award.180 
 Problems of scope might be addressed in the initial arbitration clause itself.  At 
the time of concluding their transaction, foresighted parties could give arbitrators explicit 
authority to adjudicate challenges to the extent of their powers and the range of matters 
covered by the arbitration clause.  Again, the extent to which a grant of jurisdictional 
power will be recognized in court depends on the relevant judicial system.   
 Even if a legal system does not give final effect to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional 
ruling, it might well accord interim deference by delaying judicial review until after an 
award.  The timing for challenge, however, remains a question separate from the effect of 
the jurisdictional decision and the parties’ intention in that regard.  
B. Common Trouble Spots 
 An arbitrator’s jurisdiction to hear a matter will normally depend on several 
distinct lines of inquiry:  (i) the existence of an agreement to arbitrate; (ii) the scope of 
the agreement with respect to parties, subject matter and procedural powers; (iii) public 
policy that might override the agreement, by making the subject non-arbitrable or the 
governing law inapplicable.   
                                                 
178  See Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan Ministry of Food & Agriculture 
(Emmanuel Colocotronis No. 2), [1982], 1 W.L.R. 1096, 1 All E. R. 578 (disagreement 
on whether charter party terms incorporated into a bill of lading).  See also discussions of 
the law in the United States (infra) and Finland (supra). 
179  See discussion infra of the German BGH decision of 13 January 2005. 
180  The subsequent arbitration agreement would in essence transform a jurisdictional 
question (in the first dispute) into one of the substantive merits (in the second).  
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 With respect to the first two “contract-related” categories, common questions 
arise with respect to implied agency; waiver of right to arbitrate (for example, by 
initiation of court litigation or undue delay), survival of an arbitration clause after 
assignment, and authority of a corporate officer.  Even if a valid arbitration agreement 
exists, its substantive and procedural limits may be circumscribed in ways that require 
serious examination.  Did the parties intend that tort claims arising out of the contract 
would be subject to the arbitrator's jurisdiction?   Were statutory causes of action (for 
example, relating to antitrust violations) included within the arbitrator's mission?   Did 
the arbitrators exceed their authority by disregarding the applicable law181 or the basic 
terms of the contract?182  While some countries create presumptions about certain aspects 
of jurisdiction,183 care must be taken that they not be misapplied. 
 The process for constitution of the arbitral tribunal also affects arbitral power.  
Arbitrators possess jurisdiction only if appointed according to the parties' agreement.  If 
the parties agreed to arbitration by a tribunal appointed by the International Chamber of 
Commerce, there is no basis to oblige the defendant to participate in an arbitration 
convened by the American Arbitration Association.184  Interpreting the parties' intent as 
                                                 
181 For example, arbitrators who apply provisions of United States antitrust law, 
notwithstanding the merchants' agreement that the contract shall be subject to the laws of 
another country, might exceed their jurisdiction, unless the mandatory norms of the 
United States (as place of performance) preempt the contractually-designated law.  See 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
182  See e.g., Mobile Oil v. Asamera, 487 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).   
183  In England, for example, the House of Lords decision in Lesotho Highlands 
(discussed infra) might be seen as creating the presumption that arbitrators who exercise 
statutory powers do so within their mandate, notwithstanding that the powers have been 
exercised incorrectly.   
184  For an analogous problem, see Guinea v. MINE, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C.C. 1982), and 
Geneva Office des Poursuites, 26 I.L.M. 382 (1987). 
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to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal becomes particularly problematic when courts 
are called to repair pathological clauses lacking particulars about the arbitral situs or 
institutional rules.185  In some cases, the arbitrators' qualifications will be established in 
part by the institutional rules to which the arbitration agreement refers.186 
 Procedural powers exercised by arbitrators can also become jurisdictional issues.  
Did the parties authorize the arbitrators to consolidate two proceedings?  Did the parties 
authorize the arbitrators to punish a party for failing to produce documents?  Did the 
parties authorize the arbitrators to award compound interest?   
 Sound analysis will depend on the contextual configuration in which jurisdictional 
questions are asked.  The problem areas sketched below have in the past fertilized 
disagreements about arbitral authority. 
a) Who is a Party?  
 When arbitrators assume jurisdiction over a non-signatory to the arbitration 
agreement (perhaps because two or more corporations are related through common 
ownership), the task of determining who agreed to arbitrate may be complicated by the 
form in which contract documents were signed.187  Corporate restructuring provides 
                                                 
185  See e.g., Jain v. De Méré, 51 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995); National Iranian Oil Company 
v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987); Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks GmbH v. 
Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2006). In the last case, the contract between German 
and American entities provided only for “arbitration in the Hague under the International 
Arbitration rules.”   
186  For example, the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce require arbitrator 
"independence."  Arbitration qualifications incorporated into a contract through reference 
to institutional rules often overlap public policy limits on biased arbitrators, just as 
arbitration rules on notice and the right to present one's case will frequently echo due 
process requirements of municipal arbitration law.  
187 For example, in South Pacific Properties v. Egypt, an arbitral tribunal had to determine 
whether the government of Egypt was bound by an arbitration clause in an investment 
contract concluded by an Egyptian state-owned corporation but also initialled by a 
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another fertile source for confusion as to the proper party to an arbitration agreement.188  
b) Meaning of Contract Terms 
 In commercial arbitrations, disputes frequently raise questions about what 
controverted events are covered by the clause, and what procedural powers have been 
given to an arbitrator.  For example, a party might assert that a transaction occurred 
before the arbitration clause entered into effect, or that the arbitrator’s power to award 
punitive damages had been expressly circumscribed.189 
c) Waiver, Delay and Other Post-Contract Events 
 Arbitrators are often presented with questions arising out of events subsequent to 
contract formation.  Invalidity might be asserted on the basis of assignment,190 waiver of 
the right to arbitrate,191 failure to observe statutory or contractual time limits, or undue 
delay in pursuing a claim.192  For example, the arbitrator might be asked to determine 
whether one party's recourse to courts constitutes waiver of the right to compel 
                                                                                                                                                 
government minister with the ambiguous words "approved, agreed and ratified."  Egypt v. 
Southern Pacific Properties, Ltd., Judgment of July 12, 1984, Cour d'appel, Paris 1987 
J.D.I. (Clunet) 129; 1986 Rev. Arb. 75.  See 23 I.L.M. 1048 (E. Gaillard trans. 1984).  
Affirmed by Cour de cassation Judgment of Jan. 6, 1987, Cass. civ. lre,  1987 J.D.I. 
(Clunet) 469 (with commentary by Ph. Leboulanger), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1004 (E. 
Gaillard trans. 1987).  The I.C.C. award itself (Case No. 3493) is published in 22 I.L.M. 
752 and 1986 Rev. d'Arbitrage 105.  Following a subsequent ICSID award against Egypt 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 20 May 1992), the parties reached a final settlement in 
December 1992.  See 8 Int. Arb. Rep. 328 (Jan. 1993). 
188  See also discussion supra of U.S. Court of Appeals decisions in Sarhank, Intergen, 
and Bridas v. Turkmenistan; English Queen’s Bench decision in Kazakhstan v. Istil and 
U.S. district court decision in Fluor Daniel  v. General Electric. 
189  See also discussion infra of the Scalia opinion in Pacificare. 
190  Apollo v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989). 
191  Cabintree v. Kraftmaid, 50 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 1995). 
192  Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 647 N.E.2d 1308 
(1995). 
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arbitration, or whether delay in bringing a claim bars arbitration by virtue of a statute of 
limitations or an eligibility requirement contained in arbitration rules.193 
d) Ab Initio Invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement   
 The validity of an arbitration clause may be in doubt not only because of gross 
consensual defects related to physical duress and forgery, but also due to the lack of 
authorized signatures required by the corporate by-laws or inadequate incorporation of 
institutional arbitral rules.194     
e) Procedure 
 In addition to excess of jurisdiction with respect to substantive contract questions, 
an arbitral tribunal may act outside the limits to their authority set by the parties with 
respect to procedural matters.  The arbitral tribunal may be improperly constituted (under 
a set of institutional rules other than the ones specified in the contract), or the arbitral 
tribunal may deny one side its right to be heard during the arbitral proceedings.  An 
                                                 
193 See, e.g., Paine Webber v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193 (D. Mass. 1995) (six year time 
limit for bringing claim under NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure held to be a question 
for arbitrator to decide); Smith Barney v. Luckie, New York Ct. App., 21 Feb. 1995, 63 
U.S. Law Week 2531 (7 March 1995) (statute of limitations questions must be resolved 
by courts; New York law not pre-empted by Federal Arbitration Act).  Compare New 
York cases cited in Paine Webber v. Landay at n. 5 of Judge Woodlock's opinion.  See 
also Zwitserse Maatschappij van Levensverzekering en Lijfrente v. ABN International 
Capital Markets, 996 F. 2d 1478 (2d Cir. 1993) (initiation of judicial proceedings in the 
Netherlands resulted in waiver of right to arbitrate); Khalid Bin Alwaleed Foundation v. 
E.F. Hutton, U.S. Dist. Ct. N. D. Ill., E.D. (1990), reported in XVI Yearbook Comm. Arb. 
645 (1991) (participation in pre-trial discovery did not constitute waiver of right to 
arbitrate).    
194 See Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d. 1136 (9th 
Cir. 1991), concerning securities law violations brought by government entities against 
investment company.  The government entities resisted arbitration on the grounds that the 
individual who signed the agreements allegedly on their behalf did not have authority to 
do so. The Court of Appeals held that whether the signatory had authority to bind the 
plaintiffs was a question for the courts to decide, and remanded the case to the district 
court for a determination on the matter. 
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increasingly important source of jurisdictional difficulty lies in the multiparty dimension 
of many business disputes.  Problems arise from attempts to consolidate related 
arbitrations195 and to appoint arbitrators for claims against more than one defendant.196  
For better or for worse, the Federal Arbitration Act does not authorize forced 
consolidation of different arbitration proceedings, even if they present similar questions 
of law and fact.197 
 Since specific examples often provide greater insight than general definitions,198 a 
list of illustrative jurisdictional problems has been appended to this essay.199 In no way 
do these scenarios exhaust the variety of situations in which the arbitrator’s right to make 
a jurisdictional ruling could become an issue.  Rather, they are presented as further 
examples of when and how challenges to arbitral power arise.   
C. Admissibility 
 Often we understand what something is by considering what it is not.  The 
essence of arbitral jurisdiction might be put into starker relief through a comparison with 
                                                 
195  Consolidation difficulties are illustrated by the now legendary story of the Macao 
sardine case as retold in Michael Kerr, Arbitration v. Litigation, 3 ARB. INT'L 79 (1987). 
196  Siemens and BKMI v. Dutco, Cour de cassation (France), 7 January 1992, Chambre 
Civile No. 1, Cass., 1992 Rev. d'Arbitrage 470. (two defendants and a three person 
arbitral tribunal). 
197 See United Kingdom v. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68 (1993).  The United Kingdom moved to 
consolidate arbitrations with Boeing and Textron, Inc., both of which had contracted with 
British Ministry of Defense to develop an electronic fuel system.  The Court ruled that 
consolidation of separate proceedings cannot be ordered absent the parties’ consent.  An 
earlier decision in Neurus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975), was distinguished on its 
facts.  In the United States, forced consolidation will be possible only in a jurisdiction 
(like Massachusetts) that does provide for joinder of related parties.  See New England 
Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988), discussed infa. 
198  Sylvia Plath once observed that “the concrete can save when the abstract might kill.”  
SYLVIA PLATH, THE JOURNALS OF SYLVIA PLATH 287 (1982). 
199  Appendix I, infra. 
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what is sometimes called “admissibility”.   
 A precondition to arbitration (limiting an arbitrator’s right to hear the case) is not 
the same thing as a precondition to recovery (restricting one side’s right to obtain 
damages).  For example, arbitrators might well have authority to hear a dispute over 
mismanagement of a brokerage account, but deny the claim on the basis that the statute of 
limitations had passed.200  
 Notions of admissibility would normally be used to describe constraints on the 
right to file claims in cases clearly subject to arbitration.  Since the matter is properly 
before the arbitrators, their decisions would usually not be reviewable in court.201  
Admissibility might relate to whether a claim is ripe enough (or too stale) for 
adjudication, or to arbitral preconditions (such as mediation) or time bars (a prohibition 
on claims more than six years after the alleged wrong).202   
                                                 
200  Other illustrations of pre-conditions to recover can be found in long-term supply 
contracts, which often provide for arbitration of disputes about price adjustments.  
Frequently, price modification will require the arbitrators (i) first to find a change in 
market conditions, and (ii) then to establish how far (and in what direction) the prices 
should be modified to reflect such changed conditions.  Both questions remain matters of 
the substantive merits of the case, since the parties intended them to be addressed by the 
arbitrators rather than courts.  The two-fold nature of the arbitrators’ task simply 
represents the parties’ assessment of the most efficient and logical way for analysis to 
proceed.   
201  There might, however, be some situations in which valid jurisdictional challenges 
could be mounted to improper decisions on admissibility.  If a contract says no actions 
may be filed before 2010, a putative award in 2005 would appear to most observers as an 
excès de pouvoir (subject to annulment) rather than simply an unreviewable mistake 
about calendars. 
202  For a comparison of jurisdiction and admissibility in investment arbitration, see Ian 
A. Laid, A Distinction without a Difference?  An Examination of the Concepts of 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction in Salini v. Jordan and Methanex v.USA, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION:  LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, 
NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (T. Weiler ed. 
2005).  See also contribution by Jan Paulsson in INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE & 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 601 (2005). 
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 In some instances, jurisdictional and admissibility questions may overlap.  For 
example, a brokerage contract might be subject to rules that make an investor’s claim 
ineligible for arbitration unless filed within six years after the allegedly inappropriate 
advice or trade.  In addition, a statute of limitations might exist in the law applied to the 
merits of the dispute.  The latter question (statute of limitations) would clearly fall to the 
arbitrators as part of their decision on the merits.203  The former (eligibility for 
arbitration) might or might not be for arbitrators, depending on the parties’ intent as 
evidenced in the applicable arbitration rules. 
 It may not always be apparent why distinctions should be made between (i) the 
time bar in a statute of limitations and (ii) a time restriction on arbitration eligibility.  
However, the difference is crucial.  The statute of limitations (a matter of admissibility) 
bars recovery itself, whether before courts or arbitrators.  The limitation applies to the 
claimant’s right to receive damages, regardless of the forum.  By contrast, the 
jurisdictional limit, restricting eligibility for arbitration, says only that the case must be 
brought in court rather than before the arbitrator.  
 Preconditions to arbitration do not always lend themselves to facile analysis.  In 
one intriguing case, Vekoma v. Maran Coal,204 Switzerland’s highest court annulled an 
                                                 
203  Statutes of limitations relating to arbitration law (rather than the underlying claim) are 
for judges.  For example, in a motion to compel arbitration opposed on the basis that it 
was made too late, an American court found that the Federal Arbitration Act failed to 
provide its own statute of limitations, and thus borrowed analogous limitations from state 
law principles at the place where the court was sitting.  See National Iranian Oil v. Mapco 
Int’l, 983 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1992).   
204  See Tribunal fédéral (Bundesgericht) decision in Transport-en Handelsmaatschappij 
Vekoma B.V. v. Maran Coal Co., Civil Division I, 17 Aug. 1995, reprinted 14 (No. 4) 
ASA BULL. 673 (1996) with commentary by Philippe Schweizer.  See generally, Paul 
Friedland, Swiss Supreme Court Sets Aside an ICC Award, 13 (No. 1) J. INT’L ARB. 111 
(1996); Pierre Karrer & Claudia Kälin-Nauer, Is There a Favor Iurisdictionis Arbitri?, 13 
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award in which the arbitrators had declared themselves competent to hear a claim 
arguably brought after the contractually stipulated time limits.  The contract required 
claims to be filed within thirty days after the parties agreed that their differences could 
not be resolved by negotiation.  The arbitrators found that settlement negotiations had 
broken down in April 1992, and thus a May filing was timely.  The respondent took the 
position that failure to settle occurred in January, when a letter from the claimant met 
with silence.   
 The court vacated the award, finding the arbitration clause lapsed by May when 
the claim was filed.  Saying that negotiations might fail as a matter of either fact or law 
(“tatsächlich oder normativ”), the court found failure as a matter of law when the 
January offer went unanswered.205  Whether the court was right to review the arbitrators’ 
determination about time limits depends largely on the parties’ intention in drafting their 
contract.  Here as elsewhere, jurisdictional determinations often remain very fact 
sensitive.   
 One questionable aspect of this decision is that the Swiss court apparently deemed 
its review powers greater on questions of law than of fact, perhaps analogizing to review 
of cantonal court decisions.  As a policy matter, this distinction is highly problematic.  If 
arbitrators wrongly assume Company A acted as agent for Company B in signing an 
arbitration clause, they exceed their authority as to Company B whether from 
misunderstanding the law of agency or from a factual mistake about who signed the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(No. 3) J. INT’L ARB. 31 (1996); François Knoepfler & Philippe Schweizer, Jurisprudence 
suisse en matière d'arbitrage international, 1996 REV. SUISSE DR. INT’L & DR. EUROPÉEN 
573.  Compare an arbitral tribunal’s treatment of missed deadlines, deemed not to rise to 
the level of a jurisdictional defect.  Tribunal fédéral Decision of 24 March 1997, 15 ASA 
BULLETIN 316 (1997).  
205See 14 ASA BULLETIN 676-78, at ¶ 3. 
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contract. 
 At this point, the distinction between “admissibility” and “jurisdiction” might 
provide a helpful segue into a deeper analysis of the nature of jurisdictional challenges.  
As we shall see, it is not always an easy task to distinguish between a decision that goes 
beyond the arbitrator’s mandate and one that is simply wrong.  
D. The Nature of Authority:  Out of Bounds or Just Wrong?   
1. Party Consent  
 The party raising questions about the arbitrator’s authority is not just saying that 
the arbitrators have made (or might make) an incorrect decision about whatever question 
has been put at issue.  Rather, jurisdictional challenges argue that arbitrators have gone 
(or will go) out of bounds whatever their decision, whether right or wrong.  At stake is 
not whether claimant breached the contract or owes $10 million, but rather the identity of 
the forum (arbitration or court proceeding) that will address and adjudicate the questions 
of contract breach and damages.  Even if the respondent did breach, and does owe the 
money, an arbitrator lacking jurisdiction would not be authorized to hear the arguments. 
 A jurisdictional challenge asserts that the arbitrator has no right at all to hear a 
matter or exercise a procedural power.  The challenge may be directed at the case in its 
entirety, a particular question (such as a competition counterclaim), or the exercise of a 
procedural power (such as imposing sanctions for failure to produce documents or 
granting interest).  The problem may also rest with the absence of a precondition to 
arbitration, such as the expiry of time limits.206     
                                                 
206  A precondition to recovery, of course, is not the same thing as a precondition to 
arbitration.  For example, arbitrators might well have the right to hear a case, but deny the 
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 The labels applied to excess of authority may vary from country to country, with 
related terms (“jurisdiction”, “authority”, “powers” and “mission”) often used almost 
interchangeably, or with slight contextual nuances to indicate what the arbitrator was 
authorized to decide rather than how the arbitrator was authorized to decide.  In some 
legal systems, excess of authority may overlap with notions related to clear legal error.  
For example, courts in the United States have given themselves power to set aside awards 
for “manifest disregard of the law”,207 a malleable term most often applied when 
arbitrators have exceeded their authority,208 also a statutory basis for vacatur.209   
 These jurisdictional questions remain neutral as to the merits of the case.  It 
makes no difference whether claimant or respondent is right on the question of contract 
interpretation.  The only issue is whether the arguments should be heard by arbitrators 
rather than courts.   
                                                                                                                                                 
claim on the basis that the statute of limitations had passed.  The distinction is sometimes 
referred to as between jurisdiction and “admissibility”.  See discussion infra. 
207 See e.g., Noah Rubins, “Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral 
Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363 (2002); Hans Smit, Manifest 
Disregard of the Law in New York Court of Appeals, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 315 (2004).  
See also Stephan Wilske & Nigel Mackay, The Myth of the ‘Manifest Disregard of the 
Law’ Doctrine, 24 ASA Bulletin 216 (2006). 
208  See Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 
TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, at 530-533 (2005), analyzing the doctrine through the lens of two 
recent Court of Appeals cases, Hoeft v. MVL Group, 343 F. 3d 57 (2d Cir 2003) and 
George Watt & Son v. Tiffany, 348 F3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001). 
209 For a recent rejection of a losing party’s “manifest disregard” challenge, see St. John’s 
Mercy Medical Center v. Delfino, 414 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The arbitrator did not 
cite relevant law and then ignore it….”).  By contrast, the court did vacate for “manifest 
disregard” in Patten v. Signator Insurance Agency, 441 F. 3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006), where 
the arbitrator dismissed a claim against an insurance company by one of its sales agents, 
invoking a time limitation in an earlier contract with a different company.  In theory the 
Court distinguished non-reviewable error in contract interpretation from reviewable 
excess of authority.  The court then lost its way, however, and went on to cite substantive 
Massachusetts law to find that the award was in “manifest disregard of the law”. 
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 Attempts to grapple with the nature of arbitral jurisdiction often fall prey to two 
divergent intellectual tendencies.  The first conflates substantive errors on the merits 
(misinterpretation of the law) with errors of jurisdiction for the purpose of subjecting 
arbitral decisions to judicial review.  After all, it might be argued, the parties never 
authorized the arbitrators to make a mistake.  Thus from one perspective, each time the 
arbitrators go wrong in law they go beyond their mandate.210  According to this view, 
since mistakes are not authorized, by definition they constitute an excess of authority.   
 The reverse tendency conflates jurisdictional questions with the dispute’s 
substantive merits, but for the opposite purpose:  to deny courts the opportunity to second 
guess arbitrators.  Rather than saying that mistakes of law are questions of jurisdiction, 
some American courts find that jurisdictional questions have become questions of 
substance, submitted to the arbitrators by virtue of the parties’ agreement.  Such a 
characterization exercise has been performed on questions such as time bars to arbitral 
authority, the right to consolidate cases, and the power to grant punitive damages.211   
 Admittedly, it is not easy to articulate an intellectually rigorous test for 
distinguishing jurisdictional error from other types of mistakes, either for commercial 
                                                 
210  Such was the position once taken in England by Lord Denning, who once suggested 
(albeit in an administrative context) that “Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes 
outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void.”  See LORD DENNING, THE 
DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW 74 (1979).  See also Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of 
Harrow School, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736, 743 (C.A.) ("The distinction between an error 
which entails absence of jurisdiction and an error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . . 
that it is rapidly being eroded.").  See generally the House of Lords decision in Anisminic 
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, [1969] 1 All ER 208.  
Happily for the health of English law, the House of Lords in 2005 rejected this position a 
year ago in the Lesotho Highlands decision. 
211  See discussion infra in Part V. 
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arbitration or for law in general.212  As with most legal problems, the difficulties lie at the 
fringes.213  However, definitional difficulty does not mean that vital distinctions cease to 
exist between a decision that is wrong and one that exceeds the authority of the purported 
decision-maker.214   
 In deciding challenges to arbitral authority, the parties’ intent should serves as the 
touchstone and the lodestar.  If the arbitrators have addressed (or are likely to address) 
questions that the parties submitted to arbitration, they do not exceed their power. 
                                                 
212  For an inquiry into similar questions in public international law, see W. MICHAEL 
REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION (1971).  See also Alex Lees, The Jurisdictional Label: 
Use and Misuse, 58 Stanford L. Rev. 1457 (2006), addressing more rigid applications of 
jurisdictional rules that operate “to shift authority from one law-speaking [sic] institution 
to another.”   Id. at 1460.  The matter was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Kontick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (bankruptcy time prescription for creditor 
objections not jurisdictional in the sense of dispositive), which described jurisdiction as a 
word with “many, too many, meanings”.   Id. at 454. 
213  In some instances, the very same facts might be relevant both to the merits of a 
dispute and to jurisdiction.  See Jackson v. Fie Corporation, 302 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2002), 
involving enforcement of a default judgment arising from the misfire of a pistol allegedly 
made by an Italian manufacturer.  Testimony of the plaintiff’s firearms expert (stating the 
gun was made by Fratelli Tanfoglio) proved relevant both to the merits of the products 
liability action and the court’s personal jurisdiction over the foreign company.   
214  The world of education provides a relatively simply illustration of the difference 
between simple mistake and excess of authority.  In American law faculties, the professor 
who teaches a course normally bears responsibility for grading exams.  If the lecturer 
decides that a paper merits a “B”, then the student receives a “B”, perhaps adjusted for 
classroom participation, again by the professor.  Now assume that a colleague happens by 
chance to read the exam, and finds the grade excessively severe (the student deserved an 
“A”) or unduly generous (the paper merits only a “C”).  The second professor’s views do 
not matter, whether correct or not.  Each professor bears the authority and duty to grade 
his or her exams.  That being said, not all authors would agree that a distinction can be 
made between the merits of a dispute and jurisdiction, at least in the context of court 
actions.  See Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS LAW J. 
1613 (2003), examining links between words such as “power” and “ability” in the context 
of jurisdiction.  One wonders whether the thesis has not been overstated.  Simply because 
the line between merits and jurisdiction sometimes runs thin does not mean the line never 
exists.   
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2. The Arbitrator’s Job:  Competing Principles 
 Judicial deference to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determination implicate several 
principles sometimes in tension one with another.215  First, the arbitrators’ decisions are 
normally final on the questions submitted to them, usually referred to as the merits of the 
dispute.  Second, the arbitrators’ decisions are not final on issues that the parties did not 
submit, which is to say, which fall outside the scope of the arbitral authority.  Finally, 
courts will not defer to arbitrators’ decisions that violate basic notions of public policy in 
the forum asked to endorse or give effect to the award.  
 Renunciation of the right to seek justice through government courts means that an 
arbitrator has the right to get it wrong, in the sense of evaluating a controverted event 
differently than would the otherwise competent judge.216  Assuming the risk of a bad 
award on the merits of the dispute does not, however, mean giving arbitrators power to 
decide matters never submitted to them.  The arbitrator’s job is to decide the case.  The 
court’s job is to support the arbitral process, but only to the extent it does not exceed the 
mission conferred by the parties or the limits of public policy. 
 This distinction between a mistake on the merits and an excess of authority goes 
                                                 
215 By deference, of course, one means something more than hypocritical adornment to 
soften the blow of an annulment, where a judge prefaces the vacatur with words such as, 
“With greatest respect for the distinguished arbitrator” while really thinking that this is an 
award that must be seen to be believed. 
216  In mandated, court-annexed "arbitration" within the United States however, the 
parties normally retain a right to a de novo trial, making the so-called arbitrator a 
conciliator in reality.  See 28 U.S.C. § 655.  See generally Lisa Bernstein, Understanding 
the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration 
Programs, 141 U. PENN. L. REV. 2169 (1993).  Some state statutes, however, seem to 
ignore the principle of consensuality.  See e.g. Minnesota's statute requiring arbitration of 
motor vehicle accident claims not in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) (Minn. 
Statutes § 65B.525), where the state has in essence given an adjudication franchise to the 
American Arbitration Association. 
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to the heart of what arbitration is all about.  Arbitration is a consensual process unfolding 
within an enclosure created by contract.  Litigants accept the risk of arbitrator mistake 
only for decisions falling within the borders of arbitral authority.  A simple error is 
normally not subject to challenge, since the parties asked an arbitrator to decide the legal 
and factual merits of their dispute.  But no court should recognize an award falling 
beyond the arbitral authority that gives legitimacy and integrity to the process. 
 Most modern arbitration statutes acknowledge this prohibits appeals related to the 
substantive merits of an award.  Unlike judges, arbitrators do not normally find their 
decisions reversed for mistake of law.  Arbitration statutes do, however, allow challenge 
to awards that go beyond the arbitrators’ mission,217 whether described as an “excess of 
jurisdiction,” “excess of authority” or “excess of powers”.218   
 A party disappointed by an award will sometimes attempt a “backdoor” appeal 
through arguments which depict the arbitrator’s mistake as an excess of authority rather 
than a contract misinterpretation.  Errors of law in contract interpretation seem to lend 
themselves to being portrayed as excess of jurisdiction.  An award allowing lost profits, 
                                                 
217  Some arbitral regimes permit annulment for excess of authority only when a tribunal 
“manifestly” goes beyond its powers.  See Article 53(1)(b) of the 1965 Washington 
(ICSID) Convention, insightfully discussed in Philippe Pinsolle, Manifest Excess of 
Power and Jurisdictional Review of ICSID Awards, in ICSID Annulment, 2 TRANSNAT’L 
DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 39 (April 2005).   
218  For the purpose of this analysis, the terms jurisdiction, authority, and powers are used 
interchangeably.  Slight nuances might exist in certain contexts.  For example, “excess of 
jurisdiction” might apply to what the arbitrator is authorized to decide, and “excess of 
powers” to how the decision is made.  However, each expression describes arbitrator 
behavior that goes beyond what is permitted by the relevant legal and contractual 
framework.  See generally statement by Lord Phillips in Lesotho Highlands (at paragraph 
51, discussed infra) acknowledging that “the concept of an excess of power that is not an 
excess of jurisdiction is not an easy one”.  .  
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for example, might be portrayed as an arrogation of power not granted by the contract.219   
Sound distinctions between simple mistake and excess of authority rest on two 
fundamental principles.  First, an agreement to arbitrate normally means accepting that 
the arbitrator might make a mistake in evaluating the merits of the parties’ claims and 
defenses.  It would make little sense to say that an award will be final and binding if 
litigants automatically get a second bite at the apple, turning arbitration into foreplay to 
court proceedings.   
3. Consent and Presumptions 
 Equally important, however, is the principle that litigants in arbitral proceedings 
do not expect to be bound by overreaching intermeddlers.  Decisions on matters never 
submitted to arbitration deserve no more deference than the opinions of a random 
commuter passing through the Paris Métro or New York’s Grand Central Station.  This 
distinction remains central to the degree of deference that courts should grant an award 
that appears to tread on jurisdictional matters. 
 While such extreme examples may be rare (due to the in terrorem effect of 
judicial scrutiny), they do exist.  Until enjoined by a federal court, a Florida “arbitration 
service” recently conducted one hundred and fourteen (114) “arbitrations” against a bank.  
In each instance, a credit card holder received an “award” in the precise amount of the 
cardholder’s outstanding debt, even though the bank had never signed an agreement 
authorized the arbitration service to decide these disputes.220 
                                                 
219  See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas v. Société Générale (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
220  Chase Manhattan Bank v. National Arbitration Council, 2005 WL 1270504 (M.D. 
Fla. 2005).  One Mr. Charles Morgan acted as sole arbitrator under the auspices of the 
National Arbitration Council (NAC), of which he was sole proprietor.  The arbitration 
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 In the more normal line of cases, analysis is complicated by the different 
thresholds that exist for various types of consent.  In some instances consent must be 
explicit or in writing.  On other occasions, circumstances might permit consent to be 
inferred or presumed.   
 This should not be surprising, given the varying manifestations of consent in 
aspects of life other than arbitration.  Only the most unromantic (or unrealistic) individual 
would argue that a woman’s consent to be kissed by her boyfriend must be in writing.  A 
glance or a phrase can supply the invitation.  Her consent to be married, however, 
normally requires a higher degree of formality, evidenced by ceremony and explicit 
words of acceptance. 
 Similarly, in determining consent to arbitrate jurisdictional questions, the nature 
of the evidence required varies according to the character of the challenge.  On one 
extreme, a company might say it never agreed to arbitrate anything at all.  To meet this 
challenge, the other side would normally need to produce a written agreement of some 
sort.  At the other end of the spectrum, the parties might differ over whether the arbitrator 
appointed to decide their dispute has power to award compound interest.  Here, one might 
rely on inferences or presumptions drawn from generally accepted arbitral practice.  In 
the middle might fall questions about the validity of an arbitration clause following an 
assignment, where the parties’ intent can be ascertained by inferences in some situations 
                                                                                                                                                 
clause in the credit agreement listed three arbitral institutions:  American Arbitration 
Association, JAMS and National Arbitration Forum.  The court granted an injunction 
against NAC and Mr. Morgan from conducting arbitrations or issuing awards involving 
the bank (Chase), and from accepting any monies from Chase cardholders for arbitration 
services.  
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but not others.221  
 In short, consent implicates a continuum of commitment.  Once the major step (an 
agreement to arbitrate) has been taken, the details (arbitrator power on matters such as 
interest or assignment) might yield more easily to presumptions.222 
4. Public Policy 
 In order to reflect the interests of persons not party to the arbitration agreement, 
legal systems sometimes draw boundaries around an arbitrator’s jurisdiction.  Such 
“externalities” relate to sensitive public norms that affect all of society.  The restrictions 
on arbitral power usually take the form of either limits on subjects that may be arbitrated 
(either in general or for a specific case)or refusal to give effect to awards whose content 
offends the recognition forum’s most basic notions of morality or justice. 
a) General Subject Matter Limits  
 An arbitrator’s decision may be “out of bounds” not only because it lacks any 
foundation in the parties’ mutual consent, but also due to the arbitration’s legal 
framework applicable regardless of any agreements between the litigants.  
Notwithstanding the protagonists' desires, arbitration has on occasion been limited for 
“public policy” (ordre public) reasons with respect to sensitive subject matters such as 
                                                 
221  See AC Equipment Ltd. V. American Engineering Corp., 215 F. 3d 151 (2d Cir. 
2003), where a subcontractor challenged the contractor’s assignment of their agreement, 
arguing that the assignment invalidated the ad hoc arbitration clause.  The court held that 
arbitration could be compelled, and an arbitrator appointed, without judicial hearings on 
the assignment’s validity.  The court distinguished the situation in which a subcontractor 
argues that it never agreed to arbitrate at all. 
222  For an exploration of consent as a series of concentric circles, see Alan Scott Rau, 
Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, forthcoming 2007.  
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competition law, securities regulation or civil rights violations.223   
 An attempt to empower an arbitrator to hear a particular dispute might be 
impermissible because the state has taken a monopoly on implementation of the law in 
areas where arbitrators (much like foxes guarding a chicken coop) present too great a risk 
of getting it wrong.  Public policy may be invoked as a catch-all prohibition on the 
arbitration of certain categories of disputes, as well as to protect the integrity of the 
arbitral process in matters such as arbitrator bias or lack of due process. 
 Public policy limits on arbitrability per se are less important than they used to be, 
in the sense that courts now tend to allow arbitration to proceed with respect to public law 
claims related to anti-trust, securities regulation, patents, bankruptcy and state franchise 
statutes.224  Nevertheless, there still exist situations in which courts might feel it proper to 
deny arbitrators jurisdiction to hear questions relating to certain statutory claims, out of 
concern that the arbitrator might “get it wrong” in a way that injures vital public interests.  
 To revive an old metaphor, allowing deference to arbitrators’ determinations of 
acceptable public policy would be similar to leaving matters of war entirely to generals.  
In connection with vital public law claims, it would be hard to see how any submission of 
arbitrability to the arbitrator (regardless of whether it was in fact accepted by the parties) 
                                                 
223  It is important to distinguish between invocation of public policy as a bar to 
arbitration, and the imposition of public policy to limit the way an arbitrator can or must 
decide the case.  In the latter connection, See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. V. Benetton 
International NV, European Court of Justice, Case 126/97 (ECR I-3055, 1999), 
concerning an application to annul an award contrary to European Community 
competition law.  On public policy in arbitration, see generally, HOMAYOON ARFAZADEH, 
ORDRE PUBLIC ET ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA MONDIALISATION (2005) 
Chapter II, 79-128.   
224  For examples of the abandonment of earlier judicial hostility to arbitration of 
statutory claims that implicate vital societal interests, see generally, William W. Park, 
International Forum Selection (1995), at 97-100. 
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could be immune from independent judicial review.   
 Challenges to jurisdiction based on public policy do not yield to the same kind of 
analysis as jurisdictional limits based on the parties’ agreement.  The parties cannot 
expect the state to respect a grant of arbitral power on a subject matter that the state 
deems non-arbitrable.  Similarly, arbitrators would not normally be permitted to 
determine their jurisdiction in any final and binding way in an award that furthers the 
parties’ fraud.225 
b) Restrictions for Specific Cases 
 In some instances, public policy might limit arbitration of a particular dispute 
rather than an entire subject matter.  The imposition of such jurisdictional restrictions can 
be illustrated by the decision in United States v. Stein.226  Said to be the largest criminal 
tax case in American history, the case involves the indictment of former partners of the 
KPMG accounting firm, who were accused of conspiracy and tax evasion in connection 
with abusive tax shelters.227  The partners asserted that by contract KPMG must advance 
                                                 
225  For example, a federal Court of Appeals in the United States upheld vacatur of an 
award in which the re-incorporation (“redomestication”) of a captive insurance company 
from Massachusetts to Bermuda was deemed to be a fraud on the public regulatory 
authorities.  See in Commercial Union v. Lines, 378 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2004).  A captive 
insurance company called EMLICO reinsured with Commercial Union a portion of its 
liability under policies that EMLICO issued to General Electric, its only policy holder.  
General Electric sought to recover asbestos clean-up costs from EMLICO, which in turn 
sought to recover these from Commercial Union.  EMLICO allegedly had transferred its 
corporate domicile to Bermuda by deceiving the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner 
about its solvency.  The district court was directed to determine whether the Bermuda 
liquidation of EMLICO affected the results in the arbitration.  The fraud at issue was not 
in the procurement of the re-insurance contract, nor in the procurement of the award (for 
example, by bribery), but rather fraud on a governmental body that potentially affected 
the outcome of the arbitration.   
226 2006 WL 2556076 (SDNY 2006); stay pending appeal denied, 2006 WL 2724079. 
227  Employees as well as partners were indicted. For ease of articulation, however, the 
term “partners” will be used for both categories of defendants. 
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the legal fees incurred for their defense.  The firm argued that this “advancement claim” 
must be arbitrated pursuant to the terms of a partnership agreement    
 When the partners brought a court action to enforce their claim for the legal fees, 
the firm moved to dismiss the action on the basis of the arbitration clause.  The court thus 
had to consider whether the dispute over the right to legal fees was itself subject to 
arbitration.    
 The case holds that arbitration of the legal fees issue would violate public policy 
even assuming the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.228  The reasoning requires a 
bit of background.  Federal prosecutors had been found to have violated the partners’ 
Constitutional rights to counsel by pressuring KPMG (under threat of indictment and 
destruction of its business) to refuse advancement of the legal fees.   
 Acknowledging the principle that ambiguity in the scope of an arbitration clause 
would normally be decided in favor of arbitration, the court nevertheless took jurisdiction 
to decide on the question of legal fees.  The policy in favor of arbitration was outweighed 
by a stronger federal policy in favor of prompt and fair criminal trials.  The court 
considered arbitration of the legal fees issue would undermine this policy.   
 The court posited that arbitration involves “unpredictable timing and the 
likelihood of delay” and thus “would force the court to do violence to one important 
public interest or another.”  The interest that tipped the scale was the prompt 
determination of whether the defendants had proper counsel, or rather needed 
appointment of a lawyer at public expense.   
 One might disagree with the court’s assumption about the delay occasioned by 
                                                 
228  The decision also addresses rights of several allegedly “non-party” defendants who 
asserted that they had never agreed to arbitrate.  
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arbitration rather than litigation.  However, it is not hard not to understand the concern 
that private arbitration should not derail a large criminal case, even if one does not accept 
the court’s suggestion that arbitration is slow and unpredictable. 
c) Content of the Award 
 Questions related to subject matter arbitrability intersect with, but are distinct 
from, problem derived from awards that violate public policy by reason of their content.  
For example, an arbitrator might well have jurisdiction to decide an antitrust question.  
But he or she cannot ignore the relevant law and policies without risking having the 
award refused recognition on the grounds that it violates public policy229 or gives effect 
to illegal conduct.230   
                                                 
229  See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985), where 
the Court asserted (rightly or wrongly) that “having permitted the arbitration to go 
forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws has been addressed [because the New York Convention] reserves to each signatory 
country the right to refuse enforcement of an award where the “recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”  While 
the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award-
enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that 
the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.  
230  Obvious examples include awards ordering payment for sales of slaves, heroine or 
illegal arms to terrorists.  If an airline pilot is dismissed from employment for showing up 
drunk at the cockpit, courts can be expected to vacate an award reinstating the pilot.  See 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern., 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988), 
involving pilot who was intoxicated while flying a commercial plane from Bangor, 
Maine, to Boston, Massachusetts.  Focusing on the regulations promulgated by the Fedral 
Aviation Administration, the court consider the case non-arbitrable, stating the airline 
“was under a duty to prevent the wrongdoing of which its Pilot-In-Command was guilty, 
and it could not agree to arbitrate that issue.”  Id. at 674.  This non-arbitrability approach 
denies effect to an arbitral finding on the facts that the pilot had not been drunk.   Such 
violation of public policy in the process of performing employment duties was 
distinguished from situations in which public policy was violated outside employment, 
giving rise to no workplace violation of a duty.  In such instances, an arbitrator might be 
given greater leeway with respect to bad behavior.  See United Paper Workers v. Misco, 
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 Mandatory norms of the place of performance may limit an arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction regardless of the applicable law.  An arbitrator who ignores American 
antitrust laws, in connection with sales to New York consumers, can expect his or her 
award to be vacated (assuming an arbitral situs within the United States) even though the 
contract provides for Swiss law to be applicable.231 
 In this connection, arbitrators may find themselves in a double bind.  In applying 
the mandatory norms of the place of performance, an arbitrator may exceed his or her 
jurisdiction under the law of a country called to enforce the award or monitor the 
integrity of the process.  In the above example, the arbitrator who applied American 
antitrust rules even though the parties asked for a decision according to Swiss principles 
could expose the award to annulment for excess of authority in an arbitral situs that did 
not share the United States' perspective on the proper role of competition law.  
IV. Items for Further Consideration  
 Inevitably, no matter how good a legal doctrine, questions arise about its 
application in specific situations.  The devil always lurks in the details.  The following 
discussion takes as its springboard several questions drawn from the French, German, 
English and American legal systems.  Raising these queries in no way suggests that the 
legal systems mentioned have proven inadequate.  Rather, the various lines of inquiry 
reflect a call for further dialogue.   
                                                                                                                                                 
484 U.S. 29 (1987) (marijuana found in car) and Florida Power Corp. v. IBEW, 847 F. 2d 
680 (11th Cir. 1988) (drunk driving on employee’s own time).  
 231  See footnote 19, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 
(1985).  Pro-consumer usury prohibitions might also impose themselves on the arbitration 
of a loan transaction expressly made subject to the laws of a country without limits on 
interest rates. 
 91 
A. “Manifestly Void” Clauses in France  
 As mentioned earlier, in French law the arbitrators’ power to decide on their own 
competence operates in tandem with an explicit provision that puts off jurisdictional 
challenges until after an award is rendered.  The Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile 
provides that if a claim has already been presented to the arbitrators (literally, if the 
tribunal has been “seized” of a matter) courts must declare themselves without 
jurisdiction to hear the case.  If arbitration has not yet begun, courts must also declare 
themselves lacking jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement is “clearly void” 
(manifestement nulle).232   
 The theory seems to be that a party wrongfully hindered in bringing its arbitration 
claim deserves more solicitude than does a party improperly joined to an arbitral 
proceeding.  To deal with the former risk (dilatory tactics to disrupt arbitration), courts 
are given only limited power to examine the validity of the arbitration clause before the 
arbitration has begun, and none at all after proceedings have started. 
 Following an award, however, judicial review will take place on the grounds 
provided by the French arbitration statute, which for international arbitration covers a 
                                                 
232  NCPC Article 1458.  The full text reads as follows, “When a dispute for which an 
arbitral tribunal has been constituted [literally “seized” of the dispute] pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement is brought before a governmental court, the court must declare 
itself without jurisdiction.  If the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted [literally 
“seized” of the dispute], the court must also declare itself without jurisdiction unless the 
arbitration agreement is clearly void.”  Author’s translation.  (In the original, “Lorsqu’un 
litige dont un tribunal arbitral est saisi en vertu d’une convention d’arbitrage est porté 
devant une juridiction de l’État, celle-ci doit se déclarer incompétente.   Si le tribunal 
arbitral n’est pas encore saisi, la juridiction doit également se déclarer incompétente à 
moins que la convention d’arbitrage ne soit manifestement nulle.”)  Although certain 
provisions of domestic French arbitration law do not apply to international arbitration, 
such is not the case for Article 1458, which falls within Title I of Book IV of the NCPC.  
See NCPC Article 1507 and Décret du 12 mai 1981, Articles 55 and 56, providing for 
non-application of certain provisions in Titles IV, V and VI.  
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number of jurisdictional defects:  decision in the absence of an arbitration agreement, 
irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal, and failure to respect the mission given to 
the arbitral tribunal.233  
 This system conserves judicial resources by delaying review until the end of the 
process, when the parties may have settled or the arbitrator might have gotten it right.  
Some authors have called this sequence a “guarantee of good administration of 
justice”.234  
 One source of puzzlement to many non-French lawyers lies in the fact that the 
exception for clauses that are manifestement nulle applies only when the arbitration has 
not begun.  Why should this be so?  Faced with a clause that is clearly void, why should a 
court finds its hands tied in declaring the nullity of the proceedings simply because a 
purported arbitration has already begun?  Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the 
parties are already before a judge, and thus the risk of delay is less than if no judicial 
action had yet begun. 
 A “manifestly void” clause would seem inoperative regardless of how far along 
the sham procedures had run.  To some observers, it seems strange to delay judicial 
                                                 
233  Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile Article1502, for international cases.  Review in 
domestic arbitration can be found in Articles 1483, which provides for annulment of an 
award containing analogous jurisdictional defects. 
234  Pierre Mayer, L'autonomie de l'arbitre dans l'appréciation de sa propre compétence, 
217 RECUEIL  DES COURS (Académie de droit international de La Haye) 321 (1989) at 
350, suggesting, “L’examen successif est une guarantee de bonne administration de la 
justice; le juge pourra s’inspirer de la motivation adoptée par l’arbitre, ou y trouver au 
contraire une faille révélatrice.”  However, Mayer also argues that when a court action 
has been begun before arbitration, the judge should address the alleged jurisdictional 
defect without regard to whether “manifest” or not.  Id. at 346.  Moreover, good reason 
exists to suspect that Professor Mayer’s views may have evolved during the past few 
years, to the point that he would favor an immediately available summary court 
proceeding to decide whether an arbitration clause was clearly void.   
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intervention in an arbitration with no consensual underpinning simply because someone 
has set a process in motion.   
 Perhaps, at the beginning of an arbitration, courts might limit their task to 
determining whether they can be prima facie satisfied that the arbitration clause exists, 
deferring an in-depth analysis of jurisdiction to the moment when the award itself must 
be reviewed.  But why should all examination of jurisdiction be forbidden? 
 Since arbitration remains consensual at its core, one might even ask how a 
purported tribunal can be “seized” of any matter on the basis of a void clause.  There 
exists a risk of loading the analytic dice by using the term “arbitration” to refer to a 
process that was never accepted by the two sides.  As a definitional matter, when a 
signature on an alleged arbitration agreement was clearly forged, or signed with a gun at 
her head, to label someone an arbitrator would not provide decision-making authority any 
more than calling a dog’s tail a “leg” would give the animal five limbs instead of four.235  
Without a grant of authority from the litigants, a would-be arbitrator is no more than a 
shameless volunteer.     
B. The New Approach in Germany 
1. The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Clause236 
 Like the length of women’s dresses, arbitration law often experiences its own 
fashion changes from one season to another.  Perhaps the most radical of such style shifts 
can be found in the German approaches to arbitrators’ jurisdictional determinations. 
                                                 
235 Abraham Lincoln once asked, “If I call a tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have? 
Five?”  He then answered, “No.  Four.  Calling a tail a leg does not make it so.” 
236  For helpful comments on the German cases, thanks are due to Professor Peter 
Schlosser, Professor Klaus Peter Berger, and Dr. Ulrich Lohmann. 
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 At one time, German courts recognized contract provisions that granted 
arbitrators a right to rule on their own authority in a final (rather than temporary) way.237  
In a landmark case arising from a charter party of a refrigerated transport ship, 
Germany’s highest court admitted the possibility of an agreement on jurisdiction (eine 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz-Klausel).  The arbitral tribunal was given power to render a 
jurisdictional decision on whether the charterer’s agent was bound to arbitrate, subject to 
no judicial second-guessing.238  The job of deciding whether in fact such a clause existed 
in the relevant freight contract (so as to bind the party resisting arbitration) was remanded 
to the lower court.  This principle followed the lines of an earlier Bundesgerichthof 
decision rendered almost a quarter century earlier,239 and was confirmed in a case 
decided as late as 1991,240 the same year the German Ministry of Justice established a 
reform commission whose work ultimately led to enactment of a new arbitration law. 
2. The 1998 Reforms  
 In 1998 Germany adopted the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law.241  During the 
                                                 
237  See generally Peter Schlosser, The Competence of Arbitrators and of Courts, 8 ARB. 
INT’L 189 (1992), at 199-200.  See also Klaus Peter Berger, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ARBITRATION (1993) at 359; Klaus Peter Berger, INTERNATIONAL 
WIRTSCHAFTSSCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT (1992) at 253. 
238  BGH, Urteil v. 5 Mai 1977, III ZR 177/74.  Reported in 68 BGHZ 356, at 358.  See 
discussion in Peter Schlosser, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN 
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT (1989) at § 556. 
239  BGH II ZR 323/55, decided in 1953. 
240  BGH III ZR 68/90.  See BGH Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1991, 2215. 
241  On the 1998 German law, see Friedrich Niggemann, Chronique de Jurisprudence 
Étrangère:  Allemagne, 2006 Rev. arb. 225; Otto Sandrock, Procedural Aspects of the 
New German Arbitration Act, 14 ARB. INT’L 33 (1998); Peter Schlosser ADR II, Institute 
of Comparative Law, Chuo University, Japan 335 (Takeshi Kojima, ed. 2004); Klaus 
Peter Berger, Das neue Schiedsverfahrensrecht in der Praxis – Analyse und aktuelle 
Entwicklungen, in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT (RIW), Heft 1 (2001). 
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drafting stage, the official commentary on Article 1040 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (the 
equivalent of UNCITRAL Model Law Article 16) stated that courts would always have 
the last word on arbitral jurisdiction.242  In essence, questions of arbitrator jurisdiction 
were shifted to the category of non-arbitrable subject matters.  This principle has been 
affirmed by judicial pronouncements and authoritative commentary, asserting that 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses are against public policy243 and that courts may intervene 
at any time to decide arbitral competence.244  As discussed below, it remains to be seen 
whether the logic of these commentators and judicial decisions will be pushed to cover 
even separate contracts on arbitral authority, rather than simple jurisdictional clauses 
contained a single commercial agreement.   
                                                 
242 See ENTWURF EINES GESETZE ZUR NEUORDNUNG DES SCHIEDSVERFAHRENSRECHTS 
July 1995, at page 132 (draft commentary on German adoption of the UNCITRAL Model 
Arbitration Law). 
243  JOACHIM MÜNCH, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZPO, 2. Auflage, Band 3, § 1040 
(München 2001), at 1183 (Rdnr. 26). This commentary argues that the interplay of § 1040 
subsections 1 (tribunal may rule on its jurisdiction) and 3 (one month period for challenge 
of ruling) establish a mandatory character of judicial jurisdiction.  Consequently, the 
commentary characterizes Kompetenz Kompetenz clauses as unwirksam, weil gegen 
zwingendes Recht verstossend (inoperative because they violate mandatory law).  See 
also KLAUS-PETER BERGER, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, 
Volume I (2006), at Question 7; Klaus-Peter Berger, The Implementation of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany, 13 INT. ARB. REP. 38 (January 1998). 
244  Peter Schlosser in STEIN/JONAS, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, 22. 
Auflage, Band 9 (Tübingen 2002) § 1040, Rdnr. 2, at page 489, with cross-reference to 
Schlosser’s own comments at § 1032, Rdnr. 11.  Professor Schlosser writes, “Aus der 
vorläufigen Kompetenz-Kompetenz des Schiedsgerichts folgt auch nicht, dass es das 
‘erste Wort’ bezüglich der Wirksamkeit der Schiedsvereinbarung erhalten hätte.”  (“It 
does not follow from the arbitrator’s preliminary Kompetenz-Kompetenz that he has the 
“first word” regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement.”)  In referring to the “first 
word” on jurisdiction, Professor Schlosser sought to draw attention to the way Germany’s 
practice (permitting courts to rule on jurisdiction before an arbitral award) differs from 
the legal position in France, where court review of jurisdiction generally waits until after 
the award has been rendered.  German law provides that courts will always have the “last 
word” on jurisdiction, and in some instances may also have the “first word” as well.  
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 Current case law has endorsed a prophylactic rule that seems to bars such clauses, 
regardless of what the evidence might show about the parties’ intent.  The prohibition on 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses was confirmed clearly by a 2005 decision of the 
Bundesgerichtshof245 which had followed a shift in approach announced three years 
earlier in a case expressing concern that a wrongful assertion of arbitral jurisdiction might 
results in deprivation of a party’s “lawful judge” (gesetzlich Richter)246   
 The significance of the 2005 decision lies not only in its statements about 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses, but also in its affirmation that judges may provide 
jurisdictional input before an arbitrator’s decision on the matter.  Thus courts not only the 
“last word” on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, but in some instances the “first word” as well. 
 To a large extent, this new approach seems to derive from a fear of sloppy judicial 
decision-making.  Rather than a rigorous analysis to determine the existence of a genuine 
agreement to arbitrate jurisdiction, judges were apparently inclined to leave jurisdictional 
                                                 
245 BGH, Urteil 13 Januar 2005, III ZR 265/03.  Reported NJW 16/2005 at 1125.  The 
case is also reported on the DIS database, with notes by Huber/Bach and Wagner/Quinke. 
An alleged loss on a brokerage account (typical in arbitration cases) brought a court 
action for recovery notwithstanding the arbitration clause.  In the course of confirming 
the duty to arbitrate, the Court re-emphasized that any jurisdictional decision would be 
subject to review.  On its facts, the BGH pronouncement gives little difficulty.  There was 
in fact no award review at all, let alone a challenge to a first award establishing 
jurisdictional principles for a second arbitration.   In Anglo-American legal thought, the 
court’s decision might be labeled dictum.  See also BGH decision of 23 February 2006 
(III ZB 50/05), reported 2006 SCHIEDSVZ (May/June 2006) 161, reversing the Karlsruhe 
OLG refusal to recognize an award rendered in Minsk under the rules of the Byelarus 
(White Russia) Chambe of Commerce.  Germany’s highest court rejected the contention 
that international public policy (ordre public inernational) had been violated by an 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling in a final award on the merits.  According to the 
BGH, no policy violation occurs if the final jurisdictional ruling rested with the 
government courts, as was the case in Byelarus.  2006 SCHIEDSVZ 161, at 164.   
246  BGH, Urteil 6 Juni 2002, III ZB 44/01.  This decision involved an arbitral tribunal’s 
finding that it lacked jurisdiction.  However, the court in dictum contrasted the facts of its 
case with the opposite scenario, where an arbitral tribunal wrongfully assumes 
jurisdiction thereby depriving a party of its “lawful judge” (gesetzlich Richter).    
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issues to the arbitrators, almost automatically finding Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses on 
scanty evidence.  In the backlash, legislators and scholars expressed the opinion (rightly 
or wrongly) that the UNCITRAL Model Law was inconsistent with such a practice.247   
 In discussing the prior lack of analytic rigor, one of Germany’s most eminent 
scholars suggests that prior to 1998 his country’s judiciary had become inclined to find 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses even where they did not exist, thus clearing the judicial 
dockets even as to a party that had no real intent to waive its right to a court hearing.248  
Professor Schlosser tells of a case in which a corporate liquidator had begun an action in 
Germany for a determination that certain goods were not the property of the respondent, a 
matter which arose by operation of law apart from the contract subject to arbitration.  The 
parties to the relevant arbitration agreement had agreed as follows: “For all disputes 
arising out of this contract the contracting parties submit themselves to the Chamber of 
Commerce of Geneva.”  The Bundesgerichthof instructed the lower court to verify the 
existence of an oral agreement to arbitrate by which the arbitral tribunal would have had 
jurisdiction to decide the scope of the written agreement to arbitrate.249   
 The German arbitration statute has an express provision permitting declaratory 
court judgments on the validity of arbitration clauses, provided application is made prior 
                                                 
247 See BT-Drucksache 13/5274 at 26 & 44, cited by the Bundesgerichthof in its decision 
of 13 January 2005, at 5 & 6.  See also ENTWURF EINES GESETZE ZUR NEUORDNUNG DES 
SCHIEDSVERFAHRENSRECHTS July 1995, at 132 (draft commentary on German adoption of 
the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law), discussed supra. 
248 Peter Schlosser ADR II, Institute of Comparative Law, Chuo University, Japan 
(Takeshi Kojima, ed. 2004) 335, at 340. 
249  Schlosser, id. At 342-343, citing Juristenzeitung 1989, 201. 
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to constitution of the arbitral tribunal.250  Moreover, German judges may examine fully 
the validity of the arbitration clause either in the context of a court action on the merits of 
a claim251 or an annulment action of either an interim jurisdictional decision252 or final 
award.253   
 It should be noted, however, that German scholars are not unanimous on all 
questions related to court review of arbitrators’ jurisdiction.  Some writers say that 
judicial review is mandatory, and thus the parties cannot by agreement create a de facto 
waiver of those provisions through an agreement giving a jurisdictional question to 
arbitrators.254  Others, however, appear to accept that the parties may waive grounds for 
award vacatur that are designed to protect private interests,255 as opposed to public 
                                                 
250  ZPO Section 1032(2) which provides, Bei Gericht kann bis zur Bildung des 
Schiedsgerichts Antrag auf Feststellung der Zulässigkeit oder Unzulässigkeit eines 
schiedsrichterlichen Verfahrens gestellt werden.  (“Prior to the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal, an application may be made to the court to determine whether or not arbitration 
is admissible.”) 
251 ZPO Section 1032(1).  Compare the practice obtaining in France under NCPC Article 
1458, which allows pre-award court pronouncements on arbitration clauses only if the 
clause is “manifestment nulle” and only if the arbitration has not yet begun. 
252  ZPO Section 1040(3), analogous to UNCITRAL Model Law Article 16(3).  
253 ZPO Section 1059.  
254  Judicial review would normally occur under either under ZPO Section 1040(3) or 
ZPO Section 1059, depending on whether the award is interim or final. 
255 See Geimer in ZÖLLER, ZPO, 25. Aufl., 2005, § 1059, Rdnr. 2 and 80; SCHWAB & 
WALTER, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT, 7. Aufl., 2005, Kap. 6, Rdnr. 10; Albers in 
BAUMBACH, LAUTERBACH, ALBERS & HARTMANN, ZPO, 64. Aufl., München 2006, § 
1059, Rdnr. 2.  See also GEIMER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (5. Aufl., Köln 
2005) at 130-131 (notes 309-311), addressing procedural party autonomy in relation to 
foreign judgments.  Geimer posits that parties should be able to waive grounds for non-
recognition designed to protect one of the parties, as opposed to government interests 
(unmittelbare Staatsinteressen), and to create by agreement a reliable environment for the 
resolution of their dispute. 
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order.256  The result of this latter approach would be that courts might give respect to 
agreements subjecting jurisdictional questions to final arbitration, provided such 
questions are clearly identified.  
3. The Parties’ Expectations 
 At the risk of appearing presumptuous (always a hazard for a foreign lawyer), one 
might ask whether a blanket denial of Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses constitute an 
overreaction which might in some cases disregard the parties’ legitimate expectations.  
The text of the law provides simply that arbitrators may rule on their own jurisdiction, 
that jurisdictional challenges must be raised in a timely fashion, and that the arbitrators’ 
rulings on the matter would normally (in der Regel) take the form of an interim decision 
subject to judicial review on a request filed within thirty days of the ruling.257   
 These provisions say nothing about when or whether these arbitral decisions 
should be final.  The statute here is silent about whether parties may create a special 
contractual regime submitting jurisdictional questions to final decision by an arbitrator.   
While such agreements may be rare in practice,258 they might in some cases exist. 
 If the parties have two disputes (one related to the merits, and the other to 
jurisdiction), and wish to submit each to arbitration, it is hard to see why they should be 
prevented from doing so.  Courts should, of course, have the opportunity to verify the 
reality of the alleged consent to arbitration.  Judicial review would in all events involve 
                                                 
256  Clearly the grounds for vacatur under ZPO 1059(2) (public policy and subject matter 
arbitrability) should not be waivable, since these matters directly implicate government 
(rather than private) interests.   
257  ZPO Section 1040 
258  In the adversarial context of preliminary jurisdictional rulings under ZPO § 1040 
(UNCITRAL Model Article 16), parties rarely agree on very much, let alone a 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause. 
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examination of the validity of the initial agreement allegedly granting the arbitrators 
power on jurisdictional questions such as the scope of their procedural powers or the 
range of issues covered by the arbitration clause.   
 The grounds for judicial review envisaged in ZPO Sections 1040 (for interim 
decisions) or 1059 (for final awards) certainly remain matters of public policy, and 
include lack of arbitral authority.259  However, it would seem an elevation of form over 
substance to suggest that a question of arbitral authority which relates only to what the 
parties agreed (bearing no relation to any issue of substantive ordre public) must remain 
non-arbitrable (thus eluding a final decision by the arbitrator) notwithstanding an express 
contractual stipulation to the contrary.   
 The matter may well turn out to be a question of what is meant by a decision on 
the “merits”.  As suggested in the cautionary tale set forth earlier in this paper,260 the 
parties may well wish, in some cases, to grant arbitrators power to decide a jurisdictional 
question in the same way they would decide some other questions of contract 
interpretation.  If so, it would be unfortunate if the new German position on Kompetenz-
Kompetenz clauses applied to separate agreements on arbitral authority,261 and indeed 
                                                 
259  ZPO Section 1059, analogous to UNCITRAL Model Law Article 34, permits vacatur 
for invalid arbitration agreement, inability to present one’s case, an award that deals with 
a matter not falling within the arbitration submission, or improper constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal.  
260  See discussion supra in Part II.  The time limits in that scenario, we remember, are 
restrictions on arbitral authority, not statutes of limitations.  The latter remain substantive 
in German law.  BGB §§ 195 et seq.  The hypothetical presumes that the restrictions limit 
the right to arbitrate, not substantive recovery. 
261  ZPO Section 1059(1)(c) (analogous to UNCITRAL Model Law Article 34) permits an 
award to be set aside if it deals with a dispute beyond the scope of the arbitration 
submission, and Section 1059(1)(d) permits setting aside of the arbitral award if the 
procedure is not in accordance with the parties’ agreement.    
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inconsistent with the goal of the UNCITRAL Model Law, to give binding effect to 
legitimate arbitral decisions.   
 Whether made in Germany or abroad, an award should be subject to challenge for 
jurisdictional infirmity.262  However, neither side should be permitted to renege on a 
freely-accepted arbitration agreement followed by fair proceedings, even if the agreement 
covers matters relating to arbitral authority,. 
4. Avoiding Extremes 
 It is not difficult to sympathize with the concerns of German courts, legislators 
and scholars in connection with the confusion and potential abuse caused by earlier 
decisions.  Loose talk about arbitrators determining their own jurisdiction can give rise to 
inappropriate overreaching.  A contract’s jurisdictional clause does not necessarily give 
the arbitrator competence, any more than pieces of paper can by themselves agree to 
anything.263  Only individuals agree, whether in their own capacity or as agents for 
legally cognizable collectivities.  Jurisdiction must be determined according to all the 
facts and circumstances, not simplistic recitals. 
 The prospect that a legal principle may be misused does not necessarily justify a 
rule that leads to a different type of error.  With respect to arbitral jurisdiction, risks exist 
at two extremes. On the one hand, courts should not assume the finality of an arbitrator’s 
jurisdictional determination merely on the basis of contract recitals taken out of context.  
On the other extreme, no good reason has been advanced to prohibit genuine consent to 
                                                 
262  See discussion in Niggemann, Chronique de Jurisprudence Étrangère, supra at 235: 
“les tribunaux allemands constatent régulièrement que la décision du tribunal arbitral 
étranger sur sa compétence ne les lie pas”.  Nigemann goes on to cite New York 
Convention Article V(1)(a), related to absence of a valid arbitration agreement. 
263  See Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Sphere Drake v. All American Insurance, 256 F. 
3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001), at 590.  
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arbitration on questions related to the existence of an arbitrator’s power.   
 As a matter of policy, sophisticated business managers have long been permitted 
to agree on final decisions about contract liability and damages.  Such decisions normally 
benefit from a presumption of deference to the parties’ pre-dispute wishes.  Likewise, 
business managers may agree to arbitrate such matters.  No good reason seems to prevent 
similar agreements about the jurisdictional pre-requisites to such arbitration.264  
 If the “old style” German Kompetenz-Kompetenz was abused, the remedy might 
be better education of judges and lawyers about the dangers of overreaching arbitrators.  
With thoughtfulness and care, policy-makers should be able to avoid both extremes in the 
pursuit of reasonable counterpoise in the articulation and application of jurisdictional 
rules. 
C. Arbitral Jurisdiction and Contract Interpretation  
1. The Litigants’ Role in Creating Arbitral Authority  
 In a commercial agreement, broadly drafted arbitration clauses often give the 
arbitrator authority to construe contract language as well as to establish the facts.  In an 
international context, this interpretative function will occasionally involve determining 
which governing law applies.    
 On occasion, the parties may wish to be more explicit about either the powers 
granted, or the restrictions imposed, with respect to the arbitrator’s powers.  Sometimes 
this may be done through explicit contract language, and sometimes through 
incorporation of provisions in the relevant arbitration rules.  For example, an arbitrator 
                                                 
264  In a consumer context, sound public policy might call for a higher level of judicial 
paternalism.  See DAVID QUINKE, BÖRSENSCHIEDSVEREINBARUNGEN UND PROZESSUALER 
ANLEGERSCHUTZ (Carl Heymans Verlag 2005).  This question was expressly left open by 
the BGH above-cited decision of 13 January 2005. 
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might be granted, or denied, the right to award attorneys’ fees265 or to permit third parties 
to intervene.266   
 What should happen when arbitrators misconstrue (in the eyes of the reviewing 
court) contract language relating to their authority?  Challenges to an arbitrator’s exercise 
of specific powers can set the stage for a battle between two equally important 
presumptions:  (i) the last word on contract interpretation is normally for the arbitrator; 
but (ii) absent the parties’ agreement otherwise, the final say on arbitral jurisdiction 
remains for the courts.  As in so many other matters related to arbitral jurisdiction, the 
                                                 
265  Article 31 of the AAA International Rules permits arbitrators to follow the European 
practice by awarding “the reasonable costs for legal representation of a successful party”.  
By contrast, New York CPLR § 7513 endorses the so-called “American rule” by 
providing that attorneys’ fees are permissible only if provided in the parties’ agreement.  
At least one court has held that reference to the AAA Rules does not satisfy the 
requirements of New York law.   See CIT Project Finance v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 
799 NYS2d 159, 2004 WL 2941331 (2004).  This slip opinion may be distinguished on 
its facts, given that the relevant clause was drafted restrictively, giving the arbitrator 
power to decide only a narrow question whose resolution did not dispose of the claim.  
The approach applied more generally permits arbitrators to determine the parties’ intent 
with respect to legal frees.  See PaineWebber v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996).  See 
also Shaw Group v. Triplefine International Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2nd Cir. 2003) and 
Stone & Webster v. Triplefine International Corp., 118 Fed.Appx. 546 (2d Cir. 2004), 
involving attorneys’ fees in an ICC arbitration.  The two Triplefine decisions related to 
the same dispute, although the first decision also included Stone & Webster’s parent the 
Shaw Group.  In the Shaw decision the Second Circuit vacated a lower court decision that 
had enjoined a party from claiming as contract damages attorneys’ fees incurred in 
opposing motions to stay arbitration.  In the Stone & Webster decision the court affirmed 
an award of attorneys’ fees (for the arbitration and the court action) notwithstanding the 
argument that they were precluded by N.Y. P.P.L.R. § 7513, which imposes the so-called 
“American rule” of denying legal fees in breach of contract cases “unless otherwise 
provided in the agreement to arbitrate.”  The decision upheld the parties’ right to waive 
the provisions of New York law by reference to institutional rules (such as those of the 
ICC) which provide for arbitrators to allocate legal expenses. 
266  See e.g., See Rules 22.1(h), LCIA Arbitration Rules, allowing a willing third person 
to be joined to a proceeding notwithstanding the objection of one of the parties. 
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resolution of such conflicts will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the 
case.  Set forth below are two contexts in which courts have struggled with this tension.   
2. Paradigm Cases:  Foreign Currency and Punitive Damages 
a) The House of Lords in Lesotho Highlands 
 One distinctive feature of English arbitration law is its detail.  The 1996 Act 
seems to contain more specific rules about particular arbitral or judicial powers than any 
other major arbitration statute.   
 Most of these rules, however, contain an important escape hatch:  they apply 
unless the parties have otherwise agreed, which is entirely as it should be in a legal 
system that values party autonomy and flexibility.  For example, arbitrators are given 
authority to order security for costs (Section 38), to dismiss a claim for inordinate delay 
by the claimant (Section 41), to make an award in “any currency” (Section 48), or to 
award compound interest (Section 49).  In all cases, however, the relevant arbitral powers 
are circumscribed by the qualifier “unless otherwise agreed” by the parties.267  Granting a 
“power” to an arbitrator constitutes another way of saying that the arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction to do something, whether order security for costs, award interest or make a 
decision denominated in a particular currency.  
In connection with these jurisdictional grants, the question that then arises is, 
                                                 
267 Similarly, courts are given powers subject to the parties’ agreement otherwise.  The 
most notable example can be found in Section 69, which gives courts the right to correct 
an error of law. The Act provides for appeal on question of law (defined as questions of 
English law) but permits appeal to be waived either before or after the dispute arises.  
This opportunity for waiver of merits review meets the goal of arbitral finality expected 
by those members of the international business community who arbitrate in London for 
reasons of convenience and expertise, rather than to hear high-priced QC's engage in 
clever courtroom debate of matters already decided by the arbitrators.  As under prior 
law, exclusion of merits review can be made by reference to institutional arbitration rules 
providing for waiver of appeal.   
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“Who decides whether the parties have otherwise agreed?”  Who determines whether a 
particular form of authority has been taken from arbitrators? A mistake in contract 
interpretation should not normally be reviewable.  The arbitrators’ job is to interpret the 
parties’ agreement.  But what happens if the part of the contract they interpret relates 
directly to their powers?  
On the one hand, an award might well be recognized even though arbitrators 
imperfectly exercised powers granted by the statute. If the contract says that an arbitral 
tribunal is authorized to award compound interest, there would normally be no cause for 
annulment simply because the chosen rate was different than the one that a reviewing 
court might have considered appropriate.   
On the other hand, the principle that arbitrators interpret contract language cannot 
stand for the proposition that they can create their own jurisdiction ex nihilo.  If a contract 
says that arbitrators have no authority to award treble damages, it is hard to see how they 
could interpret the limitation as a grant.   
What an arbitrator might find, however, is that the ban on treble damages was 
void under the applicable law.  If so, the award could award exemplary damages if 
justified by the portions of the contract that were not tainted by invalidity.  Similar 
findings might be made with respect to other contract restrictions, such as a limitation of 
liability clauses that fixed a ceiling on recovery at a percentage of the price of goods sold, 
or excluded consequential damages.  In all cases, however, the finding would need to be 
made as a matter of contract construction (the task given to the arbitrator), not 
interpretation of the arbitration law. 
The matter has sometimes been subject to a certain ambiguity.  The principal 
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speech by Lord Steyn in the House of Lords decision in Lesotho Highlands suggested 
that the Arbitration Act gave “unconstrained” power to make an award in any 
currency.268  His colleagues disagreed, however.269  Lord Steyn then went on to posit that 
the power was not unconstrained, and that arbitrators had erred in interpreting either the 
contract or the Arbitration Act.  In either event, he said, the arbitrators would have done 
no more than commit error of law.270   
The possibility of a mistake in the interpretation of the Arbitration Act, however, 
might be more troublesome.  Interpretation of arbitration statutes normally falls to courts.  
Arbitrators cannot, simply by their own bare assertion, create powers they do not have.  If 
an arbitration statute requires awards to be denominated in Sterling, it is hard to see how 
an arbitrator’s ipse dixit can generate authority to award Swiss Francs. 
The difficulty arises because a decision on whether the parties have “agreed 
otherwise” amounts not only to an interpretation of the contract, but also to a de facto 
construction of how the Arbitration Act should be applied in a particular circumstance.  
By deciding that the parties have or have not “agreed otherwise” the arbitrators expand or 
contract their own authority accordingly.  
In Lesotho Highlands, Lord Steyn made clear that the most that might have 
                                                 
268  Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43 (30 
June 2005), reversing the Court of Appeal decision found at [2004] All  ER (Comm.) 97 
(CA 2003).  Id., at Paragraph 22.  See generally William W. Park, The Nature of Arbitral 
Authority:  A Comment on Lesotho Highlands, 21 ARB. INT’L 483 (2005). 
269  Lords Hoffmann, Scott and Rodgers agreed that error of law does not equal excess of 
power.  However, they disagreed with Lord Steyn’s construction of Section 48 concerning 
an arbitrator’s power to order payment of money in any currency.  Lord Phillips (at 
paragraphs 43-54) went further and stated that the arbitrators had purported to exercise a 
discretion that the statute did not give them.  
270  Paragraph 23, HL decision of 30 June 2005. 
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occurred in the case at bar was an erroneous exercise of powers that actually existed.271  
An award of Swiss Francs might be an imperfect exercise of arbitral power, but would 
not be a jurisdictional invention.  
The contours of arbitrator power, however, may be more difficult to ascertain in 
other situations.  For example, a contractual choice-of-law clause might designate a legal 
system that prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.272  But such a clause 
could perhaps be read to designate substantive only state contract law, not including 
arbitral procedure.273  Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, it is not 
always obvious when damages are punitive rather than compensatory.274  To what extent, 
then, do arbitrators have the power to confer on themselves, in a final and binding way, 
authority to grant punitive damages? 
 The decision in Lesotho Highlands cannot stand for the proposition that 
arbitrators may purposefully ignore their mandate.  The arbitrators awarded currencies 
considered “appropriate in the circumstances” after having taken careful note of the 
contract stipulations275 and looked only to currencies and exchange rates in the parties’ 
agreement.  Nothing suggests that their award was a fig leaf to cover intentional disregard 
                                                 
271  Paragraph 24, HL decision of 30 June 2005. 
272  See, e.g., New York law as expressed in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 
(1976).  
273 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995), upholding an award 
for punitive damages in a dispute covered by a New York choice-of-law clause. 
274 See Pacificare Health Systems v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2002), where a unanimous 
Court upheld the right to compel arbitration of claims under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act, which provides for treble damages, notwithstanding a 
contractual prohibition on punitive damages.  The Court suggested that treble damage 
awards sometimes serve “remedial purposes” that are compensatory in nature. 
275  See portions of award cited in Paragraph 10, HL decision of 30 June 2005. 
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of the contract. 
 The risk of pernicious arbitrator willfulness was noted by one observer, whose 
comment on Lesotho Highlands raised the specter of arbitrators “misapplying the 
Arbitration Act”, “ignore[ing] the parties’ agreement as to applicable law” and “riding 
rough-shod through choice-of-law provisions”.276  Beyond cavil, those who care for the 
health of arbitration must remain vigilant to such dangers, mindful of the difficulty in 
drawing the line between an arbitrator’s innocent misconstruction of the parties’ contract 
and a full-scale disregard of the arbitral mission.   
 That being said, the House of Lords decision in itself gives no mandate for such 
bad behavior.  An arbitrator might well apply a power given to him or her by the 
Arbitration Act, but do so in an imperfect way.  This might occur, for example, if the 
arbitrator applied interest or currency rates different from those that the reviewing judge 
would have considered appropriate.  A wrong decision with respect to exercise of clearly-
granted powers does not always equal an excess of authority.  
b) Punitive Damages:  The Supreme Court in Pacificare 
 In Pacificare Health Systems v. Book277 a group of doctors had filed a nationwide 
class action against several health maintenance organizations, alleging that the 
organizations had conspired to refuse proper reimbursement for services provided under 
the health plans accepted by the physicians.   The legal basis for the doctors’ action 
included claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 
                                                 
276 See Adam Samuel, Lesotho Highlands:  Denaturing an Arbitration Statute and an 
Express Choice of Law does not Involve the Arbitrator Exceeding his Powers, 23(3) J. 
INT’L ARB. 259 (2006), at pages 261, 262 and 263, respectively. 
277  538 U.S. 401 (2003), reversing In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation, 285 F. 
3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 109 
commonly known as RICO.278  This line of attack was attractive for the plaintiff 
physicians because the RICO statute allows awards of treble damages, amounting to three 
times any actual damage proven.  There was a catch, however.  The physicians had 
agreed to resolve disputes with the health care providers through arbitration.  And some 
of the arbitration agreements to which they had agreed were explicit in prohibiting 
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.279 
 The Supreme Court allowed the arbitrators themselves to determine, as an initial 
matter, whether they could grant treble recovery under the RICO, notwithstanding the 
contract limitation on punitive damages.  While the case is sometimes presented as an 
example of judges deferring to arbitrators on jurisdictional matters, the court in fact 
followed a different (and rather murky) line by denying that it was engaged in 
jurisdictional analysis at all.  As discussed below, Justice Scalia asserted that it was not 
clear (at least to him) that the power to award punitive damages presented a gateway 
“arbitrability question”, which is to say, a jurisdictional issue.  
 The lower courts had refused to require the physicians to arbitrate, reasoning that 
                                                 
278  18 U.S.C. § 1961-68.  While some readers might be puzzled that a health care 
provider was influenced by racketeers, those familiar with RICO know that it has long 
been commonplace to include racketeering counts in ordinary business litigation. Section 
1962 makes it unlawful to invest income derived from a “pattern of racketeering” in any 
business engaged in interstate or international commerce.  Section 1961 defines 
racketeering to include not only acts and threats of things such as murder, kidnapping, 
arson, robbery and bribery, but also acts indictable under several sections of federal 
criminal law.  Frequently RICO civil claims are based on alleged conspiracy to commit 
mail and wire fraud, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1341 & 1342.  Section 1964 provides that 
persons injured by violations of RICO shall recover “threefold the damages he sustains” 
as well as attorney’s fees.   
279   The various agreements provided either that (i) “punitive damages shall not be 
awarded [in the arbitrations], (ii) “arbitrators…shall have no authority to award any 
punitive or exemplary damages” or (iii) “arbitrators…shall have no authority to award 
extra contractual damages of any kind, including punitive or exemplary damages.”   
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if arbitrators could not award punitive damages this would deny meaningful relief for 
violations of RICO.  Presumptively, RICO claims were of such public importance as to 
be non-waivable in a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  The health care organizations 
appealed.  
 In a relatively brief opinion by Justice Scalia, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld 
the health care organizations’ right to compel arbitration.  The key to the Court’s 
reasoning lies in its assumption about the ambiguity of the term “punitive damages” and 
the nature of treble damages in the RICO statute.  The Court suggested that some judicial 
decisions had given treble damage a compensatory character, “serving remedial purposes 
in addition to punitive objectives.”280  Consequently, the Court expressed agnosticism 
about whether an arbitrator would or would not interpret the punitive damage 
prohibitions in a way that might cast doubt on the permissibility of treble damages.  “We 
do not know how the arbitrator will construe the remedial limitations,” wrote Justice 
Scalia, and thus it would be “mere speculation” (using the vocabulary of an earlier 
decision281) to presume that arbitrators might deny themselves the power to grant 
punitive damages”.  It was that very prospect (that treble damages might be found beyond 
the arbitrators’ jurisdiction) which had troubled the lower court, anxious to protect the 
physicians’ right to recovery.  Consequently, the Court would not take upon itself the 
authority to decide “the antecedent question” of how the ambiguity concerning punitive 
damages is to be resolved.282  
                                                 
280  Referring to statutory remedies such as those at issue in RICO claims, Justice Scalia 
described treble damages as lying “on different points along the spectrum between purely 
compensatory and strictly punitive awards.”  538 U.S. 405. 
281 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995). 
282  538 U.S. 407. 
 111 
 In essence, the Court decided not to decide, but to pursue a “wait and see” policy. 
On the theoretical level, therefore, the case cannot be said to give the arbitrators’ power 
to make final a determination on the matter of their authority.    
 Justice Scalia added to the suspense with an intriguing footnote.  “If the 
conceptual ambiguity [about what the prohibition on punitive damages might mean] 
could itself be characterized as raising a ‘gateway’ question of arbitrability,” he reasoned, 
then “it would be appropriate for a court to answer it [the arbitrability question] in the 
first instance.”283  The Court then concluded, “Given our presumption in favor of 
arbitration … we think the preliminary question whether the remedial limitations at issue 
here prohibit an award of RICO treble damages is not a question of arbitrability.”284 
 What the Court seems to be saying is that arbitrators would construe a particular 
expression in the contract (“punitive damages”) in the same way they interpret any other 
contract phrase, taking into account the context of the parties’ relationship and other 
terms in the agreement.  While the meaning given to these terms might affect one side’s 
recovery, it would not enlarge arbitral authority, given that it is already broadly defined 
under the common arbitration clause which gives arbitrators the job of interpreting the 
language in the parties’ agreement and the applicable law, even (and especially) in close 
                                                 
283  538 U.S. 407.  But the footnote continues that the phrase “question of arbitrability” 
should be applicable only in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting parties 
“would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are 
not likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, 
consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of 
forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate.”  
There are those who might observe, however, that the heart of arbitral jurisdiction turns 
on what the parties were “likely to have thought” about the decisions an arbitrator was 
supposed to make. 
284  538 U.S. 407, at n. 2. 
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cases.285 
 From one perspective, Scalia might be saying no more than that the matter is not 
ripe for determination until the court knows whether the arbitrators will in fact exceed 
their jurisdiction or violate public policy.286  The troubling aspect of this decision lies in 
its susceptibility to misinterpretation, as in essence giving arbitrators de facto power to 
determine their own jurisdiction to award treble damages, simply by the way they would 
interpret the notion of punitive damages.  If the arbitrators held that treble damages under 
RICO were not “punitive” in the context of the physicians’ claims, then by definition 
these damages would be within their jurisdiction.   Such a result may not be implausible 
under the circumstances.  Arguments have been made that treble damages make “rough 
justice” compensation for the disruption that may result from contract breach but be 
difficult to quantify.  The slope, however, does not continue indefinitely.  At some point 
language ceases to be elastic, and the parties’ words impose definite boundaries on what 
arbitrators can do. 
                                                 
285  Illustrations of this point arise in many interesting arbitrations.  Here are a few.  
(1) Professional specialty.  A statute might make limitation of liability clauses valid only 
in contracts between persons “in the same profession” (French law refers to contracts 
“entre professionels de la même specialité”).  Since two professional lives are rarely 
completely alike, the arbitrator must determine how narrow to draw the concept of 
professional “specialty”.  (2) “Subject to…”  A contract might make one obligation 
“subject to” a particular event.  Does the expression mean “On condition that” or 
“Unless”?  Both usages exist.  “Bob must take the exam, subject to [unless] being 
excused by the Dean.  But, “Christine will have dinner at home, subject to [on condition 
that] her plane lands on time.  (3)  A licensee might be entitled to sub-license to an entity 
that sells a “range” of the licensee’s products.  If the licensee sells three dozen products, 
how many constitutes a “range”?  Presumably we need more than one, but not necessarily 
thirty-six.  
286  Of course, when arbitration award can be enforced against assets abroad, this may be 
of little consequence. 
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D. The “Arbitrability Question” in the United States  
1. Legal Framework 
a) Overview 
 In the United States, questions otherwise be labeled “jurisdictional” often find 
themselves being classified as matters for the arbitrators to decide along with the merits 
of the dispute.  As we shall see, this characterization exercise lies at the heart of judicial 
deference to the arbitral process.    
 Unlike the arbitration laws of France,287 and to a lesser extent England,288 the 
Federal Arbitration Act creates no statutory presumption that courts should await the 
award before pronouncing themselves on an arbitrator’s authority to hear a dispute.289  
Early in the arbitral process, courts can decide whether a particular matter has been (or 
can be) submitted to arbitration, usually in the context of a motion to compel arbitration 
or to stay litigation.290   Courts remain free to entertain motions related to arbitral 
jurisdiction at any moment from the start of proceedings onward.  Moreover, when the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate is open to doubt, courts may order the question 
                                                 
287  See NCPC Article 1458, discussed supra. 
288 See 1996 Arbitration Act, Section 72, discussed supra, which provides for the right to 
challenge the arbitration agreement or jurisdiction through a motion for declaration or 
injunction only when the person alleged to be a party to the arbitration “takes no part in 
the proceedings”.  See also Sections 70(2) (applications and appeals may be brought only 
after exhaustion of available arbitral process) and 73 (loss of right to object to lack of 
jurisdiction if a litigant takes part in an arbitration without raising the matter in the 
proceedings). 
289  For the German position on the matter, see BGH decision of 13 January 2005, 
discussed supra.  
290  FAA Section 3 provides that federal courts shall stay competing litigation “upon 
being satisfied that the issue involved in such [judicial] suit or proceeding is referable to 
arbitration ….”   
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resolved by a jury.291 
 In other ways, however, American arbitration law has been extremely generous in 
giving arbitrators both the first and the last word in determining their own authority.   The 
statutory scheme for international arbitration has been integrated with a practice of 
sending jurisdictional questions to arbitrators if there is evidence that such is the path 
intended by the parties.292   
 The conceptual underpinning of this approach relies on a finding that “the parties 
intended that the question of arbitrability [used in the sense of jurisdiction] shall be 
decided by the arbitrator.” 293  With a different vocabulary, American courts have in 
essence adopted the old German concept of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause, by which the 
parties may agree to submit a jurisdictional matter to final and binding arbitration.294  As 
discussed more fully below, jurisdictional differences have been manipulated into the 
                                                 
291  See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000);  China Minmetals 
Materials Ltd. V. Chi Mei, 334 F.3d 274 (3d. Cir. 2003). 
292  For a survey of cases along these lines, see Robert B. Davidson, Recent U.S. Cases 
Affecting the Power of an International Arbitral Tribunal to Determine its own 
Jurisdiction, in THE SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT OF 1999 FIVE YEARS ON:  A CRITICAL 
REVIEW OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 61 (Lars Heuman & Sigvard Jarvin, eds. 2006; 
Symposium Proceedings, University of Stockholm, October 2004). 
293  See PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1192, at 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1996).  See also 
Alliance Bernstein Investments, discussed supra.  The principle has also been extended to 
class actions in JSC Surgutneftegaz v. Harvard College, 167 Fed.Appx. 266 (2nd Cir. 
2006), 2006 WL 354282, affirming 2005 WL 1863676 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  Here investors 
brought a class action arbitration over dividend policy of a Russian company, whose 
shares were evidenced by American Depository Receipts (ADR’s) held in New York.  
The court found “the intent of the parties to commit the question of arbitrability to the 
arbitrator.”  Slip opinion at 3.  The contest was not about the existence of the arbitration 
clause (accepted by both sides) but rather about whether its scope was broad enough to 
cover the parties’ dispute. 
294  American courts are often unwilling to use the same vocabulary as other nations, 
preferring to talk of “the arbitrability question” rather than jurisdiction.  See First Options 
of Chicago. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 
589, 596-98 (1st Cir. 1996).   
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realm of substantive questions whose resolution the parties are deemed to have given to 
the arbitrators.  
b) Void and Voidable Clauses 
 In the past, judicial decisions often distinguished between “void” and “voidable” 
clauses.  Under this view, only courts may decide challenges based on allegations that the 
agreement is void ab initio, rather than simply voidable at one side’s election.295   
 The instinct behind such decisions is understandable.  Ex nihilo nihil fit:  nothing 
comes from nothing.  Consequently, a void clause cannot serve as the source of authority 
for any putative arbitrator.296    
 However well-intentioned, the void/voidable distinction seems unnecessary.  The 
better approach would be for courts to ask simply, “What did the parties intend?”  If the 
arbitration clause was for some reason invalid, then there would be no party intent to 
arbitrate anything.  In some cases the invalidity might taint the entire contract, as in the 
event of forgery or unauthorized signature.  In other instances, the invalidity might touch 
only the arbitration clause, and might be the result of fraudulent misrepresentations about 
the arbitral process which gave one side the right to rescind that aspect of the 
                                                 
295  See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000); Three Valleys Mun. 
WaterDist. V. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F. 2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991); Canada Life Ass. Co. v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Sphere Drake Ins. v. All 
American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001).     
296  Pollux Marine Agencies v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 455 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  
In this connection, analytic links are often between an arbitrator’s jurisdictional power 
and the separability (autonomy) in the arbitration clause.  If the voidness or illegality of 
the main agreement does not strike the arbitration clause, the arbitrator continues to have 
power to make a jurisdictional determination.  By contrast, if the invalidity does infect 
the agreement to arbitrate (as might happen in a forged document) the arbitrator would 
clearly lack authority.  See Harbour Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kansa General Int’l Ins. Co., 
[1993] Q.B. 701. 
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transactions.297   
 What should matter is simply that the arbitration clause was invalid, regardless of 
how that came to be.298  Mercifully, the void/voidable distinction was finally laid to rest 
by the United States Supreme Court in its recent Buckeye decision.299  An action against a 
check cashing service, accused of making illegal usurious loans, was brought by 
borrowers in derogation of the arbitration clause.  The Court found that the allegation of 
“void loan agreement” did not deprive the arbitrators of the right to decide that very 
issue, as long as the arbitration clause itself remained sound. 
2. The Dictum in First Options  
 To understand the “arbitrability question” approach, the most convenient starting 
point might be First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan.300  In dictum, this U.S. Supreme 
Court decision supplied a verbal hook on which much subsequent case analysis has been 
                                                 
297  See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997), involving a 
malpractice claim against a health care provider in which habitual delays in arbitration 
were found to constitute fraud by the provider. 
298  For a view along these lines (albeit pursuant to a slightly different line of reasoning), 
see Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International 
Arbitration:  Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit?  Or Can Something Indeed Come From Nothing?, 
13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19 (2002), at 34-36. 
299 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S.Ct. 1204 (2006), discussed supra.   
300  514 U.S. 938, 943.  See generally, William W. Park The Arbitrability Dicta in First 
Options v. Kaplan:  What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?, 12 
ARB. INT'L 137 (1996), reprinted 11 INT'L ARB. REP. 28 (Oct. 1996); William W. Park, 
Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction:  Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 
8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133 (1997); reprinted in [2000] ADR LAW J.19 (March 2000).  For 
an academic tourney on some of the issues raised in First Options, see Thomas 
Carbonneau, Comment Upon Professor Park’s Analysis of the Dicta in First Options v. 
Kaplan, 11 Int’l Arb. Rep. 18 (November 1996); Alan Scott Rau, Arbitration As 
Contract:  One More Word About First Options v. Kaplan, 12 INT’L ARB. REP. 1 (March 
1997); Thomas Carbonneau, Le Tournoi of Academic Commentary on Kaplan:  A Reply to 
Professor Rau, 12 INT’L ARB. REP 35 (APRIL 1997).  See also, Shirin Philipp, Is the 
Supreme Court Bucking the Trend?  First Options v. Kaplan in Light of European Reform 
Initiatives in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U. INT’L L. J. 119 (1996). 
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hung.  Almost invariably, these cases cite First Options for the dual proposition that 
(i) contracting parties may agree to arbitrate jurisdictional matters (questions about 
“arbitrability”) but (ii) such agreement must be founded on clear evidence.  
 Prior to that decision, general American contract principles certainly existed to 
provide a doctrinal foundation for deference to arbitrators’ decisions on their authority.  
First Options, however, supplied a high level of visibility and authoritative endorsement 
for such deference.301   
 In First Options, an arbitral award had been rendered against both an investment 
company and its owners with respect to debts owed to a securities clearing house.  The 
owners (husband and wife) argued that they had never signed the arbitration agreement, 
and consequently were not bound by the award.  The Supreme Court carefully 
distinguished between three questions:  (i) did the Kaplans owe money?  (ii) did the 
Kaplsns agree to arbitrate? and (iii) who (court or arbitrator) should decide whether the 
Kaplans agreed to arbitrate?  
 On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s finding 
that the owners had not agreed to arbitrate, without any judicial deference to the 
arbitrator’s determination.302  Whether Manuel and Carol Kaplan were bound to arbitrate 
                                                 
301  See A T & T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986), 
discussed infra.  See also Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration, supra, at 
464, note 69, suggesting that the dictum of First Options can be “found fully developed 
in earlier Supreme Court decisions.”  Not all observers have noticed such full 
development.  
302  The Supreme Court also dealt with the standard a court of appeals should apply when 
reviewing a district court decision relating to vacatur or confirmation of an arbitral award 
under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  The Court held that a district court's 
findings of fact should be accepted unless “clearly erroneous,” but that questions of law 
should be decided de novo.  The Third Circuit agreed with the owners that they were not 
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by virtue of a clause signed by their investment company was a question for courts.  It 
was for a judge, not arbitrator, to provide the ultimate determination on whether Mr. and 
Mrs. Kaplan were in fact bound to arbitrate by reason of the actions of their investment 
company, on theories such as agency, alter ego, or lifting the corporate veil.   
 Although unnecessary to the holding of the case, the Supreme Court's went 
further and suggested that in some situations (although not under the facts of Kaplan) 
“the arbitrability question itself” might be submitted to arbitration.303  In such a situation, 
the courts must defer (“give considerable leeway”) to arbitrators' decisions on the limits 
of their own jurisdiction.  However, the burden of showing that a non-signatory intended 
to arbitrate remained with the party seeking arbitration.304  
 The dictum’s critical language (which in some situations may eclipse the holding 
of the case) reads as follows: 
If [the parties agreed to submit arbitrability to arbitration] then the court's 
standard for reviewing the arbitrator's decision about the matter should not differ 
from the standard courts apply when they review any other matter that the parties 
have agreed to arbitrate.... That is to say, the court should give considerable 
leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow 
circumstances.305 
                                                                                                                                                 
bound by the arbitration agreement, and therefore had reversed the district court 
confirmation of the award against them. 
303 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
304  In the United States, given the absence of any federal common law, the bindingness 
of an arbitration clause would be a matter for state law principles.  
 305 For the proposition that arbitrability can be submitted to arbitrators, the Court cited to 
alleged authority in labor arbitration: A T & T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) and Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574, 
583, n. 7 (1960).  Invocation of these labor cases must be approached with caution.  In 
the United States, the statutory basis for labor arbitration lies in section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947 (commonly called the “Taft-Hartley Act”) rather than 
the Federal Arbitration Act. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).  
Admittedly, the law under the FAA and the LMRA has seen a convergence, with courts 
routinely citing cases decided under one statute in connection with another.  Neither of 
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 Given the longevity of Supreme Court dictum in the field of arbitration,306 its 
teaching on “the arbitrability question” can be expected to weigh heavily on the future 
allocation of functions between courts and arbitrators.  At the least, the dictum now 
requires judges to ask not only whether arbitrators exceeded their powers, but also 
whether the arbitrators were given authority to decide a jurisdictional matter in a way 
deserving deference.307   
3. Possible Applications of the Dictum 
a) Multiple Contexts of “Arbitrability” 
 The dictum may in some instances lend itself to mischief if applied by courts 
seeking to reduce their workload.  Situations will certainly exist in which parties might 
agree to submit a particular question to binding arbitration, even though that question 
would normally be characterized as jurisdictional.  However, awards may still be 
reviewed for excess of authority under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  At 
some point in any chain of agreements, a consensual basis must exist for arbitral 
authority over those questions.  
 One difficulty with the dictum is that the term “arbitrability” can cover so many 
                                                                                                                                                 
the two cited cases actually found an agreement to arbitrate the question of arbitrability.  
In AT&T Technologies the Court held that the lower court’s decision to allow the 
arbitrator to decide arbitrability was error.  Warrior & Gulf said that “it is clear…in this 
case [that] the question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide.”  363 U.S.583, n. 7.   
306 See e.g., the Court's obscure pronouncement on arbitrator "manifest disregard" of the 
law in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which has continued to be invoked long after 
the holding in the case was overruled. 
307  See e.g. PaineWebber v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).  For an early expression of 
scholarly concern over the potential for confusion, see Thomas Carbonneau, Beyond the 
Trilogies:  A New Bill of Rights and Law Practice Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 
AM. REV. INT'L. ARB. 1 (1995).  See also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACITCE OF ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2002), at 20-21 
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different matters:  whether a person ever agreed to arbitrate at all; the scope of an 
admittedly valid arbitration clause; and public policy limits on what arbitrators can and 
cannot decide.  Only the second of those issues (scope of the parties' agreement) would 
normally be capable of delegation to arbitrators in a single agreement.  The third category 
(public policy) would never be capable of delegation.   
b) Existence of Arbitration Clause 
 Perhaps the most serious challenge to the dictum arises in connection when a 
respondent in an arbitration asserts that it never agreed to arbitrate, or a respondent in a 
judicial action claims the benefit of an arbitration clause.  Delegation of jurisdictional 
authority on that question would normally require a separate agreement.  A contract 
clause purporting to give arbitrators power to determine their own authority does not, in 
itself, insulate from judicial review a decision to add a party that never agreed to 
arbitrate.308  The mere narration or recital of the arbitrator's power on a printed form 
cannot be confused with a genuine grant of authority.   
 The suggestion that arbitrators can determine their own jurisdiction with respect 
to the identity of the parties, without a separate agreement submitting that question to 
arbitration, brings to mind the picture of Baron Münchhausen pulling himself up by his 
own pigtail.  In many cases such a principle will assume the very proposition (arbitral 
jurisdiction) that remains to be proven.  In the absence of an arbitration agreement 
accepted by the person alleged to be bound with respect to the dispute in question, the 
                                                 
308  In some instances, of course, a person who did agree to arbitrate may be required, by 
the terms of the contract or agreed-upon arbitration rules, to accept joinder of a third 
party.  See LCIA Rule 22.1(h), allowing a willing third party to be joined to a proceeding 
notwithstanding the objection of one of the existing litigants.  In such a case, however, 
the objecting party has accepted the process for joinder by contracting for application of 
the LCIA Rules. 
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person rendering the award would seem better characterized as a vigilante, intermeddler 
or imposter. 
 This does not mean that a contract may never be interpreted as giving the 
arbitrator power to determine whether a particular person agreed to arbitrate at all.  
Rather, such agreements must be truly distinct from, and chronologically subsequent to, 
the alleged principal agreement.  For example, a buyer might sign a purchase contract 
with a seller corporation.  When a dispute arises, the seller might allege that an arbitration 
clause in the contract bound not only the seller corporation, but also its parent entity.  Or, 
the seller’s parent might claim the benefit of the arbitration clause in attempting to avoid 
a court action brought against the parent by the seller.  The theory might be advanced that 
the subsidiary had contracted as agent for the parent, or that the parent was the alter ego 
of the subsidiary.   
 After a dispute arises, nothing would prevent the parent from agreeing to ask an 
arbitrator to determine whether it was in fact bound by the arbitration clause.  The arbitral 
tribunal to whose authority the parent has consented under the second agreement would 
be convened to determine whether the parent bound itself under the first agreement.  In 
such a case, an arbitral tribunal so constituted would do no more than decide the merits of 
a question of fact and/or law about whether the initial agreement empowered the 
arbitrator to the extent asserted.309   
                                                 
309 This is exactly what happened in Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan 
Ministry of Food & Agriculture (The Emmanuel Colocotronis No. 2), [1982], 1 W.L.R. 
1096, 1 All E. R. 578.  Buyers of wheat at first refused to arbitrate a dispute with the 
shipper over demurrage, on the theory that the arbitration clause in the charter party had 
not been incorporated in the bill of lading which by the charter party's  terms was to 
“supersede”the charter party.  The parties submitted to ad hoc arbitration the question of 
whether the arbitration clause had been incorporated into the bill of lading. 
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c) Scope 
 Questions related to the scope of an arbitration clause lend themselves more easily 
to application of the “arbitrability question” dictum.  Depending on the facts and 
circumstances evidencing the parties’ intent, an arbitration agreement might permit 
arbitrators to decide what controverted questions are covered by the clause, or to interpret 
the extent of their powers.   
 Not all contract terms, however, lend themselves to such final interpretation by 
arbitrators.  For instance, courts presumably would not accept an arbitrator’s erroneous 
finding that a contracting party named Alpha Corporation really referred to Omega 
Limited when the two entities were in fact completely unrelated to one another.  An 
arbitrator’s construction of contract terms cannot change the parties’ identity.310 
4. Broad and “Open Ended” Clauses 
 In practice, courts often address jurisdictional questions by reference to the nature 
of the arbitration clause itself.  A “broad” arbitration clause will be seen as evidence of an 
intent to submit many (albeit not all) jurisdictional questions to the arbitrator.  Such 
expansive, widely-drafted clauses often talk about “all controversies, disputes and 
questions” that might be “related to or arising out of” the parties’ agreement.311   
 While many contracts do contain such broadly drafted clauses, they are not 
universal.312  On occasion, the parties may submit to arbitration only a single narrow 
                                                 
310  See discussion of the Scalia opinion in Pacificare. 
311  See e.g., Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgt,. 371 F. Supp. 2d 571 (SDNY 
2005); Ryan Beck & Co. v. Fakih, 268 F. Supp. 2d 210 (EDNY 2003).   
312 For an example of a narrow clause, see Bristol-Myers Squibb v. SR International 
Business Insurance Co. Ltd., 354 F.Supp.2d 499 (SDNY 2005), which held that an 
arbitration clause making reference to “any dispute or difference arising under” the 
insurance policy did not cover fraud.  The insurer sought to rescind policies and the 
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question of fact, reserving the rest of the dispute to the competent courts.313  
Consequently, scholars, judges and policy-makers must be careful about presuming their 
own conclusion on what arbitration clauses do and do not cover.  
 In disputes where challenges to an arbitrator’s jurisdiction do not implicate the 
existence of the arbitration clause, intriguing questions arise with respect to broadly 
drafted clauses that might give arbitrators absolute power to determine their own 
jurisdiction.  Such “open-ended” clauses might cover “all disputes ever arising between 
the parties” and would not include the typical language requiring that arbitration arise 
from or be related to a particular contractual relationship.  A related problem might 
derive from a master agreement subject to an arbitration provision, followed by several 
more limited contracts that do not themselves contain arbitration clauses. 
 While such open-ended language would reduce the prospect of judicial second 
                                                                                                                                                 
policyholder sought a declaratory judgment that the question of fraud was outside the 
scope of the arbitration.  The court felt bound by the earlier precedent of In Re Kinoshita, 
287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961), which while out of step with modern law stilled controlled 
on narrow facts.  For a case distinguishing Kinoshita (rightly or wrongly) see S.A. 
Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984)(words 
“whenever any question or dispute shall arise or occur under” the agreement held broad 
enough to include claims of fraudulent inducement to contract). Compare Louis Dreyfus 
Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir.2001).  ACE 
Capital Re Overseas Ltd. v. Central United Life Insurance Co. 307 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.2002). 
313 See e.g., CIT Project Finance v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 799 NYS2d 159, 2004 WL 
2941331 (2004), holding that arbitrators may not grant attorneys’ fees.  The court reached 
this somewhat surprising conclusion notwithstanding Article 31 of the AAA International 
Rules, which provides that arbitrators to follow the European “loser pays” practice of 
awarding “reasonable costs for legal representation of a successful party”.  The court 
relied on N.Y. CPLR § 7513, permitting an award of attorneys’ fees only if provided in 
the parties’ agreement.  The arbitration clause at issue gave the arbitrators power only 
over a specific issue of fact, reserving most of the dispute to courts.  By contrast, when 
the contract contains a broad clause, courts allow arbitrators to address the parties’ intent 
on legal frees.  See PaineWebber v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996); Shaw Group v. 
Triplefine International Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2nd Cir. 2003); Stone & Webster v. 
Triplefine International Corp., 118 Fed.Appx. 546 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 124 
guessing of the arbitrator, the situation would not always be problem-free. Imagine that a 
university president asks a lawyer to represent his wayward child in litigation arising out 
of an auto accident.  A retainer agreement signed by the president includes an arbitration 
clause stating that the arbitral tribunal will have power to decide questions relating to its 
own jurisdiction.  After a dispute about the number of hours spent on the accident case is 
referred to a properly constituted arbitral tribunal, the lawyer (who is also an adjunct 
member of the university's law faculty) includes in her submission to the arbitrator a 
claim for a substantial salary increase for the course she teaches.  Must a judge defer to 
an arbitral tribunal's decision to hear the salary claim as well as the retainer 
disagreement?  Normally one would think not, at least if the president was contracting in 
a personal capacity (as parent) rather than as an academic administrator.   
5. Judicial Deference toward Contract Recitals 
 Even before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in First Options v. Kaplan, some 
American judicial decisions gave evidence of deference to contract recitations which 
suggested (either explicitly or by reference to arbitration rules) that arbitrators were able 
to rule in a final and binding way on their own jurisdiction.314  One problematic example 
can be seen in the decision by the Court of Appeals in Apollo Computer v. Berg.315   
 A contract between a Massachusetts computer company and a Swedish distributor 
was terminated and the rights of the bankrupt Swedish distributor were assigned to a third 
party.  The Massachusetts company claimed that the non-assignment clause in the 
                                                 
314  Instances in labor arbitration have already been mentioned.  See A T & T 
Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986), discussed infra.   
315  886 F. 2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989), at 473. See also sequel to Apollo in Hewlett Packard, 
Inc. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995), vacating a confirmation order and remanding for 
further proceedings the award confirmed in 867 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Mass. 1994).  Similar 
questions were discussed in S.G.S. v. Raytheon, 643 F. 2d. 863 (1st Cir. 1981). 
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contract covered the arbitration clause itself, which became void as a consequence of the 
assignment.   
 The court held that the arbitrators' jurisdiction over the claims was a question for 
arbitrators themselves to decide.  The arbitral tribunal was appointed pursuant to the 
Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which calls for the ICC to 
refer to the arbitrators any objections to the validity of an arbitration agreement, as long 
as the ICC is prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement may exist.316 On this basis 
the American court reasoned that the parties had agreed to submit the arbitrability 
question to the arbitrators.   
 On closer examination the reasoning in Apollo might reveal itself as an exercise in 
presuming a conclusion.  The problem is not that the parties lacked the power, as a matter 
of contract law, to submit the jurisdictional question to arbitration.  Rather, it is simply 
not certain that they actually did so. 
 If a full examination of the facts reveals that the arbitration agreement was in fact 
automatically terminated by the assignment, then ICC Arbitration Rules become relevant.  
This would be relatively evident had the arbitration clause contained a proviso, typed in 
large bold letters, to the effect that “The Arbitration clause is void after assignment”.  In 
such circumstances, it is hard to imagine that any arbitrators could accord themselves 
jurisdiction in a final and binding way.  A similar result would seem to obtain if the 
parties’ had evidenced their intent through selection of an applicable law that yielded the 
same result. 
                                                 
316  ICC Rules, Article 6(2) (1998 Version).  At the time, the applicable rule was found in 
Article 8, and referred to the “prima facie existence” of the arbitration agreement, rather 
than the ICC Court being prima facie satisfied.   
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 A better approach might have been simply to make a finding about the effect of 
the assignment under Massachusetts law, which seemed to provide that a general non-
assignment clause bars the delegation of duties, but not the assignment of rights, 
including the right to arbitrate.  Indeed, such was the approach of the federal district court 
in this case.317  For better or for worse, the Court of Appeals refused to address the issue, 
instead resting its decision on the principle that the effect of the assignment was a 
question for the arbitrators. 
 For a private arbitral institution like the International Chamber of Commerce to 
leave the difficult issues to the arbitrator may be acceptable as an efficiency device if 
national courts later exercise a fuller control over the clause's validity.318  However, the 
aggregate social and economic consequences of such a prima facie approach are likely to 
be less acceptable when a judge imposes state power to enforce an arbitral award without 
an independent examination of the authenticity and scope of the alleged arbitration 
agreement.  The result may well be a loss of confidence by the business community in 
both the arbitral system and the judiciary that enforces arbitration agreements and 
awards. 
6. Amplifying First Options in Subsequent Case Law 
 Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court provide a perspective on 
how American jurisdictional methodology plays itself out in practice.  The following two 
                                                 
317  886 F. 2d at 407.  For a general discussion of the assignment of rights under 
UNICROIT principles, see Wolfgang Wiegant & Corinne Zellweger-Gutknecht, 
Assignment, in UNICROIT PRINCIPLES:  NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS 27 
(ICC Bulletin, Court of Arbitration, 2005 Special Supplement). 
318  Even for arbitral institutions, however, this approach may not be free from problems.  
An arbitration agreement with a forged signature, or a real signature forced by a gun at 
the head, ought to be no less a complete nullity because it gives the appearance of being 
valid.  
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cases, Howsam and Bazzle, address which threshold preconditions for arbitration are to 
be determined by judges and which are for arbitrators.319   
a) Time Limits 
 Securities arbitration has been a particularly fruitful ground for jurisdictional 
conflict with respect to time limits.  The investor generally tells of a “nest egg” lost due 
to a financial adviser’s misconduct, with golden retirement years turned into a financially 
harsh old age due to unsuitable investments.  The adviser, of course, replies that the 
customer was well aware of the risks and pushed hard for aggressive growth stocks.320 
 The reason time bars are so frequently invoked in brokerage disputes is that the 
investor is a bit like a casino gambler:  happy when winning, but likely to complain in the 
event of a loss.321  If stock rises in value, there would be no loss, and thus no grumbling 
that the investment advice was “unsuitable.”  Only when things later go sour will the 
broker be accused of misbehavior, even though the purchase of securities might be many 
                                                 
319  See generally William W. Park, The Contours of Arbitral Jurisdiction:  Who Decides 
What?, 3 INT’L ARB. NEWS 2 (ABA, Summer 2003), reprinted in 18 INT’L ARB. REP. 21 
(August 2003).  A third Supreme Court opinion in Pacificare Health Systems v. Book is 
often discussed in connection with Howsam and Bazzle.  In a puzzling footnote the Court 
stated that the question at issue was “not a question of arbitrability.”  538 U.S. 407 at n.2. 
(Emphasis added.)  In light of its somewhat different rationale (courts wait to see how the 
arbitrators will decide) Pacificare has been discussed earlier, along with Lesotho 
Highlands, in relation to the impact of contract interpretation on arbitral jurisdiction.   
320  The so-called “Seven Deadly Sins” of securities transactions are hardly as exciting as 
the classic offenses: lust, gluttony, sloth, anger, envy, pride and greed – although the last 
of these often plays a role in broker misbehavior.  The catalogue of common 
transgressions includes (i) churning, (ii) unauthorized trading, (iii) unsuitable trading, (iv) 
intentional misrepresentation, (v) broker ignorance, (vi) misappropriation and 
(vii) outside business activities of the employee relating to investment marketing that is 
attributed to the employer.  See David E. Robbins, Seven Deadly Sins that Lead to 
Arbitration Disaster, 820 PLI/Corp 489, Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series (July-August 1993).   
321  While the investment in Howsam had occurred sometime between the account 
opening in 1986 and its closing in 1994, the arbitration was begun only in 1997. 
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years in the past.322   
 For decades, the question of what jurisdictional determinations could be made by 
an arbitrator was moot, since the basic distrust of arbitrators (the foxes who would guard 
the chicken coop) generally meant there was no arbitration of securities transactions.  
Except in international cases,323 courts traditionally refused to enforce arbitration clauses 
that implicated either the 1933 Securities Act or the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.324  
Interpreting these two pieces of legislation was considered too important for the private 
sector.  Therefore, since most investment portfolios contain stocks and bonds, accusations 
of misfeasance by financial advisers generally ended up in court. 
 In 1989 the situation changed due to liberalization of limits on subject matter 
arbitrability by the U.S. Supreme Court.325  In part the attitude shift may have been due to 
the SEC playing a more active role in supervising the self-regulatory organizations (such 
as the National Association of Securities Dealers), under whose auspices securities 
arbitration proceeded.  And in part the change in attitude might have been related to the 
perceived need to relieve congestion in judicial dockets. 
 In any event, the result was a wholesale adoption of arbitration by the securities 
                                                 
322  One recalls the vignette from the 1942 movie Casablanca, starring Humphrey Bogart 
and Ingrid Bergman.  The French police captain, played by Claude Rains, closed down 
Rick’s Café because he was “shocked” to find gambling going on – all the while being 
quite happy to take his winnings.  
323  See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (securities disputes arbitrable 
in a German-American contract at a time when prohibited in a domestic contract). 
324  See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled in Shearson/American Express v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (fraud claims under Exchange Act §10b). Ironically, 
Wilko has lived on in its dictum which posited “manifest disregard of the law” as an 
extra-statutory ground for judicial review. 
325  See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989), 
concerning Securities Act §12(2) claims. 
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industry to a point where many securities law questions are no longer addressed by courts 
at all.  Much of the law has thus been frozen during the past dozen years, with few 
judicial precedents to fertilize legal development.  
 In Howsam v. Dean Witter326 the drama played itself out through an investment in 
limited partnerships whose performance proved unsatisfactory, causing the investor to 
allege broker misrepresentation of the investment’s quality.  The brokerage firm then 
filed suit in federal court requesting an injunction against the arbitration on the ground 
that the original investment advice was more than six years old, and thus barred by the 
NASD “eligibility rule” requiring that any claim be brought within six years of the 
relevant occurrence.327  The Supreme Court gave the arbitrators a green light to 
determine whether their power to hear the case was affected by time limits contained in 
the arbitration rules.   
 Resolving a split among the circuits over who (judge or arbitrator) decides on 
“eligibility” requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court in Howsam held that time limits were 
for the arbitrator.  An opinion by Breyer paid lip service to the principle that judges 
would normally decide gateway jurisdictional matters unless the parties clearly provided 
otherwise.  However, the Court presumed (rightly or wrongly) the parties’ intent that the 
NASD Rules be construed by the arbitrators themselves, who were supposed to possess 
                                                 
326  537 U.S. 79 (2002).  The unanimous decision was written by Justice Breyer.  A 
concurrence by Justice Thomas rested solely on the basis that New York law (applicable 
to the contract in question) had held that time bars under the NASD Rules are for 
arbitrators to decide. 
327  NASD Code of Arbitration Section 10304 (formerly Rule 15), states that no dispute 
“shall be eligible for submission to arbitration …where six (6) years have elapsed from 
the occurrence or event giving rise to the … dispute.” 
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(according to the Court) special familiarity and expertise in interpreting these rules.328    
b) Class Actions 
 A plurality of the Court followed a similar line of reasoning in Green Tree 
Financial Corp v. Bazzle,329 which involved an attempt at class action arbitration of 
disputes arising from consumer loans used to purchase mobile homes and finance 
residential improvements.330  Once again, the Supreme Court punted the question to the 
arbitrator himself.331   
 In violation of South Carolina’s Consumer Protection Code, the lender allegedly 
neglected to give borrowers notice about the right to name their own lawyers and 
insurance agents.  Two groups of borrowers filed separate suits in the South Carolina 
state courts seeking class certification of their claims against the lender.  The first court 
certified the class and compelled class arbitration pursuant to the loan agreement’s 
                                                 
328  The court also noted that § 10324 of the NASD Rules (formerly Rule 35) gave 
arbitrators power to “interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under the 
[NASD] Code.”  For other cases on time limits, see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 
Exalon Industries, Inc., 138 F. 3d 426 (1st Cir. 1998) (time limits for challenging award 
do not apply when existence of an arbitration agreement is challenged).  But contra see 
MBNA America Bank v. Hart, 710 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 2006); MBNA America Bank v. 
Swartz, 2006 WL 1071523 (Del. Ch) (time bar for challenging clause).  
329  539 U.S. 444 (2003).  The interesting plurality decision split 4-1-3-1. Four Justices 
concluded that it was for the arbitrator to decide whether the contracts allowed class 
action arbitration.  One concurred in the judgment although he would have preferred to 
affirm the South Carolina decision that ordered arbitration to proceed as a class action.  
Three Justices dissented on the basis that any imposition of class-wide arbitration 
contravened the parties’ contract, and one dissented on the ground that the FAA should 
not apply in state courts.  
330  In federal court, class actions would be permitted under FRCP Rule 23.  Several 
arbitral institutions (including the American Arbitration Association) have established 
rules for class action arbitration patterned on these provisions.  
331  Commentary on this case includes Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waiver in 
Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 199 (2004); Bernard Hanotiau, A New Development 
in Complex Multiparty-Multicontract Proceedings: Classwide Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT’L 
39 (2004) 
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arbitration clause.  The second court initially denied the lender’s motion to compel 
arbitration, but was reversed and the case proceeded to arbitration before the same 
arbitrator.   
 After the arbitrator awarded the two classes $10.9 million and $9.2 million 
(respectively) plus attorney’s fees, the South Carolina Supreme Court consolidated the 
lender’s appeals and ruled that the relevant loan contracts permitted class actions in 
arbitration.332  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the state 
court holding was consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act.  The plurality opinion by 
Justice Breyer announced that the permissibility of class action arbitration was a matter 
of contract interpretation for the arbitrator, not the courts.  For Justice Breyer and his 
plurality, the question was “what kind of arbitration proceeding [had] the parties agreed 
to?”  If the contract is silent, the question was for the arbitrator, they said.333  The state 
court decision was vacated and remanded for further consideration.334  
 It is of course possible that litigants might agree to give an arbitrator broad power 
                                                 
332  The South Carolina Supreme Court had determined that the loan contracts were silent 
in respect of class action.  By contrast, on the U.S. Supreme Court the dissenting opinion 
by Justice Rehnquist found that that the contracts forbid class arbitration, while the 
opinion by Justice Breyer delivered for the Court essentially ducked the issue and held 
that it was for the arbitrator to determine whether the contract allowed class arbitration.  
333  With respect to the implications of silence, one is reminded of the playful 
comparisons of European legal systems.  In Germany, all which is not permitted is 
forbidden.  In France, all which is not forbidden is permitted.  To which some add that in 
Italy all which is forbidden is also permitted. 
334  A dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy) 
argued that any imposition of class-wide arbitration contravened the parties’ contract as a 
matter of law.  Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the Federal Arbitration Act 
should not apply in state courts.  Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but dissented 
from its reasoning.  Believing that the state court was correct as a matter of law that class 
action arbitration was permitted, Stevens would have affirmed the South Carolina 
decision.  However, to avoid the absence of any controlling majority (only three out of 
nine Justices agreed with Rehnquist) Stevens concurred with Breyer in the judgment. 
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to determine whether an arbitration clause includes the possibility of class action, as 
suggested by the Breyer opinion in Bazzle.  However, such a conclusion is by no means 
obvious from the language of the relevant contracts, each of which was accepted by an 
individual borrower and provided for an arbitrator to be selected for all disputes arising 
from “this contract” – a reference to the singular, not plural.  In commercial arbitration, 
the normal presumption has always been that parties agree to arbitrate with particular 
claimants or respondents, not with the whole world.  Prior to Bazzle, the FAA did not 
authorize forced joinder of different arbitrations arising out of related claims335 except as 
agreed by the parties336 or when conducted pursuant to a statute that explicitly so 
provides.337   
 In passing, one might ask to what extent the result in Bazzle was influence by the 
somewhat unusual language in the arbitration clause.  Arbitration was to resolve not only 
contract-related disputes claims or controversies, but also controversies arising from or 
relating to “the relationships that result from this contract.” 
 In one post-Bazzle case (on appeal as of this writing), a federal district court 
                                                 
335 See Government of U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1993) (denying 
consolidation of arbitrations with Boeing and Textron, Inc. relating to contract with the 
British Ministry of Defense to develop an electronic fuel system). 
336  As between the same parties, Article 4(6) of the ICC Rules permits the Court to join 
claims until the signing of the Terms of Reference.  Thereafter, addition of any new claim 
must be authorized by the arbitral tribunal.  Compare Article 22(h) of the Arbitration 
Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration, permitting the arbitral tribunal to 
allow third persons to be joined in an arbitration provided the third person has consented 
in writing to joinder. 
337 For example, Massachusetts Gen. Laws, c. 251, § 2A, calls for consolidation as 
provided in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which in Rule 42 permits joinder 
of actions “involving a common question of law or fact.”   New England Energy, Inc. v. 
Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) has held that a federal court sitting in 
Massachusetts may order consolidation of related arbitrations pursuant to state statute  
Compare California Code of Civil Procedure, § 1281.3.   
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vacated an arbitral award that had interpreted a maritime transport contract to include a 
class action stipulation.338  In finding “manifest disregard of the law” the court stressed 
both the maritime nature of the contracts (as to which expert testimony established a clear 
presumption against class actions) and the principle of New York law that when contracts 
are silent on an issue no agreement has been reached.339   
 As to the parties’ intent, the court might well have reached the right result.  Given 
the long tradition of non-consolidation for international maritime arbitration, something 
quite special would be needed to justify a determination that the litigants granted the 
arbitrators authority to create a class action process.340   
 Even if the court might have been correct on contract interpretation, it is by no 
means certain that the arbitrators’ mistake (if it was one) could be characterized as 
“manifest disregard” of law.  The job of interpreting the parties’ intent falls to the 
arbitrators.  This task, which implicates mixed questions of fact and law, as well as 
evaluation of industry custom and practice, has always been entrusted to the 
arbitrators.341 
 A new twist was added by a Court of Appeals decision arising from customer 
                                                 
338  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).     
339  Id.  387. 
340  In some instances (not applicable in Animalfeeds) a state statute might provide 
otherwise.  See New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 
1988), applying Massachusetts law.  On the law concerning consolidation before Bazzle, 
see United Kingdom v. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68 (1993), discussed supra. 
341 Perhaps the court believed the arbitrators to have concluded that Bazzle dictated an 
interpretation of the contract which favored class arbitration.  While this would indeed be 
a misreading of Bazzle, it seems more than unlikely that this particular panel (Gerald 
Aksen, Kenneth Feinberg and William Jentes) could have made that mistake.  The court 
itself seems to have misstated Bazzle, suggesting that the interpretation of the agreement 
was for the arbitrator only “in the first instance” rather than as a final matter.  Id. At 384. 
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disputes with a cable television provider.  Kristian v. Comcast Corp.342 held that a ban on 
class actions would invalidate the arbitration agreement,343 but for the possibility of 
severing the class action prohibition.  In an action for antitrust violations under both state 
and federal law, the Court applied a consumer protection rationale to conclude that the 
validity of the ban on arbitrability of the class action should be decided by courts rather 
than arbitrators.  The Court allowed the arbitration to proceed only after striking down 
and severing this prohibition. 
7. Consumer Transactions 
a) Legal Framework:  Justice Astbury’s Ghost 
Unlike most of Europe, the United States provides no statutory scheme of general 
application to protect the interests of ill-informed consumers and employees who may be 
dispatched by an arbitration clause to seek uncertain remedies at inaccessible locations. 
For the past eighty years, a venerable but antiquated federal arbitration statute has 
stubbornly resisted distinctions between business and consumer arbitration, and has pre-
empted state law that tried to protect the so-called little guy.   
 This does not mean, however, that courts cannot reach the same result 
(protecting consumer against abusive clauses) through ordinary contract principles.  On a 
case-by-case basis, doctrines such as “unconscionability”, “excessive cost” and 
“mutuality of remedy” have been pressed into service to safeguard the interests of weaker 
                                                 
342 2006 Westlaw 1028758 (1st Cir. 2006).  See also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 
113 P. 3d  1100 (2005), declaring a class action waiver to be unconscionable and Strand v. 
U.S. Bank N.A., 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005), upholding such waivers.    
343  The arbitration clause itself provided (in bold face capitals!) that “there shall be no 
right or authority for any claims to be arbitrated on a class action or consolidated basis.” 
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parties to adhesion contracts.344  Indeed, in one Alabama case the court found a loan 
agreement’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause in itself to indicate unconscionability.345  
To a large extent, this American exceptionalism finds its roots in yet another 
national idiosyncrasy:  the role of the civil jury in deciding contract claims, often 
beginning with a bias in favor of the consumer or employee (the proverbial “little guy”) 
against the manufacturers and employers.  Concerned about the lack of rationality in jury 
verdicts, the business community sees arbitration as a more reasonable alternative to 
court litigation.  This legal oddity has given to arbitration law in the United States an 
evolutionary path distinct from that of most of its trading partners.   
Resistance to reform has come largely from arbitration’s institutional 
establishment, which (perhaps understandably) perceives itself as providing a bulwark of 
adjudicatory evenhandedness.  The fear is often expressed that any move toward a more 
modern arbitration law might open a Pandora’s Box of upheaval, led by an unholy 
alliance of consumer advocates and plaintiffs’ lawyers who see arbitration as a scam to 
                                                 
344  See e.g. Kloss v. Jones (discussed infra); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 
889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2002) (limitation of damages and unilateral nature of the clause 
found unconscionable).  See also Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 927-36 (N.D. Cal. 
2002).  For a view questioning mainline consumer protectionist thought, see Stephen J. 
Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements – With Particular 
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006).  For a 
contrasting view, see Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration 
as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 17 (2003).  See 
generally, Edward Brunet, Richard Speidel, Jean Sternlight & Stephen Ware, 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006), Chapter 5 (Consumer 
Arbitration). 
345  American General Finance v. Branch, 793 So. 2d 738 (2001).  The in question 
provided, “Borrower and Lender further agree that all issues and disputes as to the 
arbitrability of claims must b of Such authority of the arbitrator to determine its [sic] own 
authority may also be resolved by the arbitrator”.  Id., 741.  Other indicia of 
unconscionability included the breadth of the arbitration clause (applicable to every 
dispute or controversy) and the lender’s exemption from arbitration in certain cases. 
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protect crooked finance companies and abusive bosses.346 
 The institutional establishment’s opposition to change brings to mind remarks 
attributed to Sir John Astbury, the English judge who declared the 1926 British General 
Strike to be illegal.  As mobs took to the streets and workers rioted throughout Britain, 
some political leaders talked of conciliation and change.  To which Astbury reportedly 
replied, “Reform? Reform? Are things not bad enough already?”347 
b) Jurisdiction in Credit and Securities Operations 
 For better or for worse, the absence of any federal consumer protection regime for 
arbitration has engendered reactions at the state level.  Two cases merit special attention, 
each one relating to a financial transaction in which the arbitration clause played a role in 
a scheme to take advantage of a relatively unsophisticated party.  
 One of the most creative efforts to protect weaker parties came out of Montana, 
which in Kloss v. Jones348 attempted to impose public policy limits on the entirety of an 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction.  In refusing to compel arbitration against a financial adviser 
accused of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, the Montana Supreme Court held the 
arbitration clause to be an impermissible attempt to waive basic rights guaranteed by the 
                                                 
346 See e.g., John M. Townsed, The Federal Arbitration Act is Too Important to Amend, 
4 INT’L ARB. NEWS 19 (ABA, Summer 2004). 
347  Attributed to Mr. Justice Astbury (1860-1939), who sat on the Chancery Bench from 
1913 to 1929, and was elevated to the Privy Council in 1929. 
348  310 Mont. 123, 54 P.3d 1 (2002), on reh’g 57 P.3d 41, cert. denied, 538 U.S. 956 
(2003).  For a rather harsh critique of Kloss, see Carroll E. Neesemann, Montana Court 
Continues its Hostility to Mandatory Arbitration, ABA DISPUTE RESOLUTION J. 22 
(February/April 2003), suggesting that the decision “makes the failure to read a provision 
(any provision, not just an arbitration clause) in an adhesion contract a complete defense 
to enforceability.”  Of course, in fact the Montana decision did not refer to “any 
provision” but concerned only waiver of constitutional rights not within the weaker 
party’s “reasonable expectation.”   
 137 
Montana constitution.   
 Kloss bears out the adage that “hard facts can make difficult law” – or at least 
problematic rules.  After a 95-year-old widow had been persuaded by her investment 
adviser to create a trust, the adviser proceeded to fund the trust by selling assets from her 
personal brokerage account.  When the widow’s nephew learned of the sell-off, he helped 
her begin litigation against the adviser for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and deceptive 
business practices.  The adviser invoked the arbitration clauses contained in the account-
opening documents, likely fearing a less than sympathetic hearing before a jury.  
 The Montana Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause involved a waiver 
of rights guaranteed by the Montana Constitution:  access to courts and trial by jury. The 
arbitration clause, contained in a contract of adhesion, had purported to waive these 
“sacred” and “inviolable” rights.349  This waiver was not within the weaker party’s 
“reasonable expectation” and thus was held to be unenforceable. 
 This avenue of attack is significant.  The state court addressed waiver of 
constitutional rights in general, rather than saying that an arbitration clause was per se 
unconscionable, thus running less risk of conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  
While the FAA implements a policy favorable to arbitration, it contains a significant 
(albeit unintended) escape hatch by providing that arbitration clauses are enforceable 
except “on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”350  
Since the United States has no general federal law of contracts,351 one must look to state 
                                                 
349  Id., Special Concurrence by Nelson, at paragraph 55.   
350  9 U.S.C. § 2.  
351  Sixty-five years ago in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the U.S. Supreme 
Court (attempting to prevent forum shopping between state and federal fora) stated, 
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law for the basic common law grounds for contract revocability.  
 Some states have attempted to push revocability beyond classic common law 
defenses such as fraud and duress, and occasionally impose special grounds for 
revocability of arbitration clauses, usually within the context of consumer or employee 
protection legislation.  Such legislation has been held invalid, however, to the extent the 
state targets arbitration for special burdens that would defeat the policy of the FAA.352   
In other words, a state might say that all contracts must be in capital letters, but could not 
say that only arbitration clauses must be in capital letters.353  
 Here we return to our nonagenarian widow in Montana.  When the court in Kloss 
v. Jones struck down the arbitration clause, it did not single out arbitration itself for 
attack.  Rather the court applied principles of law “generally applicable to all contracts” 
in order to protect citizens against waiver of constitutional rights.   Arguably, therefore, 
the refusal to enforce the arbitration clause did not run afoul of federal arbitration policy. 
Kloss serves as a reminder that an arbitrator’s power to address jurisdictional matters will 
be limited by public policy, which can always circumscribe the type of disputes that may 
be sent to arbitration. 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law 
to be applied in any case is the law of the state.” Id. at 78.  
352  For example, at one point Montana passed a law stating that an arbitration clause was 
revocable unless in capital letters and underlined.  See Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, 
517 U.S. 681 (1996).  Massachusetts also attempted (unsuccessfullly) a similar restriction 
on securities arbitration.  See Securities Industry Assoc. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st 
Cir. 1989).  For other attempts to rationalize the role of state arbitration law, see 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman, 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Allied-Bruce v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 
265 (1995); Volt v. Stanford, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).  
353  The U.S. Congress, however, can and has passed legislation limiting arbitration on 
behalf of special interst groups.  See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act, § 11028, Pub. 
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (enacted as 15 U.S.C. § 1226), sometimes known as the 
Bono Bill in recognition of its original sponsor the late Sonny Bono. 
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 A much less digestible decision recently came out of Kansas.  Although the state 
Supreme Court had its heart in the right place (if courts have hearts anywhere), the 
reasoning remains highly problematic as a guide for the adjudication of future cases.  
 In MBNA America Bank v. Credit,354 the Court vacated an arbitration award used 
to collect on a credit card debt of one Ms. Loretta K. Credit.  The Bank had been unable 
to produce an arbitration agreement, and reason existed to suspect that the arbitration 
service provider might have been showing a systematic sympathy to financial institutions 
inconsistent with the impartiality one expects of arbitral institutions.   
 To reach its decision, the Court need only have noted that the bank had provided 
no evidence of an agreement to arbitrate.  Unfortunately, however, the court added 
dictum stating, “When the existence of the [arbitration] agreement is challenged, the issue 
must be settled by a court before the arbitrator may proceed.”  The assertion has no 
foundation in logic, policy or law.355   
 While it would have been outrageous for the bank to have the award confirmed 
without producing the arbitration clause, a court can always address this matter at the 
award enforcement stage. Or, the question could be raised earlier, in the context of a 
motion to compel arbitration (by the bank) or to stay court proceedings (by the borrower). 
However, to require an arbitration to stop merely because arbitral jurisdiction has been 
challenged departs from the very fundamentals of sound arbitration law and practice.  
                                                 
354  281 Kan. 655 (2006), 132 P.3d 898 (2006).  To avoid reader confusion, it should be 
mentioned that “Credit” was the name of the individual borrower.  See generally 
Christopher Drahozal, Jurisdiction of Arbitrators to Decide Their Own Jurisdiction, 17 
WORLD ARBITRATION & MEDIATION REPORT 296 (September 2006).  
355 Had the court purported to apply a Kansas statute, the matter might have been less 
serious.  The Federal Arbitration Act, however, provided the applicable procedural law. 
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8. The Next Step 
 Where these cases leave us for the future is not entirely certain. The decisions in 
Howsam and Bazzle (like the decision in Pacificare discussed earlier) are plausible.  
However, the presumptions about the parties’ intent may not be self-evident.  If a case is 
not eligible for arbitration later than six years following the broker’s misbehavior, can 
one even speak of an “arbitrator” for an arbitration begun in the seventh year?  If a 
contract prohibits arbitrators from awarding the two-thirds part of treble damages that 
most people consider punitive, can arbitrators give themselves this power merely by 
saying that these damages are really compensatory?  If an agreement to arbitrate is 
intended to provide bilateral dispute resolution, can an arbitrator turn the proceedings into 
a multilateral process?  Do the cases presume their own conclusions and imply that 
arbitrators can create authority simply by defining contract terms that accord with the 
desired scope of arbitral power? 
 The heart of the jurisdictional dilemma is that language, while often ambiguous, is 
not infinitely plastic.  Some contract terms with a jurisdictional significance may well fall 
within the spectrum of matters the parties intended the arbitrator to interpret.  Others, 
however, do not.  Much depends on the precise context of the jurisdictional issues, which 
are increasingly (and unfortunately) called “arbitrability questions” in many decisions.356 
                                                 
356  American courts often use “arbitrability” interchangeably with “jurisdiction.”  This is 
regrettable, since it blurs useful distinctions between an arbitrator who may not hear a 
case because of the parties’ drafting choice, and an arbitrator lacking power because non-
waivable legal norms prohibit him to consider the disputed subject matter.  It is true that 
when arbitrators lack jurisdiction, a dispute is not arbitrable.  However, the term would be 
better reserved to instances where the subject matter of a dispute has been declared off 
limits by the relevant legal system.  In this sense, antitrust and securities disputes were 
traditionally non-arbitrable in the United States, and employment and consumer 
controversies remain non-arbitrable in many parts of Europe, at least under pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements. 
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 To illustrate, the Second Circuit has held that an ICC arbitrator may address 
claims for costs incurred in a court action allegedly brought in breach of an arbitration 
clause.357  This is hardly remarkable.  In reaching the conclusion that the parties 
bargained to arbitrate “questions of arbitrability,”358 the Court simply noted that the 
parties had signed a broad arbitration clause, which would be given effect under the ICC 
Rules.359  
 Let us change the facts a bit, however, and return to our earlier scenario about the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal by an improper appointing authority.  Imagine that a 
contract provides for arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, 
but the claimant files its request for arbitration with the International Chamber of 
Commerce, which it perceives as likely to appoint an arbitrator predisposed to claimant’s 
case.  It is difficult to see how an ICC arbitrator could render a final and binding award, 
absent modification of the parties’ agreement.360   
 Or, to invoke another example, let us envisage two merchants who agree to 
arbitrate disputes arising out of the sale of fruit.  The arbitrators might rule on whether 
“fruit” was used in the botanical sense (the contents of any developed seed plant ovary) 
                                                 
357  Shaw Group v. Triplefine International Corp, 322 F. 3d 115 (2d Cir. 2003); Stone & 
Webster v. Triplefine International Corp., 118 Fed.Appx. 546 (2d Cir. 2004).  The 
arbitration clause at issue covered disputes “concerning or arising out of [the parties’] 
Agreement.”   
358  Id. At 125.   
359  In light of the Court’s citation to Article 6(2) of the ICC Rules, there may have been 
some confusion in the court about the difference between the ICC Court and the 
arbitrators themselves.  The former has power only to make a preliminary (prima facie) 
determinations of jurisdiction, while the in-depth decisions are reserved for the arbitrator.   
360  The hypothetical is presented only by way of illustration, the author being well aware 
that the ICC’s excellent personnel and efficient internal controls would make such an 
attempt at fraud highly unlikely.   
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to include pecans as well as apples.361  However, it is not at all evident that a court, when 
asked to enforce an award or compel arbitration, should accept an arbitrator's 
determination that “fruit” includes typewriters. 
 The matter would not be so serious if the arbitrators’ jurisdictional decision was 
only preliminary, subject to a clearly understood right of post-award judicial review.  
Unfortunately, the recent Supreme Court decisions on arbitration do not make clear (at 
least to this author) that a second look by the judiciary is in all events guaranteed. 
 Much of the work in allocating tasks between courts and arbitrators will turn on 
characterization of the analytic task.  One formulation might ask, “May persons who call 
themselves arbitrators determine their jurisdiction free from judicial review?”  An 
affirmative answer would be conceptually problematic, implying that a piece of paper 
labeled “award” could be enforced without regard to the legitimate mission of the alleged 
arbitrator. 
 An alternate phraseology could pose the jurisdictional question differently: “By 
agreeing to arbitrate, did the parties intend to waive their right to have courts determine a 
particular jurisdictional precondition to arbitration (such as time bars) or a particular 
substantive question (such as liability for costs of litigation begun in breach of the 
                                                 
361  In this connection, one remembers a late 19th century customs case in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that in common parlance tomatoes were vegetables rather than fruit, 
and thus not free of import duty under a free list for “fruits,” but taxed at 10 % ad 
valorem under a tariff on “vegetables.”  See Nix  v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893). Justice 
Gray noted that “botanically speaking tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are 
cucumbers, squashes, beans and peas.”  However, in a breathtaking culinary excursion 
that makes one hungry just to read it, he continued that “in the common language of the 
people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables which are 
grown in kitchen gardens and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, 
carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery and lettuce, usually served at 
dinner in, with or after the soup, fish, or meats which constitute the principal part of the 
repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.”  Id.  
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arbitration agreement)?”  Answering the latter question would require a factual inquiry 
into the parties’ true intent.  In some instances the consent may reveal itself only through 
an explicit agreement.  In other circumstances, presumptions and inferences might 
suffice.  On this matter, considerable analytical toil remains.   
Conclusion:  Costs and Benefits  
 The principle known as Kompetenz-Kompetenz addresses a very narrow issue, 
albeit one of critical importance.  The question is not whether the arbitrator possesses 
authority to decide the merits of a particular matter, but who (judge or arbitrator) gets to 
answer that preliminary question.   
 Most legal systems seem to accept that arbitrators may rule on their own 
jurisdiction and continue the proceedings, provided no court of competent jurisdiction 
tells them to stop.  Far less consensus exists on the effect that an arbitrator’s jurisdictional 
ruling will have in court, when judges can be asked to vacate an award, to enjoin an 
arbitral proceeding or to hear a case notwithstanding an allegedly valid arbitration clause.  
For example, judges might be asked to vacate an award, or to declare an arbitration 
clause invalid before proceedings begin.   
 The various ways that different countries address the matter contain their own 
relative costs and benefits.  In all events, two issues lie in most challenges to an 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction: (i) the timing of judicial intervention to address questions related 
to arbitral jurisdiction; and (ii) the effect of any jurisdictional rulings that arbitrators 
might make. 
 The first inquiry concerns the moment for the judicial consideration of 
jurisdictional questions. Some point (or points) must be fixed in the arbitral process for 
courts to entertain motions concerning arbitral authority, with a view to preventing or to 
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correcting an excess of jurisdiction.  The second question relates to whether courts should 
ever defer, and if so in what circumstances, to arbitral determinations related to matters 
and parties subjected to arbitration.  The analysis is one of contract, with a focus on the 
basics of party intent. 
 On the matter of timing, there is much to commend the French rule, which leaves 
most judicial intervention until after the award, when the arbitrator’s decision is known.  
The “delayed review” principle limits opportunities for dilatory measures that might 
derail or sabotage an arbitration.  Moreover, postponing jurisdictional motions may 
preserve judicial resources.  Judges need not get involved if the case is settled or decided 
in a way acceptable to both sides.  If the case does not settle, judges may receive the 
benefit of an arbitrator’s discussion and findings on the jurisdictional questions, 
particularly for international cases where reasoned awards remain the norm.   
 The French rule has its cost, however.  A person who never agreed to arbitrate 
may need to hedge bets by taking part in a bogus arbitration, at substantial cost of time 
and money.  Herein lies the proverbial fly in the Gallic ointment:  innocent respondents 
must wait until the end of proceedings to challenge even the most obvious jurisdictional 
defects. 
 While frivolous attacks on arbitral authority are sometimes used as a delaying 
tactic, unwarranted arbitrations also pose their own risk.  Believing its chances better in 
arbitration than in court, a claimant playing hard ball might bring an arbitral proceeding 
with weak jurisdictional foundation, hoping for an easy win that will exert undue 
settlement pressure.    
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 Out of fairness, a rapid and summary mechanism should exist to permit courts to 
halt proceedings when the arbitration clause is manifestly void or clearly against public 
policy.362  Without some evidence of a valid arbitration agreement, the respondent’s 
burden of costly hearings (a possible default award being the only alternative) usually 
outweighs any societal benefit from reducing dilatory tactics in other cases.  An 
arbitration would go forward only if a court has been prima facie satisfied of the validity 
and application of the arbitration clause (no forgery or gun at the head during signing), 
subject to more extensive review at the award stage.363 
 Such a process could be combined with greater use of court-imposed sanctions 
(monetary penalties) to discourage frivolous jurisdictional challenges, an option 
increasingly considered by American judges frustrated with groundless motions to vacate 
awards.364  No good reason exists why, as a matter of policy, similar measure should not 
be available to moderate improper motions to compel litigation or to stay arbitration. 
                                                 
362  The suggestion here is for something equivalent to the summary process (examen 
sommaire / summarische Prüfung) of a Swiss court when asked to appoint an arbitrator.   
See LDIP, Article 179(3). 
363  For a somewhat contrasting view, see Pierre Mayer, L'Autonomie de l'arbitre dans 
l'appréciation de sa propre compétence, 217 RECUEIL DES COURS 320 (Académie de droit 
international de La Haye 1989), at 346, suggesting that courts seized of a case prior to 
commencement of arbitration should address jurisdiction fully, not limiting the review to 
determining if the clause is “manifestly” void.  Id., para. 15.  (On se demandera s’il est 
très logique pour le droit français d’obliger le juge étatique, saisi d’une demande au fond 
par une partie au mépris d’une convention d’arbitrage, à se déclarer incompétent sans 
pouvoir constater, sauf si elle est ‘manifeste’, la nullité de la convention.)  Professor 
Mayer takes a different view when the arbitration has already begun, expressing concern 
that the greater risk remains dilatory actions (Id., at 347, para. 17).   
364 Dominion Video v. Echo Star Satellite, 430 F. 3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2005) (sanctions 
imposed on party bringing baseless challenge to award confirmation); Harbert 
International v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006) (motion to vacate for 
“manifest disregard of the law” led to stern warning that the court was “ready, willing and 
able” to impose sanctions on parties who “attempt to salvage arbitration losses through 
litigation that has no sound basis in the law applicable to arbitration awards.”); CUNA 
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 Addressing the second matter (judicial deference to arbitrators’ rulings on their 
own authority) calls for considerable nuance and balance. In considering what to do with 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses, legal system must navigate between two extremes.  One 
is a lack of judicial rigor in examining the validity of such agreements.  The other is a 
blanket over-inclusive rejection of all such clauses, no matter how clearly the evidence 
might support their validity in a given factual context. 
 Alleged grants of jurisdictional power to arbitrators must be considered with 
caution.  A danger always exists that judges lacking analytic rigor will be tempted to 
clear their dockets through sloppy interpretation of the parties’ intent, thereby denying 
one side its day in court.  Arbitrators should never be given jurisdiction on the basis of a 
mere contract recital (such as “the arbitrator has jurisdiction over all questions”) without 
verifying the true consent of the party sought to be bound. Even the best of rules may be 
misunderstood.  Recitation of a “pro-arbitration” mantra often leads to cloudy thinking.  
Such potential misapplication must be considered in balancing the costs and the benefits 
of any legal rule.   
 That being said, the concern that contracts will be misinterpreted need not lead to 
a public policy that bans all forms of jurisdictional clauses in arbitration.  Legitimate 
bargains should not be trumped by fears of occasional abuse. From a commercial 
perspective, business managers may wish to reduce the prospect of judicial intervention 
(particularly for international transactions) by giving an arbitral tribunal the final say on a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mutual Insurance Society v. Office & Professional Employees Int’l Union, 443 F.3d 556 
(7th Cir. 2006) (warning that courts will not permit “spinning out the arbitral process 
unconscionably through the filing of meritless suits and appeals.”) 
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jurisdictional issue.  Respecting such agreements furthers fundamental respect for the 
parties’ legitimate expectations.   
 While not entirely free from doubt, the American cases are probably getting 
things more right than wrong.  While exceptions exist, judges in the United States seem 
to be asking the correct question:  what did the litigants actually agree to arbitrate?  On 
public policy issues, of course, arbitrators can never be empowered to make binding 
determinations.   
 Judicial review will in all events involve examination of the validity of the initial 
agreement, allegedly granting the arbitrators power on questions related to their authority.  
Such agreements will be most plausible when related to jurisdictional matters such as the 
time limits, scope of procedural powers and range of issues submitted to arbitration.  
 When one side challenges the very existence of an arbitration clause, the 
arbitrators’ authority does not always yield to routine presumptions.  Many cases present 
their own peculiar facts and issues.  Was the arbitration clause forged or signed with a 
gun at the head?  Did the corporate officer who executed the contract have power to 
commit the company?  With respect to such questions, arbitrators can make binding 
rulings only if the supervisory court has been satisfied of the parties’ informed and 
explicit consent (normally in the form of a distinct second agreement) to submit the 
precise jurisdictional question to arbitrator.    
 In all these lines of inquiry, legal maxims and phrases on arbitral jurisdiction can 
facilitate analysis by communicating general norms quickly.  The expressions lose their 
value, however, if pressed into service with excessive formalism, or pursuant to the type 
of thoughtless mimicry that parrots perform.  When lawyers invoke contract recitals 
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divorced from context, much as wizards incant magic words, the result is a voodoo 
jurisprudence that has no place in a healthy legal framework for arbitration.  
 As in most areas of the law, the articulation of specific standards that work in 
practice will require thoughtful analysis by policy-makers and practitioners alike.  The 
goal of such efforts remains an arbitral system that gives effect to the parties’ legitimate 
expectations about what questions are subject to final and binding private adjudication. 
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Appendix:  Jurisdiction in Practice:  Selected Scenarios   
1. A claim against a “non-signatory” company365 might be brought on the basis of an 
arbitration clause signed by a corporate affiliate, either offensively (to reach assets of the 
corporate parent) or defensively (to permit a parent corporation to avoid jury trial), on 
theories such as agency (express or implied), alter ego, or piercing the corporate veil.366   
 
                                                 
365  The term “non-signatories” remains useful shorthand to describe persons whose 
relationship to the arbitration is unclear at first blush.  The term can be misleading, 
however, in its implication that a duty to arbitrate must derive from signed documents.  
Better taxonomy might classify such cases as involving “un-mentioned” parties.  
Unsigned arbitration agreements can be valid, inter alia under New York Convention 
Article II (exchanges of letters ), as well as agreements subject to the procedural law of 
countries that dispense with a signature requirement, including England (Arbitration Act 
of 1996 § 5) and the United States (FAA § 2, which refers only to a “written provision”).   
See generally, James M. Hosking, Non-Signatories and International Arbitration in the 
United States:  The Quest for Consent, 20 ARB. INT’L 289(2004). 
366 For theories used to bind “non-signatories” see Thomson-CSF v. American Arbitration 
Association, 64 F. 3d 773 (2d Cir. 1993).  See also Intergen v. Grina, 344 F. 3d 134 (1st 
Cir. 2003), in which Judge Selya noted the “abecedarian tenet that a party cannot be 
forced to arbitrate if it has not agreed to do so.”  Unlike many other cases involving 
corporate affiliates (where either claimant or respondent will have agreed to arbitrate), 
Intergen involved litigation between two parent entities, neither of which had signed an 
arbitration clause.  Compare Bridas v. Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2006), 
finding that government manipulation of an oil company made it the state’s alter ego. By 
contrast, in Sarhank v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005) the Court of Appeals 
decided that a parent should not answer for the obligations of its subsidiary pursuant to an 
arbitration clause signed by the latter.  Citing “customary expectations of experienced 
business persons” the Court vacated a decision recognizing the Egyptian award and 
remanded the case for a finding on whether, as a matter of fact, the parent’s actions or 
inactions had given the subsidiary apparent or actual authority to consent to arbitration on 
its behalf.  For reasons not fully explained, the Court assumed such determination would 
be made under “American contract law or the law of agency.”  Similarly, an English court 
rejected piercing the corporate veil in Republic of Kazakhstan v. Istil Group, 2006 WL 
1020597 (2006), [2006] EWHC 448 (Comm.) QBD, applying the 1996 Arbitration Act, § 
67, to vacate an award against Kazakhstan for lack of substantive jurisdiction.   For a 
related problem involving the overlap between the Russian Federation and the Russian 
Government, see Compagnie Noga v. Russian Federation, 361 F. 3d 676 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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2.  Assertions of  arbitral jurisdiction might invoke principles of estoppel.367 
 
3. A duty to arbitrate might be based on trade usage, absent an explicit agreement,368  
 
4. Corporate affiliates might be joined to an arbitration under what has been called 
“group of companies” doctrine.369 
 
5. An award might be rendered by an arbitral tribunal whose appointment contained 
irregularities.370 
 
6. An employer might assert the right to arbitrate on the basis of an “exchange” of 
letters, contested by the employee. 371 
                                                 
367  JML Industries v. Stolt-Nielsen, 387 F. 3d 263 (2d Cir. 2004).  Charterers brought 
anti-trust action against owners of “parcel tankers” used in chemical transport.  Owners 
permitted to invoke so-called “ASBATANKVOY” arbitration clause (used in 
affreightment of liquefied products) contained in charter contracts signed by owners' 
subsidiaries, given intertwining of issues to be resolved in arbitration and issues in 
agreements containing arbitration clause; Fluor Daniel Intercontinental  v. General 
Electric Co., 1999 WL 637236 (SDNY, 20 August 1999), invoking estoppel principles to 
hold that signatories of arbitration clauses were estopped from refusing to arbitrate with 
GE entities that sought to arbitrate issues intertwined with the contracts containing the 
arbitration clause;. In Re Vesta Insurance Group, Supreme Court of Texas No. 04-0141 
(17 March 2006) (dispute between insurance company and its agent; arbitration of 
tortious interference claims between signatory to arbitration agreement and affiliates of 
another signatory). 
368  See BGH, Urt. V. 3.12.1992, III ZR 30/91, discussed in 1993 DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 465 (commentary, Klaus Peter Berger) where the 
Bundesgerichtshof said that a duty to arbitrate might be implied through custom in the 
sheepskin trade.   
369  See Isover St. Gobain v. Dow Chemical France et al., ICC Case 4131 (1982), ICC 
COLLECTION OF ARBITRAL AWARDS, Volume I: 1974-85 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, 
eds., 1990), upheld by the Paris Cour d’appel, 21 October 1983, 1984 REV. ARB. 98; 
English language extracts in 9 ICCA YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 132 (1984).  
English law has rejected the “group of companies” doctrine, and requires evidence of 
agency before joinder of related companies.  See Peterson Farms Inc. v. C&M Farming 
Ltd., [2004] EWHC 121, [2004], 1 Lloyd’s Rep 603, 2004 WL 229138 (4 February 2004, 
Q.B. Div., Commercial Court). 
370 See Enclyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2003 WL 22881820 
(SDNY, December 2003).  The tribunal’s presiding arbitrator had been appointed by the 
Tribunal de commerce in Luxembourg, as provided in the arbitration clause.  However, 
this Luxembourg appointment was not preceded by an attempt to select a chairman by the 
party-nominated arbitrators, which was another requirement of the parties’ agreement. 
371 See Dynamo v. Ovechkin, 412 F. Supp 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2006), involving hockey 
prodigy Alexander Ovechkin who had played with the Dynamo Club in Moscow before 
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7. After an insurance company and its policyholder settle a dispute that had been subject 
to arbitration, they disagree on implementation of the settlement agreement.  Whether 
the arbitrator has power to decide the subsequent quarrel will depend on the terms of 
the settlement’s dispute resolution clause.372   
 
8. If a dispute among law partners is submitted to arbitration, does the arbitrator have 
authority to declare forfeiture of the withdrawing partner’s capital interest?373 
 
9. Does an arbitrator might lack jurisdiction because the matter has already been decided 
by another arbitral tribunal?374  When an arbitration clause gives rise to multiple 
arbitrations, will principles of res judicata and issue preclusion bar later arbitrators 
from deciding particular questions?375  
                                                                                                                                                 
signing with the Washington Capitals to play in the National Hockey League.  In the 
United States, the federal district court refused to recognize an award by the Arbitration 
Committee of the Russian Ice Hockey Federation that prohibited Ovechkin him for 
playing for the American team.  No arbitration agreement resulted from the Russian 
Club’s offer that failed to elicit any “matching letter” from the player. 
372  For example, arbitrators with power to decide controversies arising from one specific 
transaction would not necessarily have authority to decide disputes arising from a prior or 
subsequent commercial relationship between the same parties.   
373 See decision by Judge Mosk in O’Flaherty v. Belgum, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 286 (2004), holding that an arbitrator exceeded his authority (as granted in the 
partnership agreement) by declaring forfeitue of a withdrawing partner’s capital account. 
374 Determinations about res judicata and issue preclusion (what the French might call 
force de chose jugée and opposabilité and the Germans Rechtskraft) do not yield to facile 
analysis.  In the real world, difficult factual nuances often arise with respect to (i) identity 
of parties and (ii) identity of action, both prerequisites to preclusion.  On the one hand, a 
losing party should not be permitted to begin another arbitration in the hope of getting a 
better result.  On the other hand, due process requires that one company should not be 
denied an opportunity to vindicate a claim simply because similar issues were litigated by 
another entity.  Particularly difficult issues arise when the same arbitration clause gives 
rise to multiple proceedings, or when in the middle of an arbitration one party sells a 
business unit that might later find itself seeking to assert related claims.  
375 For an example of multiple arbitrations arising from a single clause, see Admart AG v. 
Stephen & Mary Birch Foundation, 457 F. 3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006).  A court in the United 
States was asked to enforce an award rendered ten years earlier in a matter where a 
second arbitral tribunal was deciding questions related to the same parties and the same 
dispute, left open by the prior award.  In the initial arbitration, the buyer of an open air art 
exhibition was denied the right to rescind the purchase.  The second tribunal was asked to 
ascertain alleged damage to the purchased art works, which damage would have reduced 
the price ultimately borne by the buyer.  Determining damage, however, implicated an 
examination of the art work which the first award had purported to preclude, at least as a 
precondition to payment of the price.  
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10. A breach of contract action asserts recovery of punitive damages.  The arbitrator’s 
power to include a non-compensatory element in the award could depend on the 
terms of the parties’ agreement,376 the applicable law377 or a combination of both as 
seen through the lens of the applicable institutional arbitration rules.378  The same 
might be said of claims for compound interest or for an award denominated in a 
currency other than the one of the controverted transaction.379 
 
11. If a court in Country X has already begun to hear a matter when an arbitration begins 
in Country Y, does the arbitral tribunal have the authority proceed?  Or do notions of 
lis pendens require the work to be suspended.380  
 
12. Is an arbitrator deprived of authority because the stronger party, in order to maximize 
its litigation options,381 has imposed an arbitration clause that binds one side only to 
arbitrate?382  What role does “mutuality of remedy” play in arbitral jurisdiction?383   
                                                 
376  See Pacificare Health Systems v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2002). 
377  Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995), interpreting the New 
York state rule in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976). 
378  The AAA International Arbitration Rules exclude punitive damages unless the 
applicable statutes “requires” that the compensatory damages be increased in a specified 
manner.  Arguably, adoption of the AAA International Rules might be deemed a waiver of 
the right to request punitive damages in jurisdictions that permit parties to enter into such 
exclusions.  See e.g., Drywall Systems v. ZVI Construction , 435 Mass 664 (2002) 
(relating to the consumer protection provisions of M.G.L. Ch. 93A § 11), in which the 
court stated that “[p]arties who prefer to exclude multiple damage claims … from 
arbitration may do so by the terms of their agreement to arbitrate, or they may elect to 
waive them entirely.”  Id. At 671, n. 5.  In the instant case (a domestic construction 
dispute) no such waiver was found. 
379  Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43 (30 
June 2005). 
380  See Fomento de Construcciones y Contrats S.A. v. Colon Container Terminal S.A., 
Swiss Tribunal fédéral, 14 mai 2001 ( Ie  Cour Civile), BGE 127 III 279/ATF 127 III 279; 
discussed supra. 
381 From the perspective of litigation strategy, an institution would normally want to 
reserve an option either to elect arbitration or to go to court.  A unilateral right permits 
significant flexibility with respect to hard-to-forecast elements such as whether extensive 
document discovery (available in court to a greater extent than in arbitration) will be 
beneficial in a particular dispute.    
382 See Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F. 3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002) (arbitration clause 
“unconscionable” for “unilaterally” forcing employee to arbitrate). By contrast, when 
employees and consumers (rather than employers and manufacturers) benefit from a right 
to opt-out of arbitration (through signing a form within thirty days of being hired), 
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13. If arbitrators are asked to consolidate arbitration of claims arising from separate 
contracts or transactions, the power to do so may depend on what the parties’ 
agreement or the applicable arbitration rules say on the matter.384  A similar question 
may arise prior to the commencement of the proceedings, with courts asked to make a 
declaratory pronouncement about whether the arbitrators will have authority to 
consider the matter at all.385  Sometimes arbitration rules will address the matter, at 
least in part,386 but in most cases remain silent on the matter.387 
 
14. May an arbitrator award attorneys’ fees?  Does the answer depend on the applicable 
                                                                                                                                                 
arbitration obligations have been upheld. See Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F. 3d 1198 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Circuit City v. Najd, 294 F. 3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002). 
383 Some courts invoke the principle of “mutuality” (of remedy or of obligation) to 
invalidate arbitration agreements.  The theory is that if both parties are not bund, then 
neither is bound.  See Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (employer 
retained right to go to court). Other courts have enforced optional clauses.  See Pittalis v. 
Sherafettin [1986] 1 QB 868, [1986] (landlord/tenant rent review); Law Debenture Trust 
Corp. v. Elektrim, [2005] 1 All E.R. 476; 2005 WL 1630790; Sablosky v. Gordon, 73 
N.Y.2d 133, 138-39 (N.Y. 1989).  American financial institutions have used unilateral 
clauses to enhance litigation flexibility and reduce the prospect of what they perceive as 
biased jury proceedings.  See generally Willliam W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and 
Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 213, 251–253 (1998); William W. Park, 
Jurisdictional Issues in Financial Arbitration, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR OTTO SANDROCK ZUM 
70. GEBURTSTAG 745 (Klaus Peter Berger, ed. 2000).  
384  See Shaw's Supermarkets v. United Food, 321 F. 3d 251 (1st Cir. 2003), a union 
grievance arbitration (concerning whether union members should take leaves of absence 
when on a negotiation committee) in which arbitrators were given the right to consolidate 
three collective bargaining arbitrations brought by the same union.    
385  See Employers Insurance Company of Wausau v. Century Indemnity Company, 2006 
WL 851643 (7th Cir. 2006).  Allstate Insurance and Employers Insurance had entered into 
reinsurance contracts with Century Indemnity, which requested a consolidated arbitration 
of its claims against Employers and Allstate, as well as several other companies.  
Although holding that the question of consolidation was for the arbitrators, the Court of 
Appeals also determined that each side would appoint only one arbitrator, thus giving a 
substantial practical nudge to consolidation.  Had the Court ordered constitution of two or 
more tribunals, it would not have been self-evident which would have ceded its work to 
the other. 
386 See LCIA Rules 22.1(h). 
387  There may, of course, be institutional practices (ICC practice) or rules with respect to 
judicial consolidation.  See New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 
(1st Cir. 1988) (allowing consolidation under Massachusetts law).  Compare United 
Kingdom v. Boeing, 998 F. 2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1993) (consolidation denied).  
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law, the norms of the arbitral situs, arbitration rules, or some combination thereof?388 
 
15. Related to consolidation, arbitrators in the United States sometimes face the question 
of whether they are authorized to direct “class action” proceedings for similar claims 
arising that would normally yield individual recoveries too small to make arbitration 
economically viable.389 
 
16. Arbitration under investment treaties might raise the following jurisdictional 
issues.390   
 
• A foreign investor might bring an arbitration claiming indirect expropriation by a 
country whose courts allegedly denied the investor a fair trial.  In order for the 
arbitrators to hear the case, the alleged judicial misbehavior will need to fit within the 
definition of governmental “measures” covered by the relevant investment treaty.391   
 
                                                 
388 See e.g., CIT Project Finance v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 799 NYS2d 159, 2004 WL 
2941331 (2004), discussed supra, holding arbitrators without power to grant attorneys’ 
fees notwithstanding application of Article 31 of the AAA International Rules, which 
provides for “the reasonable costs for legal representation of a successful party”.  See 
also PaineWebber v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996); Shaw Group v. Triplefine Int’l 
Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2nd Cir. 2003); Stone & Webster v. Triplefine International Corp., 
118 Fed.Appx. 546 (2d Cir. 2004).  For another aspect of the problem of attorneys’ fees in 
arbitration, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee 
Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729 (2006)  
389  See Green Tree Financial v. Bazzle 539 U.S. 444 (2003) discussed supra.  A recent 
Court of Appeals decision held that a ban on class actions would invalidate the arbitration 
agreement but for the possibility of severing the class action prohibition.  See Kristian v. 
Comcast Corp, 2006 Westlaw 1028758 (1st Cir. 2006), an action for antitrust violations 
under both state and federal law arising from customers’ dispute with a cable television 
provider.  Under what might best be called a public policy (consumer protection) 
analysis, the decision concluded that the validity of the ban on arbitrability of the class 
actions should be decided by courts rather than arbitrators.  The Court struck down and 
severed the ban, and only then permitted arbitration to proceed.  See also Discover Bank 
v. Superior Court, 113 P. 3d  1100 (2005), declaring a class action waiver to be 
unconscionable and Strand v. U.S. Bank N.A., 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005), upholding 
such waivers.    
390  See generally, Pierre Lalive, Some Objections to Jurisdiction in Investor-State 
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY 
QUESTIONS 376 (2002 ICCA Congress, London).  Professor Lalive lists a half dozen 
categories for jurisdictional challenge in investor-state arbitration:  nationality, the nature 
of an “investment”, assignment, absence of prior “friendly negotiations”, non-exhaustion 
of local remedies, and a fork in the road between a local and international forum.  
391 Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Interim Award on 
Jurisdiction, 5 January 2001.    
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• A host state might bring a counterclaim against the foreign investor or a company 
related to the investor.  Would the arbitral tribunal constituted to hear the claim have 
authority to hear the counterclaim as well? 392 
 
• There might be an issue related to the nationality of the claimant.  Does the 
arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction to hear the claim when an investor possesses dual 
nationality, including citizenship in the host state?393  What is the arbitrator’s power 
when the surviving entity in an investor’s reorganization is incorporated in the host 
state?394   
 
• A host state might assert that the treaty’s definition of “investment” excludes 
certain categories of property (contract rights to build a factory), or requires that the 
original investor continue to hold shares of a company whose property was 
expropriated (rather than sell in order to mitigate damages).  Or there may be a 
question of whether the arbitrator’s jurisdiction covers disputes in which the state acts 
as a contracting party.395   
 
• A host state might assert that the treaty’s jurisdiction does not cover tax claims.396  
 
                                                 
392  Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction (UNCITRAL 
Rules, Netherlands-Czech BIT, 7 May 2004), rejecting jurisdiction over counterclaim 
without deciding on the relationship between claimant Saluka and another company of 
the Japanese merchant banking group (Nomura) with which it was affiliated.  
393  Decision on Jurisdiction in the case of Champion Trading Company, Ameritrade 
International Inc., James T. Wahba, John B. Wahba, Timothy T. Wahba v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt, Case No. ICSID ARB/02/9 (21 October 2003).  On nationality in investment 
arbitration, see generally, Robert Wisner and Nick Gallus, Nationality Requirements in 
Investor-State Arbitration, 5(6) J. WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE 927 (2004); Anthony 
Sinclair, Nationality of Individual Investors in ICSID Arbitration, [2004] INT. A.L.R. 191.  
See also decision in Wena Hotels v. Egypt, Award (2000) reproduced 41 I.L.M. 896 
(2002); Annulment Decision reproduced 41 I.L.M. 93 (2002).  In Sedelmayer v. Russia, a 
tribunal constituted under the German-Russian BIT addressed the question of whether the 
corporate veil should be pierced when investor and owner had different nationalities.  
394  The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/98/3, Final Award 26 June 2003. 
395  Sophie Lemaire, Treaty Claims et Contract Claims:  La Compétene du CIRDI à 
l’épreuve de la dualité de l’état, 2006 REV. ARB. 353 (2006). 
396  See e.g., Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Production Co. [ 2006] EWHC 345 
(English High Court), 2006 Westlaw 690585; UNCITRAL arbitration (LCIA 
Administered Case No. UN 3467), 1 July 2004 (Value Added Tax payments subject of 
investment dispute; taxpayer prevailed in arbitration).  For a case in which the taxpayer 
did not prevail see EnCana v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Final Award, 3 February 
2006; dissenting opinion by Horacio Grigera Naón). 
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17. An arbitral tribunal is asked to decide a dispute between a consumer and a 
manufacturer in different countries.  Two different arbitration statutes may be 
applicable.  One expressly prohibits arbitration of consumer disputes.  The other 
impliedly allows arbitration of cross-border contracts regardless of any consumer 
element.  The arbitrators’ power to hear the case will depend on which regime 
applies.397  
 
18. Do arbitrators have authority to decide a dispute on the basis of on the basis of an 
arbitration clause contained in Terms and Conditions of Sale appearing through a 
hyperlink on a manufacturers’ website shopping page?398   
 
19. Will a buyer of goods be bound to arbitrate on basis of an arbitration clause in a 
contract between a manufacturer and a distributor.399 
 
20.  The parties to a contract provide for arbitration in a particular city, but under non-
existent rules and without any identifiable appointing authority.  To what extent may 
an arbitral institution in the chosen local confer upon itself power to constitute a 
tribunal.400  
 
21. Does an arbitrator lack jurisdiction because the arbitration clause lacks 
                                                 
397 French Cour de cassation, May 21, 1997, Meglio v. Société V2000. Cass, 1e civ., May 
21, 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 537 (note Gaillard); see also Cass, 1e civ., May 21, 1997, 1998 
REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIVÉ 87 (note Heuzé). The Cour de cassation upheld the validity of 
an arbitration clause in an agreement for the purchase of a limited series Jaguar, finding 
that the contract implicated international commerce by virtue of a transfer of goods and 
funds between France and the United Kingdom. 
398  See Dell Computer Corp v. Union des Consommateurs & Olivier Dumoulin, Appeal 
to Supreme Court of Canada, S.C.C. File 31067, Leave to Appeal, 19 January 2006 
(Docket: 31067), 2006 CarswellQue 84, appeal from 2005 CarswellQue 3270, Cour 
d'appel du Québec, 2005.  
399  For an answer in the affirmative, see International Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen 
Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000), concerning sale of an 
industrial saw.  When the buyer sought to enforce guarantees and warranties contained in 
the contract between the manufacturer of the saw and one of its distributors, the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel precluded the buyer’s assertion that it was not bound by the 
arbitration clause in contract manufacturer –distributor agreement. 
400  See Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks GmbH v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2006), in 
which an arbitraton clause between a German company and a Delaware corporation 
provided only for “arbitration in the Hague under the International Arbitration rules.”  
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague found no agreement to apply the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules so as to permit the arbitration to go forward under its 
auspices.  A request to compel arbitration made to a court in the United States was 
subsequently dismissed.  
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consideration?401 
 
22. Arbitrators award monetary sanctions for one side’s failure to comply with discovery 
orders.  The award is challenged on the basis that the tribunal lacked authority to 
impose such a penalty.402 
                                                 
401  See Douglass v. Pflueger Hawaii, Inc., 135 P. 3d 129 (Hawaii 2006), holding that an 
arbitration clause failed for lack of “bilateral consideration” when included in an 
employee handbook which the employer could change at will. 
402  Superadio Ltd. Partnership v. Winstar Radio Productions, 446 Mass. 330, (2006), 
permitting arbitrators’ imposition of sanctions for violation of discovery orders.  In a case 
arising from an agency for sale of advertising on radio (each side accusing the other of 
failing to turn over advertising revenues), the court upheld the tribunal’s interpretation on 
the AAA rules, which in Rule 23(c) authorize arbitrators “to resolve any disputes 
concerning the exchange of information” As a matter of contract interpretation, the 
arbitral power to award sanctions may or may not be misplaced.  However, the court’s 
analytic methodology seems sound, in its attempt to discern what authority the parties 
granted the arbitrator.  For a contrasting perspective, see Philip J. O’Neill, The 
Arbitrator’s Power to Award Monetary Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, 60 DISPUTE RES. 
J. 60 (Nov. 2005/Jan. 2006); Update: Massachusetts Allows Arbitrators to Award $$ 
Sanctions to Remedy Discovery Abuse, 61 DISPUTE RES.. J. 8 (May-August 2006).  Mr. 
O’Neill suggests it might be best for American judges and arbitrators simply to look to 
institutional (AAA) interpretation of rules, rather than exercising independent judgment. 
Decided under Massachusetts Arbitration Act rather than the FAA, Superadio also 
refused to vacate the award on the ground that one side’s attorney was not admitted to 
practice in Massachusetts.   
